Introduction

International relations theories try to explain the mechanism of conflicts from various perspectives. Domestic issues are certainly considered as basic determinants of conflicts. However, external factors need to be integrated into the explanation of the evolution of domestic conflicts, because domestic issues are not isolated from external influences. In this sense, this article analyses the external factors of civil war in South Sudan which broke out in December 2013 from bilateral, regional, and international aspects. In addition, recent development of regional mediation is overviewed. In concrete, relations between Sudan and South Sudan is reviewed from bilateral aspect as crucial factor of South Sudanese politics. Then, hostility between Sudan and Uganda over South Sudan is described from regional aspect as significantly influential factor of shaping political landscape of South Sudan. From international aspect, attention is paid to contrasted involvements by the United States and China, and limited role played by the United Nations. Finally, support to the regional mediation mechanism assumed by Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is argued as a model case of the partnership of the regional initiative and wider international engagement for conflict resolution.

I. Backgrounds leading to the outbreak of civil war in 2013

Sudan has been inevitable and crucial factor for explaining the political dynamism of South Sudan including the period before its separation from Sudan. Thus, relations with Sudan are mainly overviewed in describing the backgrounds of civil war in South Sudan.

Sudan achieved independence from Anglo-Egyptian condominium in 1956. After the independence, the southern Sudanese people organized Sudan People’s Liberation Movement.
(SPLM) to resist the oppression by the Government of Sudan (GoS). Following the first Sudanese civil war from 1955 to 1972 between the northern region and the southern region which demanded more regional autonomy, Southern Sudan Autonomous Region was formed in 1972.

By 1981 GoS decided to implement Islamic law and to mandate Arabic in southern region where mostly Christians resided. In response to the dissolution of autonomy and increase of Islamic influences in southern region, John Garang de Mabior, a commander in the Sudanese Army, established Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) to liberate the southern people from GoS (Roach 2016: 1346).

After the second Sudanese civil war started in 1983, four distinct tribal groups allied, namely, Bahr al Ghazal Dinkas, the Ngok and Bor County Dinkas, the Nuer, and the Equatorians. On the other hand, other tribes such as the Shilluk were marginalized, which made them allied with the northern region during the civil war (Natsios 2015).

In 1991, Riek Machar and Lam Akol, commanders of SPLA, established their own Nuer-based factions, calling themselves SPLA-In-Opposition (SPLA-IO). This internal split against Dinka-based factions led by John Garang de Mabior showed fragile command structure of SPLA. To take advantages of the vulnerable internal politics of SPLA, GoS made efforts to deepen the internal split and distrust between Machar’s factions and Garang’s SPLA in the southern region by supporting Machar. However, by the summer 2001 tensions between Garang and Machar were mitigated and Machar was allowed to rejoin the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement / Army (SPLM/A) (Roach 2016: 1346).

The drastic change of the situations was brought by the involvement of the United States. Garang was able to unite most of the tribes in southern region in 2002 with strong pressure and support from George W. Bush Administration to end the North-South war in Sudan. This commitment by the United States is one reason the northern region finally began to negotiate seriously to end the civil war (Natsios 2015). GoS’s support for Islamic extremist groups committing terror attacks against European and American targets allowed Western countries, especially the United States, to perceive the southern region as the ally in the context of ‘war on terror’ (Ylönen 2014: 30-31), which pressed the United States to show firm stance towards the fragile situations of Sudan.

Garang negotiated the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with GoS and established the broad principles on the issues of self-determination for the people in southern region. This process was mediated by the Troika (the United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway), seeking compromises by both sides on issues including oil revenue sharing. The Troika took the full control over the negotiation process and excluded other IGAD members such as Ethiopia, Uganda and civil society actors, which created antipathy among them (Roach 2016: 1347).
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By the time of signing of the CPA in 2005, GoS mobilized tribally based militias to attack SPLA and destabilized the southern region. In response, SPLA had to broaden its ethnic base beyond the Bor County Dinkas which had dominated SPLA since 1983 (Natsios 2015).

Finally, on 9 January 2005, Sudan’s longstanding North-South war ended by the signing of the CPA by GoS and SPLM/A. The agreement ended Africa’s longest conflict that killed more than 2 million people. The war had its origin in the centralization of economic and political power in the northern region, whereas the peripheries, particularly, southern region remained severely marginalized. The North-South divide was further entrenched by the northern region being predominately Muslim and Arabic, whereas the southern region is predominantly Christian and African. The CPA fundamentally changed southern region as a political entity by granting the extensive autonomy and establishing the Autonomous Government of South Sudan (AGSS) as the prime ruling authority of the region.

At the end of North-South war, AGSS tried to absorb militias into SPLA. However, these militias were not successfully integrated into SPLA and remained loyal to their respective commanders. At the same time, the decades-long strategy of GoS was to divide and destabilize the southern region by supporting dissatisfied militia leaders and institutionalizing tribal conflicts. In fact, after Garang’s death in a helicopter crash in July 2005, SPLM was divided more prominently about the stance towards the North-South relations (Natsios 2015).

