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Dialogue between Civilizations



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Dialogue between Civilizations

***Civilization* (『文明』) Special issue: Dialogue between Civilizations**

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Special issue: Dialogue between Civilizations

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Preface 1: On the Publication of a Special Issue of the International Symposium “Civilization Dialogue between Europe and Japan”

Kazushige Yamamoto (Executive Director, Tokai University Institute of Civilization Research)

Tokai University is a relatively new university which was founded in 1942 during the Second World War and marks the 75th anniversary of its establishment this year. The Institute of Civilization Research, which publishes this journal “Civilization,” was founded in 1959 as a place for fundamental research conducted to realize the philosophy of the creation of a harmonious civilized society that constitutes the founding philosophy of the university. The institute goes beyond the boundaries of faculties bringing together researchers and integrating overly compartmentalized academic disciplines and by doing so strives to establish a comprehensive study of civilizations which are a macrocosm of human beings and their activities.

In an effort to explore the ideal state of civilizations, it is critical to have diverse perspectives and hence this institute has also promoted interaction among researchers from various regions. Since 2015, the institute has held an international symposium on the theme of “*Civilization Dialogue between Europe and Japan*” jointly with the Tokai University European Center in Copenhagen, Denmark. This issue was edited by the editorial department independently set up and is based on the 2nd symposium, “*Civilization Dialogue between Europe and Japan*”, held for two days at the European Center on March 3rd and 4th, 2017. We offer our profound gratitude to all the members involved in the editing.

This symposium consists of the two parts of “*Trans-Disciplinary Humanities*” and “*Cultural Psychology*”. In the “*Cultural Psychology*” part, discussions were held on the theme of “*Individuality/Collectivity and Culture*” based on the keynote address of Professor Jaan Valsiner of the Center for Cultural Psychology, Aalborg University. Professor Valsiner visited the Shonan Campus of this institute in Hiratsuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture on July 23rd, 2016 along with Associate Professor Luca Tateo and Research Associate Giuseppina Marsico of the same Center and has conducted lectures in the Cultural Psychology workshop. In the future too, there are plans to further strengthen partnership and cooperation with this Center.

In the “*Trans-Disciplinary Humanities*” part, discussions were held on the theme of “*Diachrony and Synchrony of Civilization Research*” after the keynote address by Professor Peter Pantzer from the University of Bonn, which is renowned for its research on Japan. Professor Pantzer had also conducted lectures in the 1st Symposium and we offer our profound gratitude for his contribution to this symposium as well.

The previous international symposium was held on November 13th and 14th, 2015 at the

Tokai University European Center as is this time, but on the night of the 13th there was a large-scale terrorist attack in Paris by terrorists and this led to discussions among the participants on the relationship between contemporary civilization and terrorism. Even after the 1st Symposium, there have been frequent terrorist attacks that have occurred in various parts of the world, and recently a great number of people became victims of a suicide attack in the Manchester Arena in Britain. Amid such circumstances, we see a strengthening of movements to boycott immigrants and of the tendency of the one's-own-country-first principle as also movements such as the secession of the United Kingdom from the European Union (EU) or the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement to prevent global warming. Behind these events is a sense of crisis regarding the collapse of existing cultures, customs, lifestyles, and one's own identity due to changes caused by globalization. However, international efforts are indispensable to prevent global warming, for example, and a deep understanding of the circumstances in which all are placed is essential for problem solving. We hope that the aspirations of this symposium, which aims for progress in mutual understanding based on dialogue among different civilizations, will be of some help in fostering such mutual understanding.

Preface 2: A Brief History of the Institute of Civilization Research and the 1st Civilization Dialogue between Europe and Japan

Nobukata Kutsuzawa, (Former Director, Tokai University Institute of Civilization Research / Department of History, School of Letters, Tokai University)

The International Symposium titled “The 1st Civilization Dialogue between Europe and Japan” was held at the Tokai University European Center for two days from November 13th to 14th, 2015, when I was Director at the Institute of Civilization Research. Conducting such an international symposium at the Tokai University European Center is considered a significant achievement. This is not only because Japanese researchers presented their research results in Europe but also because researchers from Europe including Germany, Austria, Denmark, and Italy participated and presented their research, leading to discussions with mutually relevant content.

The Institute of Civilization Research was inaugurated in 1959 and the first Director was Toshiaki Harada. A year earlier, at the fresh start of the Department of History, School of Letters, Tokai University, the founder, Dr. Shigeyoshi Matsumae aimed to create an undergraduate program named “Civilization” as an integrated Faculty of Humanities that did not exist in other universities. However, as it was not accepted by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) at that time, the Institute of Civilization Research was founded to realize the concept of a department of civilization in a separate form. Since then, this institute has continued to play a vital role as an educational research institution implementing the “Modern Civilization” course, an important course in Tokai University, and supporting liberal arts education with “Modern Civilization” constituting its core.

I have been a member of the Institute of Civilization Research since 1985, and have also been involved in the implementation of the “Modern Civilization” course. Among the research projects established at the institute, I conducted research in “Study on the Introduction of Western Civilization during the Period between the End of Edo Era and the Beginning of Meiji Era”. The results were published later as “Yougakukotohajime” (The Introduction of Western Civilization in the Period of the Meiji Restoration, Bunkashobohakubunsha, 1993). In addition, the “Study Group on the Modernization of Japan” was also established (1996-1997), and Dr. Herman J. Moeshart of the Leiden University of the Netherlands staying in Japan for research at that time also participated in the seminar. Dr. Moeshart presented a research report on the activities of Albert J. Bauduin who was a representative of the Dutch Trading Company from 1859 to 1874 and was involved in the establishment of offices in Yokohama, Hyogo, Osaka, Edo, and Niigata. As lively discussions were held at the institute on every occasion, there were hopes of holding research presentation sessions or a symposium in the Netherlands but this did

not materialize.

The 2015 International Symposium can be perceived as the realization of the past research activities of the Institute of Civilization Research. Further, there were also presentations by two graduate students from our university at the symposium. It was the first time for them to participate in a symposium held in a foreign country and make presentations in English and it must have been a pressure. Yet, with Professor Yoichi Hirano's help, the presentations were splendid. The presentations were also appreciated by foreign researchers and inspired great confidence in the graduate students.

In this symposium, an old acquaintance of mine, Professor Emeritus Dr. P. Pantzer, University of Bonn and Honorary President of Deutsch-Japanische Gesellschaft Bonn e.V., also made a presentation. Dr. Pantzer was also requested to present at the "Japanese-German Siebold Symposium" held in 2006 at OAG, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens in Tokyo and was in charge of the explanatory text in the exhibition catalog along with the exhibition project committee members in the "150 Jahre Freundschaft Deutschland-Japan" held at the National Museum of Japanese History in 2015. At that time too, I received a variety of help and instructions regarding foreign documents and had the opportunity to learn a lot. The symposium this time has provided opportunities to deepen my long-standing friendship with Dr. Pantzer.

The year 2017 marks the 150th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations with Denmark after the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation between Japan and Denmark was signed by the last Shogun Tokugawa Yoshinobu of the Edo Shogunate. It is of great significance that the symposium "The 2nd Civilization Dialogue between Europe and Japan" is being held in this year as also the fact that this year marks the establishment of joint research between this institute and Aalborg University of Denmark. It was in 1970 that founder Dr. Shigeyoshi Matsumae established the European Center in Copenhagen, Denmark. Dr. Matsumae visited the National High School of Denmark in 1934 and with this experience as the basis he established the Boseigakujuku which is the predecessor of Tokai University. Dr. Matsumae had a strong desire to conduct educational activities in Denmark, which constitutes the origin of the foundational ideals of Tokai University. This desire was realized with the establishment of the European Center in 1970. Further, a variety of symposiums have been held at this center till date. The fact that Tokai University will continue such activities with the European Center as the venue in the future, too, is of great significance from the point of view of inheriting the vision of the founder. It is hoped that the Institute of Civilization Research will play its part in such activities.