The CPA stipulated the provisions including the division of northern region from southern region, sharing of oil revenue, new political structure of AGSS, and a framework for the referendum on independence for the southern region. At the same time, the CPA also provided the dual option for AGSS either joining Sudan as an autonomous unit or seceding from Sudan. However, the CPA failed to offer an effective framework for addressing or instituting many of the core objectives (Roach 2016: 1345–1347). De Waal also provides his views on the CPA, arguing that the CPA contained unresolved questions whether it was a mechanism for national democracy or a stepping stone for the secession of the southern region. He also points out the ambiguity whether it was a means of broadening political participation or shaping power and wealth between the two signatory parties. Without clarification of these core issues, under Sudanese President Omar al Bashir and First Vice-President Salva Kiir, the implementation of the CPA became an exercise in zero sum competitive political game (de Waal 2014: 335).

In January 2011, the southern region achieved independence by a 98 percent vote in referendum and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) was established. After the independence, tensions resurfaced when South Sudanese President Kiir attempted to amend the transitional constitution in late 2011 and 2012 to strengthen his own control over the political process. These political behaviors showed how the governmental elites could use their power to isolate their rivals.

The civil war in South Sudan, which broke out in December 2013, originated in the power
struggle within SPLM in view of the elections planned for 2015. The situations of power struggles deteriorated in 2013. In mid-March 2013, Vice President Riek Machar criticized President Kiir openly and declared his intention to challenge for the leadership position of SPLM at SPLM’s third extraordinary national convention scheduled to be held in May 2013. Rebecca Nyandeng (Garang’s widow) and Pagan Amum (SPLM Secretary General) also showed their intention of running for political leadership. The tensions became more evident when President Kiir dismissed Vice President Machar and the cabinet members without any official reason in July 2013. However, those dismissed oppositions did not retire from politics, instead they continued to push for the internal processes within SPLM to oppose President Kiir. As countermeasures, President Kiir postponed the long-awaited National Liberation Council (NLC) meeting repeatedly. He also avoided the Political Bureau meeting, suspecting that he no longer held a majority and the meeting would result in an unpredictable outcome (Brosché and Höglung 2016: 76-77).

The tension culminated in December 2013. Broad coalition of internal opponents held the press conference on December 6 to openly criticize President Kiir. The opposition group took the name SPLM-IO led by Vice President Machar, and also included several influential politicians from various communities including Dinka tribe from which the President Kiir comes from. This broad coalition beyond ethnicity constituted severe threat to President Kiir.

In efforts to curtail the crisis, NLC was convened on 14 and 15 December. On the first day, the opposition group participated, but they abstained on the second day because of lack of conciliatory spirit of President Kiir. By 15 December, the tensions became high and finally fighting erupted after President Kiir tried to disarm presidential guards who are from Nuer communities and to arrest leaders of SPLM-IO, accusing them of an attempted coup. President Kiir opposed Vice President Machar’s ambition for power by dispatching troops into streets and offices to bring under control a suspected coup d’état by Machar (Roach 2016: 1349). This action provoked the massacre in Juba, capital city, and the violence spread across the country.

II. Analysis of External Factors

A. Bilateral aspect – Tangled relations between Sudan and South Sudan

The relations with Sudan are intricately intertwined in the politics of South Sudan, thus the dynamics with Sudan need to be looked into as a crucial external factor of civil war in South Sudan.

Following 2005 CPA, GoS kept connections with armed groups in the South and supported anti-government elements against AGSS, which was established by the CPA. In South Sudan, many southern militias are part of the anti-government armed opposition, while others made deals with GoSS before the outbreak of civil war. A history of tangled relations and competing interests of armed groups explain complexity of the conflicts in Sudan and South Sudan. As an
example, SPLA restarted the fight in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states, epicenter of Sudan’s national conflict in 2011. These forces joined Darfur rebel groups in 2011 to create Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), which is anti-Sudan coalition at the border area. In this way, most Sudanese rebels against GoS are allied to GoSS. They have been supported from South Sudan via neighboring Unity state, located at the border with Sudan, including the period before South Sudan’s independence (ICG 2015a).

After the secession from Sudan in July 2011 and before the outbreak of civil war in December 2013, South Sudan’s politics were very much affected by its relations with Sudan. International Crisis Group (ICG) points out armed groups, oil revenue arrangements, and border issue as three greatest challenges in the relations with Sudan. While some armed groups reconciled with their own governments, others continued armed insurgencies. GoS and GoSS used these armed groups to destabilize each other to gain strategic advantages. GoS accused GoSS of supporting the armed groups fighting against GoS, especially when Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement / Army-North (SPLM/A-N) and Darfur rebels formed SRF to fight against GoS jointly. When the civil war broke out in South Sudan, the Darfur rebels allied with GoSS and fought alongside with SPLA. On the other hand, GoS has supported anti-SPLA armed groups, led by Vice President Machar in South Sudan (ICG 2016a: 2–3).