Finally, I would like to express my profound gratitude for the efforts of all those who were instrumental in hosting two symposiums including Tokai University Vice-President Yoichi Hirano, Professor Shogo Tanaka of the Institute of Civilization Research, and Hisahiro Tanaka, Acting Director of Tokai University European Center.

Special Issue: Dialogue between Civilizations

The present-day world seems to be embroiled in a state of confusion. After the 20th century, which was a “century of war,” the world was groaning under the weight of a problem comprising two contrasting directionalities: progression of globalization and conservation of diversities. In fact, the 21st century is primarily concerned with the “clash of civilizations,” in which the state of international order reflects a multi-polarization of world politics along with the progression of post-colonialization. However, without international cooperation, finding solutions to issues such as climate change caused by global warming, which threaten the very existence of humankind, is impossible.

To promote worldwide sustainability, the two conflicting forces must be reconsidered. In different regions of the world, lifestyles and cultures have been increasingly reconstructed. Escaping the ways of West-centered civilization, these regions have formed their particular styles in their diverse natural environments and, in turn, maintained the identity of the individual regional civilizations. However, cooperation beyond the nation and immediate community has become crucial for the resolution of global environmental problems that have resulted from the extensive exploitation of natural resources through science-based technologies developed by modern civilizations. In order to pursue “sustainable development,” it might be essential to not only resolve actual policy challenges but also pool accumulated knowledge from different civilizations and create a dialogue among them to promote mutual understanding and cooperation.

In light of the aspects enumerated above, the Tokai University Institute of Civilization Research decided to hold a symposium on the topic “Civilization Dialogue between Europe and Japan.” The foundation of the current global civilization is arguably underpinned by values formed in modern Europe. The civilization is symbolized in particular by scientific knowledge and its application in industrial technology. Under European influence, the Japanese society has proactively accepted science and technology as well as the Western social system and its associated values since the beginning of modernization in the Meiji era (1868–1912). However, the modernization of Japanese society is not necessarily equivalent to westernization. Traditional values have persisted in various aspects. This symposium aims to compare and re-examine views on people, society, and nature underlying the civilizations of Europe and Japan as an attempt to find an academic response to the two conflicting forces with which globalizing societies are currently dealing.

This subject should be supported by research based on cultural and civilizational studies, although such studies themselves cannot form a single discipline because all that humans have built should be considered civilization. Various human activities such as the modes of

production, lifestyle, rituals, and social practices collectively form a civilization, and therefore, the overview of a specific civilization cannot be obtained without integrating findings from each aspect. Here, we introduce a perspective for working on a comprehensive study of our contemporary civilizations under a project called “Trans-Disciplinary Humanities,” which is the key focus of our research.

This attempt needs an additional perspective. As mentioned above, current civilizations have various values that differ according to communities as well as individuals. It is now necessary to discuss the sense of value based on culture, which is internalized within individuals. The discipline of this domain is called “cultural psychology,” which is particularly promoted by the Center for Cultural Psychology, Aalborg University. In the Center, human cognitions, and diverse human activities in the natural and social environment are analyzed from the perspective of individual position and behavior.

We organized the symposium on “Civilization Dialogue between Europe and Japan” in collaboration with the Center of Aalborg University keeping with this point of view. The first symposium was held under the direction of N. Kutuzawa, the then-director of the Institute, in November 2015 at the Tokai University European Center in Denmark. In this symposium, two principal sections were declared open: the section of “Trans-Disciplinary Humanities” (led by Y. Hirano) and a workshop on “East-West Dialogue through the Body” (within the field of cultural psychology, led by S. Tanaka).

The second symposium was held in March 2017, also at the European center, with closer relationship with Aalborg University. This time, J. Valsiner (Niels Bohr Professor of Cultural Psychology, Aalborg University) and P. Pantzer (Professor Emeritus, University of Bonn) delivered the keynote addresses. The two sessions were organized in a manner similar to the first symposium. One was “Trans-Disciplinary Humanities,” directed by Hirano, and the other was a cultural psychology session on the subject of “Individuality-Collectivity and Culture,” directed by Tanaka. In addition, a session for graduate students was organized. Although it was the first attempt for us, it did help to energize and invigorate the symposium further.

After the second symposium, we decided to design an agreement on research. Organizing the editorial board under this agreement, we edited this issue of articles read at the symposium.

In which direction should our civilization proceed? Once, the Renaissance established the *humanities* as a central discipline. In a way, this is considered the fruit of the synthesis of people’s wisdom. Similarly, we may be asked to determine the future direction of our civilization by synthesizing our wisdom. In addition, it is important to ascertain what role humans, individually, will play in the future of our civilization and, reciprocally, how our civilization will influence human existence as well as individual thinking and behavior. This involves various kinds of factors: the East and the West, globalization and diversity, the community and the individual, and human mind and body, among others. The symposium of “Civilization Dialogue” focuses on these very problems. Through continuous discussion, the

symposium can be a step toward the further development of civilization studies.

Editors: Yoichi Hirano, Shogo Tanaka, Luca Tateo, and Jaan Valsiner

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I. Transaction across regions

Reception of Japanese lacquerware in Europe and its impact: The growth and end of Japanning

Chiaki Genji (Tokai University)

Preamble

The world holds a rich variety of cultures and civilizations. In different regions, the natural environment is different, as are people's daily lifestyles and the cultures that emerge from those conditions. Thus, it is logical that cultures and civilizations of different regions will exert influence on one another as the regions interact. In instances where one region has an advantage over another region, the superior region's civilization and culture primarily influence those of the other region. This phenomenon is called civilization transfer.

History gives us many examples of such developments. Following the Age of Discovery and the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century, Western civilization surpassed civilizations in other parts of the world through its modern spirit and philosophy. One result of this dominance was nineteenth-century imperialism.

However, reality sometimes shows influence running counter to the civilization transfer. One example is the Japanese lacquer products that Europe began to import around the sixteenth century. The items reflected the culture of a different country. These imported lacquer products would lead to the rise of japanning, which was marked by the application of black paint to household goods and furniture. In some respects, this may appear to be a civilization transfer much like the import of Chinese ceramics. However, there was one key difference: the Japanese sumac tree, which provides the basic ingredient in Japanese lacquer paints, does not exist in Europe. Thus, Europeans seeking to copy Japanese lacquer had to establish a new method of manufacturing household goods and furniture, using different ingredients and technology.

We deal with exactly this problem in this paper. The contact between a country that has a specific technical advantage and a country that does not have it may not end in the unidirectional imposition of the culture or civilization of the country with the specific technical advantage. This paper explores the example of works of European painting arising from the development of japanning and technological innovation, and we will discuss that development. We also consider the industrial decline of European painting. Thence, we will examine an example wherein cultural and civilizational exchange helped preserve diversity.

The background of the Japanese lacquer imported to Europe and its development

Many varieties of lacquers and lacquered goods originating from Japan can be seen in prominent European art and history museums today. Because the ingredients of lacquer did not exist in Europe, these objects were imported from Japan and China. The lacquered goods

imported from Japan, principally between the sixteenth and early eighteenth centuries, are referred to as Japanese lacquer. Some items imported from China and other parts of East Asia are also categorized as Japanese lacquer. Royals and aristocrats of this period had great affection for imported Japanese lacquer, on such items as furniture, small storage vessels, and ornaments.

Japanese lacquer imports can be divided into three stylistic categories. First, the Namban style is directed at tastes common to the Portuguese and Spanish. Works of his style were imported from Japan from in the late sixteenth century to the early seventeenth century. It was a completely new style of lacquerware, different from previous styles produced in Japan. The main forms are familiar to Europeans in such items as Christian ceremonial equipment, “drawer and Western-style cabinets as living furniture” (Yamazaki, 2001, p. 27). The decoration is applied by “painting black lacquer in the whole body, bordering each surface of the container with a continuous pattern with mother-of-pearl inlay or *kin hira makie*, based on a design that fills patterns and geometric patterns such as flowers, trees, birds, and animals with the *kin hira makie* or *gin hira makie* technique, with mother-of-pearl inlay” (Yamazaki, 2001, p.27). Many Portuguese and Spaniards who came to Japan were missionaries. Much Christian ceremonial equipment was produced at their request. However, “items created by the request of Portuguese and Spanish merchants” (Fortagen, 2004, p. 19) are also included in the Namban style. Works of this period have a form which is far from the traditional lacquerware of the Japanese style its decorative style. Many religious forms, exquisite lavishly glamorous and exotic decorations can be distinguished from lacquerware of other eras at a glance. These represent a major feature of exported lacquerware at this time.

Second, the intermediate style represents a transitional Japanese lacquer that emerged when Japan began to trade with the Netherlands, shifting away from Portugal and Spain. Third, the pictorial style evolved from the intermediate style as an adjustment to Dutch tastes.

The intermediate style appeared from the 1630s to the 1650s. This is because the Dutch East India Company (*Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*, VOC) “requested another style element and adopted a stylistic transformation” (Yamazaki, 2001, p. 27). This was transformed into a style that takes advantage of the Japanese patterns that the Dutch and British prefer. It was transformed from patterns such as geometric patterns and flowers, birds, and beasts, which are characteristics of Namba style with narrative pictures. A feature seen in the latter half of the seventeenth century is “A clear contrast between black lacquer ground and *kin takamakie*, oriented to the pictorial figure” (Yamazaki, 2001, p. 27).

The style of imported lacquer ware entered into Europe via the VOC changed to one that “has wide margins, taking the surface as a black lacquer and placing patterns of castles in landscapes, people, flowers, and the like as the main body of the *kin takamakie*” (Komatsu & Katou, 1997, p. 112). Also, by adopting wide margins, “The beauty of the lacquer is emphasized, a deep black and glossy” (Komatsu & Katou, 1997, p. 112).

The three styles, the Nanban style, the intermediate style, and the painting style have been produced to suit the tastes of trading countries in each era. What they all have in common is that they incorporate Japanese aesthetic sense and seasonal feeling. The figures and patterns were produced and exported to suit the taste of Europeans, making use of domestic trends and newly created techniques.

However, at the end of the seventeenth century, after the VOC stopped official lacquer exports, the sailors on Dutch ships continued to conduct personal trade of lacquered goods on a relatively small scale (Hidaka, 2001, p. 33, 38).

Development of japanning in Europe

When items of Japanese lacquer were imported into Europe, they became accepted as craft objects that reflected affection for foreign cultures, particularly Eastern ones. However, Europeans were not only attracted to foreign styles of painting and design for their aesthetic value. Indeed, although Japanese lacquer was prized in Europe for its unique coat of black lacquer paint, lacquered goods were also valued as practical household furnishings. At the time, Europeans used varnish as their key ingredient in their various lacquer techniques imitating Japanese lacquer, because there were no Japanese lacquer trees in Europe. This is how japanning was born; the word means “making imitation lacquerware” (Hidaka, 2008, p. 103).

This spurred the development of black paint, and many workshops in each region began to churn out works using this paint. The manufacture of imitation lacquerware started in northern Italy in the mid sixteenth century. These were imitations of craft work using shellac and other materials that were made in the Islamic world and Central Asia rather than imitations of pure lacquerware. The production of imitation oriental lacquerware began in the Netherlands at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Japanning then developed dramatically in Germany, and in the eighteenth century, French crafts appeared that were made with original coating technology based on japanning.

Something that japanning, which entered its maturity, made possible was reuse of lacquerware made in Japan that had fallen out of fashion. Although imports of Japanese lacquer declined in the eighteenth century, the popularity and appeal of Japanese lacquer to royals and aristocrats did not fade. However, the demand for these goods exceeded the market supply in Europe, and the style of newly imported goods was behind the most recent trends there. Europeans thus developed new approaches to use their rare lacquered goods effectively. One approach was to disassemble lacquered furniture or remove a lacquered layer with its painting and to repurpose those parts for new furniture and household furnishings more in line with the times.

The development of this craft in Germany in the middle of the seventeenth century and France in the eighteenth century is the most remarkable thing in the technical history of japanning.

In the German-speaking regions, the Berlin atelier of Gérard Dagly (1657-1726) produced the most authentic imitation lacquer. Dagly was born in the town of Spa (now belonging to Belgium) in the house of an imitation lacquerware craftsman. In his family, “most notably Gérard and Jacques (his brother) who are to be credited with having raised European lacquerwork to a rare apogee of artistic achievement in very much the same period at Spa and Berlin and also a good quarter of a century later in Paris” (Kopplin, 2010, p. 189), lacquerwork was developed.

Dagly was summoned by the Great Elector to the court of Brandenburg-Prussia in 1686. He is said to have been responsible for the production of imitation lacquerware furniture in the workshop of the palace, the repair of oriental lacquer furniture, and work related to overall interior decoration in the palace. He can be assumed to have studied East Asian lacquerwork thoroughly, as he achieved quite a faithful imitation of its techniques, especially the Japanese “sprinkled picture” (*makie*), with its subtly differentiated planes of relief (Kopplin, 2010, p. 190). In particular, he became able to produce relief figures like *makie*. The result of his research appears in his work: “the mountains and rock formations embellished with pavilion architecture and the strikingly shaped elements of vegetation projecting over the empty lacquer ground show that Dagly had a sensitivity to and profound understanding of the aesthetics of the Japanese lacquer landscape rarely encountered amongst Western lacquerers” (Kopplin, 2010, p. 190).

Dagly’s apprentice, Martin Schnell (1675-1740), worked in the Dresden palace of Augustus the Strong. Although Schnell’s style was enriched and refined to an extraordinary degree under the impression of Augustus the Strong’s East Asian collection, it was in essence formed in his Berlin years (Kopplin, 2010, p. 196). Using lacquerware from various production areas, “Schnell fully adopted the style of composition of the Japanese and succeeded in achieving the elegance of refined economy through the contrast between dense decoration and expanses of empty surface” (Kopplin, 2010, p. 196). The work of Schnell is generally the red imitation lacquerware called Red Japan (Impey & Jörg, 2005, p. 341). One such work is stored in the Museum of Lacquer Art. This is a cabinet that Schnell made in Dresden in 1715. The method of emphasizing the figure by using the margin produces a structure peculiar to Japanese lacquerware. Imitation lacquerware in Germany at that time followed two trends. One is a Chinese-style imitation lacquerware, like that produced in England and the Netherlands, the other is work imitating Japanese lacquerware.

From jappanning to European lacquer

The Martin brothers (*les frères Martin*) in France and Germany’s Stobwasser (Johann Heinrich Stobwasser, 1740-1829) also made startling technical advances, developing their own paints and painting methods. This led to a departure from the creation of jappanning-style imitative lacquerware and the establishment of European lacquer as a new and original industry.

The Martin brothers moved away from the manufacture of imitation lacquerware, leaving only their painting technique, used for imitation. Japanning marked the end of the period of Dagly and Schnell. This was followed by the manufacture of original works that employed the painting techniques created in japanning, such as those of the Martin brothers.

In the Martins' workshop, everyday items were produced. These include snuffboxes, needle cases, opera glasses, fans, sweetmeats boxes, and so on. Some figures also remind us of Chinese-style figures and East Asian work, while others use figures based on flowers and figures familiar to Europeans, portraits, angels, myths, and so on. In addition, the colors used are not black but red, gray, green, and so on.

The work of Germany's Stobwasser shows a similar development. A look at the production activities of Stobwasser's shop shows the manufacture of a European lacquer that used black paint unique to Europe and was a departure from imitation lacquerware. This shop was already manufacturing works that were more in line with current fashion and the shapes and drawings on them fit the European tastes.

Stobwasser's characteristic works are snuffboxes. The material used for the box is paper mâché and the paint is lacquer. Both the inside and outside of the container are black-lacquered, and a figure is painted on the lid. Depending on the particular work, its name, the logo of the workshop, and its number are written in red inside the container. From the pattern of the workshop logo we can know when it was made.

The works of Stobwasser defined the era, and even today Stobwasser is highly regarded among collectors and his name is the cornerstone of exhibitions. Stobwasser and his father, Georg Siegmund Stobwasser, gained great prominence for their work.