The tension was also stretched out over oil revenues. Sudan lost three-quarters of its oil production capacity and half of its fiscal revenues due to secession of the South. At independence in 2011, GoSS informally agreed to pay transit fees to use Sudan’s pipeline. In January 2012, without final agreement, GoS began taking out oil at Port Sudan as an in-kind payment. GoSS took counter-measures of shutting down the oil production, and the tensions escalated into the bombing by GoS, targeting facilities near Bentiu, Unity State, located at the border with Sudan. In April 2012, SPLA occupied the Hejlij oil-production region, located at the border between South Kordofan state of Sudan and Unity State of South Sudan. The territorial sovereignty of Heglig is contested by both Sudan and South Sudan but administered by Sudan. SPLA withdrew from it under foreign pressure. This incident encouraged the September 2012 Cooperation Agreements to be concluded, which included restructuring the transit fees, stopping the supports for other’s rebels, and withdrawing their armed forces to a fourteen-mile Safe Demilitarized Border Zone, although these were implemented only partially. As such, Sudan–South Sudan relations are significant variable affecting the scale, scope and intensity of conflict in South Sudan (ICG 2016a: 4–6).

In any event, President Bashir of GoS and President Kiir of GoSS continue to meet and seek to preserve relations. However, at the same time, GoS is intent on defending its security interests by limiting SRF’s ties with GoSS and Uganda’s regional ambitions. Both GoS and its armed rebellion continued involvement in South Sudan’s civil war for the respective interests, and their interventions exacerbated the conflicts and undermined peace efforts. Uganda’s military
involvement also motivated the continued involvement of Sudan in the matters of South Sudan (ICG 2015a: 23–25).

In relation to Sudan, there are tensions in South Sudan between those who fought for independence from Sudan and those who sided with GoS during periods of the North-South war. These conflicts originate in splits in the rebel movement during the war, which caused fighting between South Sudanese rebel groups. After 2005 CPA, political structures of South Sudan have made the threat of violence a powerful tool for gaining concessions and influence. Particularly, elites are given prominent positions depending on how large a threat they constitute. When GoSS was installed at the time of independence, it was challenged by several armed groups. Many of these groups were against SPLM during the North-South war, as GoS persistently used a divide-and-conquer tactic that resulted in extensive fighting between southern factions (Brosché & Höglund 2016: 80–81).

Regarding the political stance towards Sudan, President Kiir strongly supported southern independence. But his wish to accommodate GoS after independence separated him from many other southern leaders. They were concerned that establishing and keeping normal diplomatic relations with the North was not plausible, because the North would hinder the development of the South as a stable, democratic, and independent state. President Kiir took the political stance that the South needed to strengthen itself institutionally and politically before it could challenge the North. On the other hand, Garang’s old revolutionary elites mostly disagreed with President Kiir and sought to bring down the North government. It turned out that eleven of these leaders were arrested during the Juba Massacre when civil war broke out in December 2013 and accused of plotting against the government. They were released only when the Supreme Court could find no evidence to support the charges against them. At the side of Sudan, GoS’s elites became eager to reabsorb the South after the secession of the South, and Sudanese President Bashir showed his commitment to reunite the North and the South. He was reflecting the dominant views within his own political party who saw South Sudan’s independence as a temporary tactical maneuver for Sudan rather than as a permanent solution to end decades of civil war between the North and the South. Some articles in Northern media suggested the reunification with the North as the best option to stabilize South Sudan. Other Northern leaders viewed the South’s enormous natural resources as a treasure which they could not give up and resisted CPA for economic reasons. Some Soudanese elites feared that a stable democratic South would present itself as a threatening alternative to Sudan’s repressive political regime (Natsios 2015).

Although GoS intended to destabilize the situations of South Sudan through supporting southern armed insurgencies based on the strategy of creating weakened South Sudan and paving a way for reunification, being a mediator in the IGAD-led negotiations, officially GoS tried to show supportive stance towards the regime in South Sudan at the surface. If GoS provided significant support to SPLM/A-IO, GoSS would provide arms to opposition forces against GoS in
Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, which concerned GoS (Rolandsen 2015: 166). From economic viewpoint, all oil produced in South Sudan is transferred through pipeline in Sudan, and the usage fee paid by GoSS is indispensable for GoS. Accordingly, upholding stable working relationship with GoSS is important for GoS. In addition, since Sudanese anti-government rebels are alongside the GoSS, keeping the proper relationship with GoSS is effective for GoS to contain them. These interests demanded GoS to show relenting stances at the surface towards GoSS. However, in fact, opposing to the intervention by Uganda which deployed military in support of GoSS, GoS allowed SPLM/A-IO to use rear bases in Sudan and gave weapons and training to Machar’s forces. In this way, GoS balanced between contradictory crucial interests and played complicated roles in the civil war in South Sudan (Brosché and Höglund 2016: 77–78).