The firm of Georg Siegmund Stobwasser & Son became not only the most celebrated japanning factory in Germany but renowned throughout Europe for the quality of its wares—a reputation which remains undiminished among collectors today (Jones, 2012, p. 288).

Decline of European lacquer

However, social changes from the latter part of the 18th century to the 19th century, bringing cheap Eastern lacquerware and market competition, witnessed the end of imitation works and the fashion for European lacquer that was a result of japanning. Stobwasser was forced to close his shop. The causes of this decline were the increasingly vibrant trade between Europe and the East that came with internationalization and the demand for real lacquerware due to the trend of *Japonisme*. In other words, as Europeans came to seek real black lacquerware with its lustrous sheen, European lacquerware was relegated to being a temporary replacement, and japanning as well as the production of European lacquerware ceased. Even so, the original black paint and painting techniques developed as a result of japanning were a result of European craftsmanship. Thought of differently, this phenomenon can be viewed as a shift from the reception of one culture to the development of techniques.

From the perspective of the transfer of civilization and culture that arises from contact between civilizations and cultures, what is the meaning of the black paint that developed from jpanning? A similar example can be found: it is the influence of Chinese ceramics, particularly white porcelain. In the seventeenth century, the white porcelain imported to Europe was considered precious items with artistic quality. At the outset of the eighteenth century, Europeans were eager to find ways to manufacture it. The Elector of Saxony, Augustus II, subjected alchemists to confinement until production methods for white porcelain could be developed. By his direction, and under heavy secrecy, a white porcelain production facility was established in the Meissen region. This led to the birth of the Meissen ceramics still known today. White porcelain was originally produced in Jingdezhen City, China, using a technique based on that region's natural features, climate, and ingredients. The Europeans imitated the white porcelain imported from China but developed manufacturing methods using their own techniques.

The advanced culture and technology associated with white porcelain manufacture had a profound influence on Europe. As a result, Europe perfected its own white porcelain manufacturing techniques and eventually established its work as superior to that of China. Here, a country that did not have a technical advantage adopted culture and technology from another country and developed that culture and technology to maturity, leading to the achievement of manufacturing and artistic advances. This also shows how imported technology and culture can, in the end, be fused with the technology and culture of the receiving region to rival or overtake the original technology of the sending region.

The reception of Japanese lacquerware in Europe and the growth of jpanning due to its influence follow a somewhat similar path. Jpanning gave rise to later, original painting technologies. However, jpanning and European lacquer, unlike Meissen porcelain, are no longer around as industries. The most striking characteristic of this difference is the question of whether the raw materials still exist in Europe. The clay required for manufacturing porcelain exists in Europe, but the lacquer for making lacquerware does not exist.

In the seventeenth century, the VOC knew the existence of raw lacquer, but they could not import it to Europe. This stems from the way lacquer solidifies. Lacquer needs a constant temperature (25–30°C) and humidity (50–80%) to solidify. It solidifies in the hot and humid climate of Southeast Asia. Even if Europeans could import, it could not be solidified in European climate (the marine climate of the west coast of Europe). Due to this, it was thought that the importation of raw lacquer was impossible. In addition, European lacquer products manufactured using jpanning were manufactured as luxury goods (preference goods) and the customer base was also affluent, so it could not spread among the common people like Meissen.

Thus, for various reasons, jpanning and European lacquer declined, unlike Meissen porcelain and was driven to substitute position.

Further discussion

Europeans developed their own black paints to replace lacquer. These paints were developed as the result of certain improvements to and developments in existing painting techniques. Thus, japanning perhaps sprang from the category known as lacquer painting within European crafts. In other words, the painting techniques of japanning and the lacquerwork of Europe were decidedly different from the porcelain manufacture of Meissen. They were nothing more than products that resembled Japanese lacquerware, manufactured using existing techniques, and did not rise to the level of their Japanese models. Thus, although we may perceive innovations from existing technologies as having arisen from the reception of a different civilization and culture in this case, these innovations did not lead to new technology or creation.

However, where civilizations and cultures come into contact, the interchange does not always give birth to new things, and civilizations and cultures are not necessarily transformed. Japanning is an example of this. The growth of japanning in Europe is a striking example of how the reception of a different culture can impact existing technologies and possibly lead to dramatic advances.

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History of Brunei's interactions with the outside world: Proposal for inbound tourism

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Tourism industry in Southeast Asia

From 1950's, the international tourism has expanded rapidly all over the world, and the tourism industry has turned to be the most critical issue among developing countries, as means of economic development to acquire foreign money and to introduce foreign capitals into their domains. International tourism to the Asian countries from European and North American developed countries has increased, because many Europeans and North Americans have been interested in the different "exotic" cultures in Asia. Along with this tendency, a tourism development rush arose in Indonesia, Malaysia and other developing Southeast Asian countries. They mainly focused on cultural tourism to show their unique living cultures and the traditional life-styles and unique customs of several indigenous ethnic groups in these countries; namely "ethnic tourism" has been flourishing in Southeast Asia from the late 19 Century and after words (Koda, 2006, p.125). By means of developing tourism industries, or the endeavors to attract foreign tourists, these countries expected to attract foreign investments to improve infrastructure of their own lands. They also believe that tourism should create jobs, both through the direct employment within the tourist industry in a narrow sense, as well as the indirect increase in sectors such as retail and transportation, although these touristic jobs might be often seasonal and poorly paid.

Tourism has strong impact not only on the economic sphere but also on the local people's life. If too many tourists visit a place, it will cause traffic jam and subsequent air pollution. In addition, it is afraid that the overdevelopment of international tourism may increase the local property prices and the cost of goods and services in general. Foreign tourists may bring to the tourist destinations not only income and job opportunities but also different values that may have some harmful effects on the local people's world view, to change or destroy fundamental characteristic cultures and societies that have been attracting foreign tourists at first. For the resources of the cultural tourism are no more than everyday lives of the local people. However, it is also true that tourism can encourage the preservation of the traditional customs, handicraft, rituals and festivals that might otherwise have been allowed to wane. In other words, tourism can maintain their culture identity in certain cases. Whatever happens, tourist behavior may have a detrimental effect on the quality of life of the host community. Tourism even might infringe on the human fundamental rights, for some tourists watch the host people's culture as strange or savage. Sociological, cultural and environmental problems induced by the tourism industry have irreversible effects on the host societies.

Some researches focusing on such socio-cultural problems caused by the cultural or ethnic tourism have been realized in various regions, this results in the need to apply new concepts, such as “sustainable tourism”, that is focusing on preservation or safeguarding of the host cultural and natural environment.

However, adequate means to cope with such cultural adverse effects, have not been taken yet, because economic benefits from the tourism industry are immensely large. Having such difficulties, the Southeast Asian tourism market is growing most rapidly in the world (UNWTO, 2014, p.2). The tourism industry has brought a lot of problems to these countries probably lead to the destruction of the indigenous life- styles in the regions, we must wrestle for immediate solution, before the cultural recovery might be impossible. It appears to be necessary for the state parties and local governments to try to develop tourism industry for promoting the sustainable tourism that may have efficient effects to avoid failure and to overcome the problems.