As described above, politics of South Sudan has been shaped by the intricately embedded relations with Sudan, and the influence by Sudan is significant. Recently, President Bashir of GoS played a central mediating role in reaching the Khartoum Declaration Agreement on 28 June 2018 among warring parties of South Sudan and signing the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) on 12 September 2018. Thus, influence of GoS remains to be a key factor for settlement of fragile situations of South Sudan.

B. Regional aspect - Hostility between Sudan vs Uganda

When civil war broke out in South Sudan, Uganda’s apparent military supports to GoSS stimulated Sudan’s committed interference. The regional hostility between Sudan and Uganda struggling for taking an initiative in South Sudan intensified.

Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and Ugandan government have been a key ally of SPLM for a long time. At South Sudan’s independence in 2011, Uganda strongly supported South Sudan. When the conflicts resumed in South Kordofan and Blue Nile in Sudan, Uganda allowed SRF fighting against GoS to base itself in Ugandan military base in South Sudan. When the civil war broke out, Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF) was quick to provide military assistance to GoSS, without which GoSS troops would probably have been unable to stop the rebels from advancing towards Juba. Thus, GoSS appeared weak and support by Uganda was indispensable, and considering the significant dependence on Uganda, President Kiir’s policy of normalization with Sudan has been viewed with suspicion (Rolandsen 2015: 166).

In response to Ugandan and SRF interventions supporting GoSS, GoS began to provide relatively modest support to SPLM-IO fighting against GoSS. Its increasing preference for SPLM-IO was further motivated by countering Ugandan involvement and also by the fact that Sudanese rebels against GoS were fighting at the side of GoSS. GoS considered that supporting SPLM-IO would balance against Uganda’s and SRF’s help for GoSS and pressure President Kiir not to aid the Sudanese rebels who are anti-GoS. In short, Uganda’s intervention helping GoSS
furthermore provoked Sudan’s involvement in the conflict in South Sudan by way of supporting SPLM-IO, which further brought tensions to the relations in the region, especially against Uganda. At the same time, GoS also took the role of IGAD mediators along with Ethiopia and Kenya with the aim of regaining international credibility. In this way, GoS kept an eye on two things by leaving place for engaging with GoSS at the same time by providing relatively limited support to SPLM/A-IO to leverage against GoSS (ICG 2015a: 21).

Sudan-Uganda hostility has deep roots in supporting for one another’s opposition groups, and the animosity culminated in the 1990s. Sudan accused Uganda of supporting Sudanese armed opposition groups such as SPLA-North, Justice and Equality Movement, Sudan Liberation Army – Minni Minawai and Sudan Liberation Army – Abdul Wahid. On the other hand, Ugandan government alleged that Sudan supported Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Ugandan anti-government insurgency. Ugandan government also regarded Machar as Sudan’s agent and alleged that he was associated with LRA. Especially, Ugandan government paid attention to the role played by Machar at Juba talks with LRA in 2006, when LRA members were given supplies including cash in assembly areas in South Sudan. In this way, these two countries have been at odds with each other as destabilizing factor for own security issues. Besides, significant amount of Ugandan business investment in South Sudan and the security issue in the Equatoria region which is bordering with Uganda’s historically unstable northern region are also serious concerns for Uganda (ICG 2015b: 5–6). Thus, Ugandan government’s animosity towards Sudan and Machar as well as economic motivation and security concern aroused firm interventions into the affairs of South Sudan.

The momentum towards Sudan-Uganda hostility in South Sudan destabilized regional peace. While IGAD was struggling with internal disruption, support from Uganda and SRF to GoSS and relatively limited support from GoS to SPLM/A-IO flared up hard-lines in both sides. The regional impasse caused by hostility between Sudan and Uganda affected the peace talks in South Sudan and put it in deadlock (ICG 2015a: 22).

As the violence intensified between GoSS and SPLM/A-IO, both Sudan and Uganda were concerned with the danger of affecting own security. In efforts to protect shared interest, GoS and Ugandan government have organized senior-level meetings since mid-2014 for the stability of South Sudan under the President Kiir. In this effort, Sudanese Vice President Hasabo Abdel Rahman visited Uganda in February 2015 and announced formation of Joint Security Committee which includes in its mandate security sector cooperation and intelligence sharing. Thereafter, Uganda stopped SRF operation from Uganda. Furthermore, Ugandan President Museveni visited Khartoum in September 2015, and in the following month, Ugandan forces withdrew from South Sudan. In return, Sudanese President Bashir attended Museveni’s fifth-term inauguration in May 2016 (ICG 2016a: 9).

As the most recent development, Khartoum Declaration Agreement was reached by
President Kiir and Former Vice President Machar on 28 June 2018, mediated by GoS President Bashir with the attendance of Ugandan President Museveni. Furthermore, R-ARCSS was signed on 12 September 2018 for peaceful settlement and instituting the regime of transitional period. As such, the engagements of these two rival leaders showed indispensability for attaining the shared interests of stability of South Sudan and the region.