Problems of cultural tourism: Case study of longhouse tourism in Malaysia

Tourism is a socio-cultural phenomenon that has developed into an economic enterprise in many regions in the Southeast Asia. Culture and tourism are always linked together, because indigenous life-styles are the tourist resource close to hand and some kinds of spectacle for the foreigners. The cultural tourism generally modifies or re-identifies the *host* culture in relation to the *guests* or the visitors. Considering the previous cases, the images of tourist destinations have been strategically and intentionally built by the marketing sectors of the *host* countries. In other words, the images of the tourist destination are formed by the strategies of the host countries considering the foreign tourist expectations and needs. For example, since the government tourism bureau was established in 1972, Malaysia has focused on the inbound tourism and has grown as one of the leading tourism countries in Southeast Asia. Among the various touristic schemes proposed by the Malaysian government, an ethnic tourism in the Sarawak state has been strongly promoted to foreigners from the early 1990’s (Hattori, 2010, p.22). In Sarawak, tourists can enjoy trekking in the rain forest to watch tropical animals and to dive in the beautiful sea. In addition, they can also stay in the Iban’s long house to experience the Iban’s traditional culture. The Iban live in Sarawak State, East Kalimantan, Indonesia. The Iban residing in a part of Borneo Island had a custom of headhunting until the early 20th century (Yamada, 2015, p.113). There were various reasons for headhunting; mainly religious and ritual reasons to acquire the spiritual bravery of the diseased enemy warriors. The Malaysian government used this extinct historical tradition, commercially to attract foreign visitors. The government called the Iban as “headhunters” and named the tourism in which tourists stay in their longhouse and experience Iban’s traditional culture as “Headhunter’s long house tourism”, and this propaganda promoted this manner of tourism to Europeans by using illustrations and photographs of the human skulls. Such an “exotic” content has tickled European’s inquiring

minds and spurred them to go there to participate in the Iban's traditional society. As a result, many international tourists visited the Iban's longhouses. The Iban's main income sources have changed from the traditional pepper and rubber cultivation to the forged "headhunter" tourism (Hattori, 2010, p.23). While economic incomes increase, socio-cultural problems also occur frequently. The longhouse tourism in Malaysia has created a situation where the host side, or the Iban had to respond adequately or bear to the "tourist gaze" suitable to the image of "headhunter", the Iban ceased from hunting heads, long time ago. But in souvenir shops and touristic pamphlets, there are full of words and illustrations referring to the past "headhunters" age. In some of the long houses, we can see the replicas of human skull, even now.

From my interview with the local guides and the Ibans who accepted the foreign tourists, it became clear that the number of longhouses that had accepted the foreign tourists has decreased in recent years. There are two main reasons. The first, the Iban's expectations for tourism were limited only to economic income from the beginning, so their interest has shifted easily to other industries more profitable than the tourism. The second, almost all the tourists have been disgusted with such a form of tourism as to watch other's life and culture with "curious gaze" peculiar to the foreign tourist. In other words, the problem can be summarized that the Iban's culture have been literally showcased, with the government efforts to exaggerate images for tourists and for other commercial purposes. As shown in such a case, various *host* and *guest* problems are necessarily caused by the "tourist curious gaze", as have been pointed out in many literatures of tourism. It is important to consider well to invent new forms of tourism that can prevent or evade the problems threatening the *host* and *guest* relationship.

Current situation of the Brunei's tourism industry

Brunei Darussalam (generally known as Brunei) is located in the northwest part of the island of Borneo. Land area is 5,765 km² with a near-pristine environmental record and more than 70% of its territory is covered by tropical rainforest. A population of approximately 430,000, Malays making up 65.7%, Chinese 10.3%, other indigenous—Dusuns, Ibans, Kedayans—3.4%, and expatriates from Europe, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and elsewhere 20.6%. Brunei is one of the multiracial nations, but also an Islamic kingdom.

Brunei joined to ASEAN in 1984. Brunei is one of the smallest ASEAN member



countries. However, owing to its oil and natural gas resources, it is an affluent nation. At present, more than ninety percent of the nation's annual income depends on oil and gas revenues and the country heavily depends on imports from neighboring countries for its daily essentials. Brunei is aiming to reduce its extreme dependence on natural resources, and it has increasingly emphasized the development of its tourism industry. One pillar of this effort is Community-Based Tourism (CBT), in which local communities take the initiative to create optimal plans to promote tourism that make the best possible use of the unique features of the local area and its traditional culture. The profits gained from CBT are recycled back into the communities.

During my field research from February 17th, 2015 to March 7th, I gained a deep understanding of the warm hospitality offered in some of the many villages taking a hands-on the CBT approach. For example, in Mendaram Besar, local residents work hard to ensure that visitors receive a detailed orientation before they enter the community. This orientation helps to keep cultural and religious difficulties to a minimum. Although every village has a unique approach, all of them display similar skill in reducing the cultural frictions that can arise due to intercultural contact as inbound tourism advances. This Bruneian style of flexibly responding to tourists' needs through CBT not only pleases the visitors but also serves to avoid acculturation problems for both tourists and the host community and to protect local lifestyles. In this paper, I would like to show that one important factor contributing to this method of working with other cultures can be found in Brunei's history of interactions with the outside world.

Brunei's interactions with the outside world prior to the fifteenth century

Although it is unclear exactly when Brunei emerged as a political unit, Chinese historical sources suggest that the predecessors to the Bruneian state were identified through the ages in various forms. During the Liang Dynasty (502–566) and the Sui Dynasty (589–618), the name Po-Li was used. During the Tang period (618–906), it was Po-Lo, followed by Po-ni (or Puni) during the Song (960–1279) and Ming (1368–1643) Dynasties. Furthermore, from before the sixth century, the Brunei region prospered as a port of call for traders from India and the Arabian Peninsula. The predecessor state to Brunei is also known to have repeatedly sent tribute missions to China, carrying goods such as coral, camphor, and spices. In addition to the business relationships with China, Brunei also had active trade with Siam (present-day Thailand). Thus, facts show that Brunei was an important member of the Southeast Asian trading sphere (Mohd. Jamil, 1990, pp.1-14; Morimoto, 1997, p.141).

Chinese people strongly influenced Brunei in the cultural sphere as well. During the Song Dynasty, the King of Brunei was recorded as wearing Chinese-style clothing and enjoying Chinese food. Other records from the same period state that the people of Puni were Buddhists, and it appears that during the Ming Dynasty, Brunei had still not converted to Islam. Several theories exist regarding when Brunei became an Islamic kingdom, but the 1363 conversion of

Sultan Muhammad Shah (reigned 1363–1402) probably marked the beginning of this development. Even as Brunei was being Islamized, its relationship with China continued thereafter, with repeated tributes being provided. Brunei's continued enthusiasm for paying tribute appears to have been motivated by its expectations of Chinese support for the expansion of its sphere of influence (Mohd. Jamil, 1990, pp.12-15; Shimomoto, 1986, p.6).

Thus, Brunei increased its national power while conducting trade. By approximately 1280, Brunei had begun to exert control over Luzon, Sulu, Sabah, and Sarawak. From the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries, Brunei developed into a powerful kingdom, expanding its authority as far as the greater part of North Borneo (the Kapuas river basin) and the northern part of the Philippines (the island of Luzon) (Sugimoto, 2007, p.42).

The Age of Exploration

In 1514, Brunei dispatched trading ships carrying a cargo of goods such as camphor, beeswax, pearls, and foodstuffs to Malacca, where they were traded for cloth and beads from India and brass bangles from China. On this occasion, Brunei sent gifts to the King of Portugal, who had occupied Malacca since 1511. Therefore, the dispatch of the trading ship appears to have played the role of a diplomatic corps. From 1523 to 1536, Portugal, which had been expanding into Southeast Asia to increase its profits from the spice trade, frequently used Brunei as a stopover on the Malacca–Moluccas route. Thereafter, even though the frequency of their interactions decreased, Portugal continued interacting with Brunei until it lost the Moluccas in 1574 (Shimomoto, 1986, pp.9-13).

In contrast, relations with Spain—which was also advancing into Southeast Asia but with its primary motive being the spread of Christianity—proved less than amicable. In 1571, Spain occupied Manila, which had been part of Brunei's holdings up to that point. The Spanish envisioned the proselytization of the entire Philippines, along with China, Taiwan, Japan, Borneo, and Cambodia, using Manila as the springboard for these evangelistic efforts. As an Islamic country, Brunei presented strident opposition to Spain, which attacked Brunei in 1578 and installed a puppet government. However, the Sultan regained power in the following year, and peace negotiations were opened. Confrontations continued to occur, including one in 1588 when Brunei supported a Muslim insurrection in Spanish-controlled Manila. However, amid increasing tensions with the Dutch, who were moving forward in controlling the East Indies, Spain signed a peace treaty with Brunei in 1599 to avoid being militarily outflanked (Shimomoto, 1986, pp.15-17).