C. International aspect - Contrasted involvements by the United States and China

The analysis of international aspect with the focus on the involvements by the United States and China is relevant to the analysis of civil war in South Sudan. Reluctance of the United States in the involvement in South Sudan and active role of China motivated by its interests of protecting its rights in oil business in South Sudan and exerting its influence on international arena are contrasted. In terms of the presence of the United States and China in the region, the United States has strong relations with Uganda, one of its main security partners in Africa, while China has considerable influence over Sudan.

The United States and China basically favored a regionally-led process leading to power-sharing agreement stipulated in Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS), which was signed in August 2015. However, there are significant differences in approach and how to protect own national interests. The United States has been interested in safeguarding its security relationship with Uganda, while China has been keen on protecting oil interests. They have real influence but have used little of it to support the mediation process. The United States has rarely been able to influence the mediation process in ways it desires. The limited amount of political capital the administration is willing to expend in South Sudan and in the region to end the conflict has not matched its objectives. By the end of 2014, the United States was increasingly disillusioned with IGAD, and accordingly, proposals to provide greater support and to gain more influence over IGAD through high-level engagement were given up in the U.S. government partly due to unwillingness to significantly challenge Ugandan foreign policy. Since Uganda is U.S. counter-terrorism partner in the region including its participation in a regional force against the LRA and contribution to the African Union (AU) force in Somalia, the U.S. government is more keen on safeguarding its primary bilateral interest in counter-terrorism, and respect of Ugandan foreign policy is prioritized. In the mediation process, the United States sought to influence the draft ARCSS being developed but grew increasingly frustrated as IGAD proceeded with its own path (ICG 2015b: 24).

In the mediation process, South Sudan has been facing the distance and neglect by the U.S. government. As soon as South Sudan achieved its independence, attention of the U.S. government was diverted to different crisis in other places. It can be fairly argued that strategic significance of South Sudan is relatively limited to the United States. The U.S. Department of State has played too limited role in modernizing and integrating SPLA, especially when compared
to its efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. From the start, a full military mission was needed in South Sudan, as well as a full embassy with senior experienced diplomats, however, the U.S. State Department never deployed the same level of resources it did in countries of strategic interest. (Natsios 2015).

On the other hand, regarding the involvement by Chinese government, during 2005 CPA’s implementation, it supported and acted as an influential party at the table for negotiations over the division of oil revenues between GoS and AGSS. In the process, Chinese government accumulated experience, gained regional and international players’ trust and built up capability and confidence in mediation, paving way for its later engagement in South Sudan. When Darfur rebels took up arms against GoS in 2003, GoS and its allied militia groups responded with a brutal counter-insurgency campaign. China’s close economic and political ties with GoS, particularly via oil industry, aroused Western accusations that it was providing financial supports and protecting a genocidal regime, and furthermore activists called for a boycott of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. At the same time, China’s substantial economic investment in Sudan gave it significant leverage. According to the testimony at the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Andrew S. Nations, who served as the President’s Special Envoy to Sudan, during Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to Khartoum in February 2007, he encouraged President Bashir of GoS to show flexibility and to allow the AU/UN hybrid force to be deployed (Natsios 2007: 9). Denying any responsibility for the Darfur war, Chinese government appointed Liu Guijin, an experienced diplomat, as its special representative for African affairs and Darfur issue in May 2007. Chinese government continued its effort to persuade Sudanese President Bashir to be relenting. Subsequently, Chinese diplomats helped mediate agreement for an AU/UN hybrid mission with peacekeepers from developing countries to mitigate Bashir’s fear that Western forces would be used for regime change. After the International Criminal Court (ICC) ordered Bashir’s arrest in March 2009, the Chinese envoy assured him that China would not support ICC’s decision, but also advised him not to expel humanitarians (ICG 2017: 4-5).

For the consideration of China’s policy towards South Sudan, China’s experience in Libya cannot be neglected. In February 2011, conflict in Libya led to massive operation to evacuate Chinese nationals working in construction and other sectors. This incident exposed the limits of China’s ability to protect its investments. Although its citizens were brought home safely, Chinese infrastructure projects worth over $18.8 billion were damaged by fighting and NATO airstrikes. Oil imports from Libya to China fell from 150,000 barrels per day in 2010 to 19,000 by 2014. Most strikingly, NATO’s campaign against Libya eventually led to regime change of Libya. The experience in Libya became costly lesson and attracted attention of Chinese foreign policy decision makers, and many began to argue that China needed to engage actively in global security affairs to prevent such chaos (ICG 2017: 5-6).

IGAD’s former chief mediator, Seyoum Mesfin, used to serve as Ethiopian foreign minister
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and ambassador to China. Through his connection with China, he paved a way for Chinese government into the mediation process. Chinese government sees itself as a newcomer to conflict resolution, and also viewed as such by international community. China’s interests in South Sudan and strong relations with the regional mediators made South Sudan an ideal testing ground for China as real-world laboratory of a pilot project for Chinese diplomacy in relatively less contentious arena. This is because, unlike conflicts and disputes in Asia, Africa seldom becomes the sensitive issues or becomes the subject of nationalist passion (ICG 2017: 9–11).

When South Sudan’s civil war began in December 2013, the violence spread across the country, and SPLM-IO targeted and destroyed some oil infrastructures and killed South Sudanese workers on Chinese-owned oil facilities. Although South Sudan accounts for only 2 to 5 per cent of China’s annual oil imports, oil is central interest among Chinese government’s priorities. Sudan was the Chinese oil industry’s first overseas success and retains symbolic importance. In terms of economic benefit, as oil prices rose between 1998 and 2003, output from Sudan contributed significantly to the company growth of the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). Accordingly, the oil refinery site in Khartoum became a frequent stop for visiting Chinese government and communist party officials. After 2005 CPA, when it appeared likely that South Sudan would gain independence, CNPC deepened its engagement with GoSS at first secretly for fear of offending GoS. In addition to oil, Chinese investments in South Sudan have been encouraged in other industries, accompanied by Chinese loans, and bilateral trade reached $534 million in 2012. By 2013, roughly 100 Chinese companies were registered in South Sudan, covering energy, engineering, construction, telecommunications, media services, hotels, restaurants, and retail (ICG 2017: 7–9). As such, securing its investments is highly prioritized for Chinese diplomacy in South Sudan. After the outbreak of civil war, in order to secure its investments in oil industry, China hedged between GoSS and SPLM/A-IO, providing supports to both parties including finance on the condition that security of oil infrastructure is guaranteed (ICG 2017: 12).

Regarding the attitude towards mediation, China appears most comfortable in the role of a table-setter, leveraging its political and economic influence. Chinese government is becoming comfortable with setting agendas, proposing terms in agreements or drafting documents. Chinese government displayed such table-setting to good effect in January 2015 when Sudan - South Sudan relations became tense over support to one another’s rebel groups. Leveraging its longstanding ties with GoS, Chinese government sent Foreign Minister Wang Yi to convene a “special consultation meeting” in Khartoum that included South Sudan’s warring parties, Ethiopia, Sudan and IGAD. This effort induced IGAD to clarify its attention and stimulated new momentum to the mediation process. Chinese government considered this a “ground-breaking initiative”, because it was the first time for Chinese government to call upon leaders of countries in the region to discuss conflict resolution in another country. As China gets familiar with conflict
resolution mechanism and gains confidence of influencing the process, China has begun to shape regional positions behind the scenes (ICG 2017: 11-14).

In terms of the perception towards China, initially, South Sudanese leaders viewed Chinese government with suspicion and resentment due to its support for GoS. However, after 2005 CPA, pragmatism drove Chinese government and GoSS to establish and solidify political and economic ties, and in this context President Kiir visited Beijin in 2005 and 2007. Even though China deepened ties with GoSS, China still maintains close relations with GoS, and its access to both sides is influential on IGAD mediation (ICG 2017: 17).

As such, although the United States and China have real influence in the region, differences in approach and how to protect own national interests have not succeeded in forming a unified position in the regional consultation process led by IGAD. In response to the lack of unification of IGAD mediation efforts, IGAD-PLUS was installed in 2015 to embrace wider international community including the United States and China, aiming at overcoming the challenges of disruptions.

D. United Nations

United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) was neither politically nor operationally prepared for the civil war. Eleven days after the civil war broke out, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative (SRSG) of UNMISS, Hilde Johnson, acknowledged “We did not see this coming”. In November 2013, one month before the outbreak of civil war, UNMISS showed “cautiously optimistic” stance despite a growing number of warning signs that security situations had been unstable (ICG 2014: 28). Power struggles within SPLM/A deteriorated seriously by the cabinet dissolution in July 2013. However, UNMISS called the cabinet dissolution and the appointment of a leaner new cabinet an “encouraging development” and “positive step” (United Nations 2013: para 2). Warning signs included suppression of media, threats to civil society leaders, deportation of the head of the South Sudan Law Society and public statements of national crisis by senior party officials. Miscalculated stance of UNMISS comes from its views on South Sudan. Since independence, UNMISS consistently presented South Sudan as a post-conflict, developing country rather than a fragile and conflict-prone polity. When Secretary-General called for a ceasefire, UNMISS continued to provide support to SPLA based on the prioritized mission mandate of supporting the extension of state authority, which questioned its impartiality. The failure to establish its impartiality frustrated opposition groups and affected its role in supporting IGAD-led mediation process (ICG 2014: 28-30).

The Security Council immediately backed the IGAD peace process and indicated its willingness to adopt sanctions at the region’s request. It rejected the proposed Protection and Deterrence Force, agreeing only to give protection to the Monitoring and Verification Mission teams without offering credible alternatives to the use of force to push negotiations forward.
UN's limited political role since the outbreak of civil war allowed IGAD to take initiatives in the mediation. UNMISS reoriented its focus on protecting internally displaced civilians sheltering in its bases. UNMISS is slowly regaining credibility, but consensus needs to be reached in the Security Council on what a greater UN role could be in promoting peace or how to support IGAD more effectively. Many see the first round of such Security Council designations, in July 2015, as “unfair”, having targeted generals, not the political decision-makers who failed to make compromises for peace. The sanctions created the perception that certain communities were being punished and deteriorated already challenging circumstances for the mediation. Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan with a political role distinct from peacekeeping mission, is expected to closely coordinate with IGAD to avoid undermining peace efforts through inappropriate steps and to mobilize concerted wider international support (ICG 2015b: 21–22).