In 1600, the Dutch sailed into Brunei, possibly to explore the region. Even though, there was a conflict between the two major powers of the Netherlands to the south and Spain to the north, Brunei displayed sufficient ability for nimble diplomacy. By increasing its economic profits through trade, it also enhanced its national strength (Shimomoto, 1986, p.19).

British and Japanese aggression

Taking its 1606 thrust into the Moluccas as an opportunity, Britain set out to establish multiple trading outposts in Java, southern Thailand, and other places. However, these efforts were blocked due to opposition from local forces and confrontations with other Western powers. As it strengthened its hold over India, Britain established its control over the Straits of Malacca, on the sea route between India and China, seeking to establish a stopover to advance its trade with China. It also planned to expand its holding further to Brunei and Sulu, where European dominance was not yet established. Britain's eastward expansion intimidated the Dutch who opened negotiations for an alliance with Brunei in 1831. However, these talks proved fruitless. At the time, Brunei was wracked by pirate activity and insurrections in its territories; the country's decline due to increasing discords in the royal family and a resulting decrease in trade rendered these problems intractable. Under these circumstances, in 1775, Brunei ceded the island of Labuan to the British East India Company and offered concessions in the pepper trade in return for assistance in thwarting piracy.

In 1841, the Briton James Brooke was awarded the governorship of Sarawak as a reward for his services in suppressing an insurrection there. Thereafter, Brooke expanded his realm to the point where he became a threat to Brunei's independence (Shimomoto, 1986, pp19-22).

Britain was not the only foreign country to be interested in Brunei. Beginning in 1845, the United States dispatched envoys to Brunei several times, signed a treaty of commerce, and opened a trading post. Naval vessels from the Italian and Australian fleets made inspection tours of Northwest Borneo in 1870 and 1875, respectively. These advances by other Western powers significantly affected the relation between Brunei and Britain. In continual decline and with its independence at risk, Brunei signed a Treaty of Protection with Britain in 1888. When oil was discovered in the country in 1903, Britain strengthened the terms of the treaty in 1906 and installed a Resident as an administrator. The Sultan was subsequently required to follow the Resident's lead in all matters unrelated to the Islamic faith; thus, while retaining the outward appearance of independence, Brunei effectively fell under British control.

Under British domination, ties with neighboring British-controlled countries became stronger. The links penetrated all the way to the level of private life in Brunei. For example, students graduating from Brunei's Malay-language educational system went on to Labuan to study in English. However, although Brunei was under British control, it did not become completely colonized, and a sense of pride in maintaining their autonomy was instilled in the people of Brunei (Shimomoto, 1986, pp. 24–31; Hickling, 2011, pp. 15–18).

With the onset of World War II in the Pacific, Japanese forces occupied Brunei to secure its oil and took possession of North Borneo in 1942. Although many points of uncertainty remain regarding the Japanese occupation, the people of Brunei appeared to have lived through this period in relative calm as the Japanese authorities adopted a moderate stance and the occupying forces invested considerable effort in local development. The Japanese army

withdrew after the Australian landing at Muara in 1945.

During the postwar period, the sharp rise in the price of oil and improved governance allowed Brunei to declare its complete independence in 1984, a status that it still enjoys today. Thus, we can conclude that modern Brunei has been shaped by negotiations and interactions with other countries dating back long before the present country came into existence and that this process has continued to the current day (Shimomoto, 1986, pp. 31–37).

Brunei's internationalism as seen through the history of its interactions with the outside world

Brunei, while being influenced by several foreign countries throughout its history, has developed a distinctive social structure and culture and has prospered economically. Against this backdrop, its people have been able to preserve their independence virtually without interruption, dealing flexibly with other cultures and demonstrating a stubborn resilience on occasion. While becoming an international trading site, riding the wave of Western colonialism yet never succumbing to it, and gaining access to vast national wealth through the development of its oil industry, Brunei has also developed as a tenacious sultanate and an Islamic Malay nation. Throughout this process, its people have fashioned both a flexible mentality in dealing with other cultures and a great pride in their own country. This attitude is reflected in how Brunei welcomes tourists today.

Tourism development in Brunei has been delayed due to the presence of major tourist destinations nearby and by the success of its oil industry. However, the country is aiming for a second bloom in the international arena through the progress of CBT and other forms of tourism. Foreign visitors bring the risk of cultural disruption and acculturation, but the sense of balance that the people of Brunei have exhibited regarding other cultures may represent a viable approach to realizing sustainable tourism if applied to Brunei's tourism policy.

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Viewing foreign countries, their peoples and cultures: What was the reason for Japonism in the West?

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Introduction

Loving one's own country should be taken for granted. If the love is not an exclusive one, the word "patriotism" might be acceptable. Nevertheless, no country exists as a singular phenomenon, and neighboring countries exert a mutual influence. Due to the development of traffic and communication throughout history, globalization is now a common term, which is used in the field of technology and exchange of commodities. People now have much more opportunity for travel. However, is the increased cosmopolitanism of our days also relevant when we speak of the understandings or/and misunderstandings of the lifestyle, society and cultural customs, and values of other civilizations that have been developed quite far from our own? Japonism is one such phenomenon in which people encountered another civilization and incorporated it into their own.

A positive view of Japan

My foremost concern is what exerts influence on the perception of other civilizations. Is perception always that of one individual? Is it possible to interpret it as that of the civilization to which the individual belongs?

The first state was Greece, a country in the Eastern Mediterranean, the height of whose civilization about 2500 years ago influenced the development of European culture. This early Greek culture was in its turn dependent on the influence of the Middle East, which passed on many achievements, such as literacy, the first democratic entities, and a wide range of art and thinking. To refer to non-Greeks, the Greeks used the word *barbaros* (in Greek writing, βάρβαρος). This was a neutral expression meaning "of a different culture," which might be compared with the Japanese word *gaikokujin* 外国人, or "people from outside." Over the course of time, however, the word became pejorative and came to include the connotation of depreciating or devaluing others who do not belong to one's own country. The term "barbarian" today has the negative meaning of not sharing one's culture.

However, throughout history, there have been positive views on others as well. Since Japan is in the subject of my paper, allow me to open a book entitled *Japonica* [Note 1], by a certain Edwin Arnold, a British writer who visited Japan during the Meiji period. He spent Christmas of the year 1890 (Meiji 23) in Kyoto. In his book, he quotes some comments of his European predecessors who had been able to visit Japan earlier than he had. Arnold begins this list with Saint Francis Xavier, who lived in Japan with a mission of propagating Christianity

for around two years in the middle of the sixteenth century, during the Sengoku period. Francis Xavier's conclusion about the Japanese people was "This nation is the delight of my soul!" He thought they were the best people he ever had the chance to live with.

Arnold quotes Will Adams, an Englishman who came to Japan on board a Dutch ship as a pilot-major. This was about 60 years later, at the beginning of the Edo period: "The people of the Island of Japan are good of nature, courteous above measure and valiant in war. Their justice is securely executed without any partiality upon transgressors of the law. They are governed in great civility. I mean, not a land is better governed in the world by civil policy."

A third person Sir Arnold mentions is a German physician, Engelbert Kaempfer, who stayed in Deshima in the service of the Dutch East India Company for a few years at the end of the seventeenth century: "The Japanese are bold, heroic, very industrious and endured to hardships ... [they are] great lovers of civility and good manners, and very nice in keeping themselves, their clothes and houses clean and neat. [...] As to all handicrafts, either curious or useful, they are wanting neither proper materials, nor industry and application, no need for masters from abroad. They rather exceed all other nations in ingenuity and neatness of workmanship." Arnold places these quotations at the beginning of his book to support his own positive view of Japan.

These quotations are all from well-known figures. I wondered whether such views could be found also as to be those of nonentities? As a historian who also sees history from the perspective of non-authorities, I have looked into the records of the ordinary lives of the butcher, the baker, and the candlestick maker, whose sentiments are usually not to be found in the materials found in archives and libraries. While looking for such sources, however, I came across a postcard of an unknown visitor to Japan, written in 1910 from Tokyo. The writer was apparently in his thirties and on a grand tour; his father was still active as an engineer in a charcoal mine on the Austro-Hungarian border.