III. Challenges of regional mediation process and making model case for partnership of regional and international engagements

It’s meaningful to review challenges and achievements of regional mediation mechanism through the analysis of the functions of IGAD as mediation body, influenced by different motives of participating countries. Notwithstanding the challenges of colliding interests of member states, revitalizing the regional mediation process through IGAD is important to achieve regional stability.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification was established in 1986 with a focus on drought and desertification, and it was restarted in 1996 as IGAD with an expanded mandate that included conflict resolution. IGAD’s conflict resolution attentions have historically focused on the North-South conflict in Sudan, which changed into the civil war in South Sudan later on. An IGAD peace process to resolve Sudan’s long running second civil war (1983–2005) was started in the early 1990s and became active in the late 1990s when Kenya was IGAD’s chair. The Troika strongly supported IGAD’s mediation efforts, particularly at the end of the process when the CPA was signed in 2005 and paved the way for South Sudan’s independence in 2011. The IGAD mediation for South Sudan after the outbreak of civil war was led by a former chief mediator, Seyoum Mesfin, former Ethiopian Foreign Minister, joined by mediators from Kenya (General Lazaro Sumbeiywo) and Sudan (General Mohammed al-Dabbi). IGAD peace mediation is supervised by the Heads of State (HoS), including Uganda (ICG 2015b: 3). Uganda sent troops to support GoSS right after the outbreak of civil war and became a belligerent party in the conflict. Although Uganda participated in the initial IGAD council of ministers visit to Juba for mediation, being militarily involved in the civil war, HoS excluded Uganda from special envoys consisting of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan. In response, Uganda focused more on securing its own interest in South Sudan rather than IGAD-led mediation (ICG 2015b: 5). Instead, Uganda favored
SPLM dialogue process, which was announced in early 2014 and designed to support the IGAD process in order to address the power struggles within SPLM as the root causes of the civil war. However, Uganda was suspected to support this process as an effort to divide the SPLM-IO (ICG 2015b: 19–20). Non-use of the IGAD Council of Ministers or other existing IGAD institutions meant that Uganda was only seriously engaged at the HoS level. As a result, it weakened the envoy’s ability to convince the warring parties that they represented the whole region. It also allowed Uganda to avoid more constructive participation in the mediation process. When relations with special envoy became tense, the warring parties believed they could go directly to the HoS, which underminded IGAD’s ability to take institutional positions (ICG 2015b: 16).

Although IGAD and its member states have contributed much time and political capital to containing and resolving the civil war, they had not been successful due to internal disruptions and power struggles, centralization of decision-making and lack of institutionalization, and too much focus on political elites with insufficient outreach to wider stakeholders (ICG 2015b: 26). As one of the drawbacks of IGAD, ICG indicates that being comprised of member states where political debate is held within the ruling party, IGAD does not have sufficient experiences to manage a peace process that includes opposition parties, civil society, traditional authorities and faith leaders (ICG 2015b: 17). ICG summarizes three major factors which has limited IGAD’s mediation: 1) regional rivalries and power struggles; 2) centralization of decision-making at the HoS level and lack of institutionalization within IGAD; and 3) challenges in expanding the peace process beyond South Sudan’s political elites. The effectiveness of IGAD mediation process through special envoys was questioned by the warring parties in South Sudan, and they opted instead to engage directly with individual HoS in a series of initiatives in Kampala, Khartoum and Nairobi. The civil war in South Sudan has made underlying regional tensions and disruptions visible. Historic hostility between Sudan and Uganda as well as rivalry between Uganda and Ethiopia over their respective influence on regional security has distorted the mediation process. Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan have been dedicated to the mediation process through sending envoys. However, Uganda is only involved at the IGAD HoS level, which supervises the IGAD mediation process as mentioned above. Uganda’s military deployment in support of GoSS precluded itself from sending an envoy to the peace mediation under suspicion of its impartiality, while Ethiopia seeks to control the mediation and eventual balance of power in the region. In this way, regional coordination has been affected by respective interests of member states (ICG 2015b: i).

Regional disruptions made IGAD incapable of putting unified pressure on South Sudanese parties. In response to the deadlocked situations of IGAD mediation efforts, IGAD-PLUS was announced to be installed, including AU, UN, the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, European Union, China, and IGAD Partners Forum comprising of donor partners in March 2015 following fifteen months of unsuccessful mediation after the outbreak of civil war to overcome the
challenges of disruptions. IGAD-PLUS approach to the mediation was considered necessary because firstly, the warring parties were unwilling to come to an agreement without pressure, and secondly, IGAD would need to call on the engagement of wider international community in a coordinated manner (ICG 2015b: 3-4). In this mechanism, UN's sanction committee could be involved more practically to ensure the effectiveness of the sanctions as a pressure to warring parties, and AU’s involvement in the mediation process was enhanced. Moreover, unified international coalition in line with the promotion of the idea of “African solutions to African problems” supported by the partnership between regional initiatives and international concerted cooperation is effective mechanism. These trends are promoted as policy issue of the UN, and in fact, in the Report of the Secretary-General in April 2015, the engagement of regional partners in peacekeeping with UN operations is described as has become the norm, and cooperation of comparative advantages of each organization has been shaped as models of multilateral engagement (United Nations 2015: 2).