"Dearest parents!" the young man wrote in German. "This Japan! The people here are not yet really immersed into our culture—unfortunately but in many respects fortunately. They think and feel different than we. But there is one thing they are quite a way ahead of us: the sense for beauty, equally for cleanliness and neatness. Anything here is charming, graceful, delicate. If you could see the tiny and sublime trees—of course similar to our trees but miniaturized. In a small bowl a really cute garden. I am wondering how the people here are able to think about such a beauty. Lafcadio Hearn found exactly the right words for this country and the people here. He understands this land profoundly, his genius makes any other description useless."

It is just a postcard, and yet it speaks volumes. The young man had apparently prepared himself by reading the works of the British writer Lafcadio Hearn [in Japanese *Koizumi Yakumo* 小泉八雲], who was a long-time resident of Japan, before his journey. A number of Hearn's writings on Japan were translated into many other languages. The German version was the

most Japonist, since the translator was like-minded and had his work supported by the illustrator Emil Orlik, a member of the Viennese painters' society Secession, who visited Japan a few years earlier, in 1900/1901. What a triangle! The nameless sample of the postcard's author (his signature is unfortunately not legible, although I tried to transcribe it. A few years later the charcoal mine was closed and the family moved from the village nearby to somewhere else), a famous European writer with an English father and a Greek mother, who lived and died in Japan, and an artist who was representative of the Austrian Japonism movement. Cultures go beyond borders!

A dream turning into real pictures—Chinoiserie

Having an interest in a certain country and its culture is not just an individual phenomenon. It can produce a public movement or even a fad to adore or respect a different culture.

If we were to provide an overview of the history of Europe in consideration of the relations to other civilizations, it would encompass three main cultural areas in different epochs respectively. First, there was Chinoiserie (East-Asia) in the 17th and 18th centuries, second came Orientalism (Near East & Northern Africa) in the 18th and 19th centuries, and the last, Japonism (Japan), was in the 19th and 20th centuries.

The expression Chinoiserie signifies China first of all, but in fact it applies more or less to East Asia as a whole, because people in Europe could not easily distinguish between Chinese and Japanese arts. If you examine the catalog of the exhibition entitled "China and Europe. Understanding China and Chinese fashions in the 17th and 18th centuries" (1973, Berlin) [Note 2], you will find that many items from outside Chinese borders were regarded as a part of the Chinese culture in Europe. The Chinoiserie period clearly was quite an extensive phenomenon, and it influenced all the countries of Europe, without any exception. There are two main reasons for this.

First, many European powers traded with China and shipped artistic products to Europe. Canton was the most important harbor in those days. Certainly, it was used for business, but it also had a role in fulfilling the wishes and expectations of certain circles of European buyers. The main reason for this fashion was the enthusiasm for such exotic decoration at aristocratic residences in every country of Europe. There was no palace, no estate, no aristocratic mansion without any items called Chinese.

Let us examine one example, the two so-called Chinese cabinets next to the large ceremonial room in the baroque palace of Schönbrunn in Vienna. The walls are decorated with blue-white porcelain. When these two cabinets were refurbished a few years ago, the curators discovered that about the one half of each of them was of Chinese make and the other half was of Japanese manufacture. Japanese kilns produced items in a Chinese style, which were then shipped by Dutch traders from Nagasaki to Europe. Since importation from both China and Japan was quite expensive, European potteries started to imitate Chinese and Japanese

porcelain. Thus, the Wiener Porzellan-Manufaktur was founded in 1718, following the Meissen, and it produced porcelain in an East Asian style, which was then followed by porcelain manufacture in other countries.

The second reason why Chinoiserie became popular in the West has a likewise comprehensive answer. Japan closed its doors to other countries at the beginning of the 17th century and excluded all foreigners, with the exception of a handful of Dutch traders. Not much information reached the West from Japan. China remained open. Europe had a very positive view of Chinese Confucian society. This positive view came to Europe via the Catholic Jesuit missionaries in China, who held in esteem Chinese society and the education of civil servants within the administration. Many Jesuits dressed like mandarins. Since they were trustworthy intellectuals, French philosophers such as Rousseau or Voltaire of the then-young Enlightenment judged Chinese values to be so rational that Europe could learn from them. That was the reason why Chinese people were not regarded as barbarians at that time.

However, Europe did not necessarily acquire knowledge in a proper or rational way. The contention and competition of the European powers and their imperialistic and aggressive demeanor toward China at the beginning of the 19th century made both sides hostile, which caused consequent setbacks. They both adopted an incorrect attitude. Enthusiasm disappeared. Suddenly, China was a backward country and the Westerner was the master.

Orientalism. A double-edged sword

Oriental art is also called Islamic art in Europe. The expression will admittedly continue in this sense in our museums, although in the last decade the word Islam has become a word of conflict due to political and ideological changes and diverse encounters and mutations between the Near East and the West. It is generally not used to denote a religious conception, though religion is a common value, but rather to bridge a number of different areas, from Iran (Persia), Turkey (the Ottoman Empire), Arab countries, and the whole of Northern Africa and combine these countries and their shared cultural background.

In fact, in spite of the diversity of its peoples and the vastness of its territory, the Orient was seen always as the cradle of European civilization. This applies foremost to the Mesopotamian region, the so-called Holy Land (Palestine), and the lands along the Nile. The West was thoroughly aware of its origin there. This remained in the mind of the people in the Roman or Christian cultural environment when, for various historical reasons, there was a parting between the Orient and Occident, when access into its inner regions were almost impossible and the Ottoman Empire tried to extend its military power into European soil. Nevertheless doings and dealings with Europe continued, and in the 18th century the Ottoman Empire opened its doors to the West. The imagination and interest of writers and artists increased. Many of them visited one or another region on a grand tour in the process of their maturation, and they brought back readers and connoisseurs the visual objects they produced

traveling from their imagination [Note 3].

Usually European artists looked or traveled into those regions where their native countries had been politically involved (such as Spain, France, and Great Britain) or where it was easy to travel to. From the turn of the 18th to the 19th century information became more easy of access. Mozart composed the opera *Die Entführung aus dem Serail* (*The Abduction from the Seraglio*), first performance in 1782, or the *Zauberflöte* (*Magic Flute*), popular since its premiere in 1791. More and more belles lettres were translated into European languages, among them poems by the Iranian poet Hafez. Missions from these Islamic countries visited Europe. European Imperialism was also not less influential.

Thus, the so-called Near East became attractive for European artists, and many average people decorated their dwellings with Oriental artifacts. This exotic furniture and pictures with unknown landscapes were completely different. Last not least there was a voluptuous touch that aroused the imagination. A husband surrounded with four wives? Is that believable? A nobleman, a pasha, with as many ladies as he could afford in his harem! Exotic? No, erotic! The best examples were provided by the French painter Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres (1780–1867), though he never traveled to the Orient. His contemporaries and today's connoisseurs might be delighted by these paintings depicting scenes of beauties, wearing just turbans on their heads, relaxing after a seraglio's bath.

One of the best known Orientalist painters was the Austrian artist Carl Leopold Müller (1834–1892), known as “Orient-Müller” or the “Egyptian Müller,” because in the second half of his life he spent a great deal of time in Egypt on his many travels and painted the country and the people of the area of the Nile almost exclusively. Captivated by the magic colors and the completely different atmosphere of the Orient, Müller created above all landscape studies flooded with light. In a letter from Cairo dated October 1877 to a painter friend in Vienna he called Egypt a wonderland and Germany boring. He wrote with melancholy that from this sunny country he would have to return into the Viennese winter. In January 1881, he wrote from Assuan (Upper Egypt) to his sisters in Vienna that to see the people there was a joy. Returning home in the evening he felt benumbed from the many surprising impressions. Thus, the only wish he has is to paint pictures to fairly mirror the enchantment spread over all nature [Note 4].