Despite its limitation, IGAD is still important as a forum to manage the regional balance of power. Notwithstanding the challenges of regional disruptions, one of IGAD’s achievements has been to anyhow manage these tensions and contain the conflicts, preventing the recurrence of full-fledged war. IGAD-PLUS is expected to function as a unifying platform to control the changing and unstable internal dynamics in South Sudan more effectively. In its attribute, IGAD-PLUS is the hybrid platform between an regional initiatives and wider international engagement, and it is meaningful to be revitalized to integrate the concerted efforts of the regional commitment and wider international support (ICG 2015b: i–ii).

As a recent development of IGAD mediation process, President Bashir of GoS was entrusted by the 32nd Extra-Ordinary Summit of IGAD which was held on June 21st, 2018 to facilitate face-to-face discussion between Kiir and Machar in the presence of Ugandan President Museveni. The Summit was attended by heads of member states and representatives of wider international community such as SRSG of UNMISS, UN Secretary General Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, Co-Chair of IGAD Partners Forum, representatives of the Troika on South Sudan and representatives of the IGAD-PLUS (IGAD 2018a). Throughout the mediation efforts, both parties reached Khartoum Declaration of Agreement on 28 June 2018. Both parties were also committed to sign the final document of R-ARCSS by President Kiir and Opposition leaders including SPLM-IO leader Machar at the occasion of 33rd Extra-Ordinary Summit of IGAD on 12 September 2018 (IGAD 2018). In this way, wider international support to regional initiatives is expected to be further facilitated as a model of bridging between regionally-centered initiatives and wider international engagement.
Conclusion

From bilateral aspect, relations with Sudan are decisive for the stability of South Sudan. The ambition of Sudan to reunite South Sudan has not allowed the development of South Sudan as a stable state, and political stance towards Sudan have shaped political landscape in South Sudan. Neutralization in terms of the relations to Sudan will be a key factor in future path of South Sudan. From regional aspect, South Sudan has been subject to the hostility between Sudan and Uganda, and their exertion of influence was reflected in South Sudan. The regional impasse caused by animosity between these two states affected the mediation process. The engagements of these two rival leaders are indispensable for the shared interests of stability of South Sudan and the region, as shown in recent mediation efforts which concluded in the signing of the R-ARCSS on 12 September, 2018. From international aspect, involvements of international powers, the United States and China, are contrasted by their differing national interests in South Sudan. Basically, the United States do not find rationale of committing further political and economic resources in the matters of South Sudan, whereas China is in pursuit of own national interest of maintaining of its rights in oil industry. China has been also motivated to be involved in South Sudan as an ideal testing ground being real-world laboratory of a pilot project for Chinese diplomacy in relatively less contentious arena. UN’s ineffective involvement so far needs to be improved through reaching consensus on its own role and facilitating coordination with IGAD to support strengthening mediation capacity and to mobilize support from wider international community. Regarding the mediation process, IGAD has been struggling with its deep regional disruption, and its effectiveness has been questioned by the warring parties in South Sudan despite its dedication to the peace process. In spite of its limitation, IGAD is still important as a forum to manage the regional balance of power, and its function needs to be revitalized through facilitating the bridge between regional initiative and wider international engagement for conflict resolution.

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要旨

南スーダン内戦の外的要因分析
——二国間，地域情勢，国際的視点から——

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本稿は，2013年12月に勃発した南スーダン内戦につき外的要因から分析を試みたものである。具体的には，二国間関係の視点から，南スーダンの安定化にとって決定的な要因であるスーダンとの複雑に絡み合った関係を独立前の歴史的経緯を踏まえ考察している。次に，南スーダンが位置する東アフリカ地域に視点を広げ，スーダンとウガンダの対立関係が南スーダンの政治状況に及ぼす影響を分析している。また，国際的視点から，南スーダン情勢への介入に対して政治的経済的資源の投入に消極的な米国と，一方，石油権益の確保と国際的影響力の増大を企図して積極的な関与を行う中国との対照的なスタンスの違いを浮き彫りにしている。また，限定的な関与に留まっていた国連の意向方を指摘しつつ，南スーダン情勢に対して国際社会の統一した立場を明確にすることの必要性に言及している。最後に，東アフリカ地域における政府間開発機構（Inter-Governmental Authority on Development - IGAD）が主導してきた紛争調停への取り組みに対し，地域主導と国際的関与のパートナーシップを促進させモデルケースとして構築していくことを提言する。