With his Oriental paintings, he established his famous reputation. The subjects of his paintings extended his fame, above all among the British clientele, who competed to acquire his works of art. His paintings are still sought after today. They are of a distinctive coloristic quality. It is not surprising that in 1890 he was elected principal of the Academy of Fine Arts in Vienna.

The problem of so-called Orientalism is that this movement was not free from cultural conceit. Looking at foreign authentic assets, extracting them from their social context and using them as toys for European eyes, reducing the foreign culture to what we want to see and not

what really was the fact. At least, one point is comprehensible—the true and candid phantasy to look at the other.

In his often-criticized book *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon 1978; translated into many languages), Edward W. Said (1935–2003) touched on exactly this point, that Western Orientalism had been for centuries a manifestation of imperialism. He mentions a “subtle and persistent Eurocentric prejudice against Arabo-Islamic peoples and their culture,” originating from a long tradition in the Western countries of false, romanticized images of the Middle East. Here, the dialog has not yet ended.

The love for the Orient was equaled and accompanied by a contempt, since the Orient is, as it was apparently said, lacking freedom. Human beings should be aware how little they know of themselves or their others, although they think they know. Would that apply also to the imagination in the field of Japonism?

Japonism. The third movement in Europe to esteem art from abroad

The opening of Japan by an American armada in 1853 and 1854 was a kind of an earthquake. Quite a few other Western countries had been thinking of forcing Japan to widen her doors for commercial exchange, since Japan with her large and well-educated population would be a welcome market for Western industrial products. The United States were ahead by a nose, and other European countries followed. At the beginning the Japanese government was not amused. The ruling aristocratic class, the samurai, acquired as a result of this political pressure and the advanced military power of Western countries an aversion and disgust, that culminated also in hostile encroachments. A difficult decade followed within the Japanese society over how to answer this strain from outside. Since it was clear that Japan would never win a war, they decided to turn the tables.

To become as quickly as possible par with Western politics, treated as equal as an independent country, they accepted the so-called Unequal Treaties with the Western powers. The opening was rapid. Western onlookers rubbed their eyes in disbelief. They wanted only a market, the rest should remain a tiny, obedient society. Thus, the perception and awareness of Japan became intense for both the Western power politicians and the Western artists who wanted to save Japan’s cultural tradition within their written or painted opera.

To close the gap in technology, the military, and other kinds of knowledge and learning Japan, set aside its former isolation policy. It would no longer pursue seclusion as it had for about 200 years, but it would be outgoing with the West. Hundreds of Western engineers, academics, and professionals were invited—of course with the expenses paid by the Japanese government—and likewise hundreds of Japanese students were sent abroad, also with their bills paid.

Japan came nearer to the West than the West had expected. Just as Japanese culture was, Japanese values and Japanese art were in a kind of a flux as East started to flow to West. In this

connection, of course also related to the economy, since it had to whip into shape the budget of the state in order to bear the substantial costs of modernizing the country, Japan appeared strikingly in the West. It participated in the fourth World Fair in Paris in 1867 and the fifth in Vienna in 1873. In Vienna, they exhibited items related to arts, crafts, and industry as well as agricultural products; Japan was emerging as a modern and self-conscious state. In 1868 (the first year of Meiji) a new government was established on top of the Japanese state with the new Emperor Mutsuhito, or Meiji, dispatching a large delegation of 70 men to Europe.

At the Paris World Fair Japan was still the outgoing government of the shogun, the then military leader, as well as two domains—the principalities of Saga and Satsuma. Nevertheless it was an important event within the history of art, with a special relation to Japonism. There is no clear date for when the first Western artist was attracted by Japanese art and created a piece of art influenced by Japanese style or Japanese taste, because even before this time, Western travelers published books and essays on Japan lauding the sense of beauty of that country. But what we know is that all the pieces of art the Japanese side exhibited prompted excitement, praise, and curiosity, influenced collectors, and made Japanese art known to the wider public. It is not inaccurate to state that this event in Paris was a quite influential starting point for Japonism in the West. This was when Japanese woodblock prints started to be popular in Europe.

To be more concise, we must distinguish so-called fine art from applied art. How to use the surface of a painting or etching and how to employ the space, these are one side of the coin, but since in course of industrialization in Europe many new products were invented, and these products also needed some design, many questions were open. Do all these items also require a sense for beauty?

The German physician and polymath Engelbert Kaempfer, cited in *Japonica*, answered this 300 years ago: “As to all handicrafts, the Japanese do not need masters from abroad. They rather exceed all other nations in ingenuity and neatness of workmanship.” Such insight and cognizance contributed to the fact why in London the Victoria & Albert Museum (at first called Museum of Manufactures) and in Vienna the Museum for Applied Art (*Museum für Angewandte Kunst*) were established—to provide expert samples to European artists and craftsmen. Samples from outside Europe, but with the greatest tendency for handicrafts and design from Japan. Our craftsmen in Europe had a lot to learn!

Japonism was learning, even when it was combined with curiosity or with a kind of naïveté. In May 1900, the princess Pauline Metternich, the foremost lady of Viennese society, organized a three-day charity event using the giant main building of the World Exhibition, where the Japanese had shown their arts and crafts in 1873. Hundreds of ladies sold Japanese items, and souvenirs from Japan or in Vienna printed picture postcards with Japanese motives, and all the ladies were dressed in kimonos. The event was called Kirschblüten-Fest (Hanami Festival). The least of those kimonos were bought in special shops dealing with artifacts from

Japan. Most of the dresses were handmade, either by the ladies themselves or by a Viennese tailor. The newspapers excelled each other in reporting, citing also the ladies' name, which lady had the most beautiful kimono and festival finery, even decorating the hairs with tangerines or other ingenious panoply. What a love for Japan!

To explain the fascination of Japonism in arts and crafts one would need illustrations. For this I would cite in a footnote a few publications in English for further reference [Note 5].

The Art of Japonism is found everywhere in the Western world. From the 1860s onwards, culminating around the turn of the century, in parallel with Art Nouveau until the 1920s. Certainly, this art is not really Japanese, but it expresses the attraction of Japan. Some artist traveled to Japan, some artists did not. This makes no difference. The main asset is the feeling. The American painter James Abbott McNeill Whistler (1834–1903), who lived mostly in Paris and in London, was never in Japan but he really understood the Japanese sensibility and easily combined it with Western art, to determine the essence of Japanese aesthetics and smoothly transferring Japanese style into European art, without merely copying it. Comparing the woodcut print by Utagawa Hiroshige depicting a night scene at Kyōbashi (a sheet from the series *Meisho Edo hakkei* [*Hundred famous views of Edo*]) and the inspiring painting by Whistler “Nocturne: Blue and Gold—Old Battersea Bridge” (1872/75) on the River Thames speaks for itself. The point of view, the extract, the true and individual composition could not be better.

No less important is the French artist Henri Rivière (1864–1951). His series transferring the *36 Views of Mount Fuji* by Katsushika Hokusai into a series of *36 Views of the Eiffel Tower* (*Les Trente-six Vues de la Tour Eiffel*, printed between 1888 and 1902), is one of the best examples of true and concise Japonism—art without copying.

Many Japonist artists traveled to Japan. During the Meiji–Taishō era, ten artists from Austria alone visited Japan to absorb the atmosphere on-site and to create their works, as well as ten renowned artists from England and many other countries.

One of these Western artist–travelers, who visited Japan on two journeys, was the Australian born Mortimer Menpes (1855–1938), an ardent Japonist who wrote an autobiographical book about his experience in Japan. He notes there an interesting comparison between the sense of beauty in Japan and that of the Western art world [Note 6]: “Japan might be said to be artistic as England is inartistic. In Japan art is not a cause, but a result—the result of the naturalness of the people [...] everywhere is to be found the all-pervading element of art and beauty. A rainy day in Japan is not, as it is in London, a day of gloom and horror, but a day of absolute fascination.”

From Chinoiserie to Japonism, or Japoniserie?

The cultural unity of Europe is owed to nothing other than the continual exchange of spiritual achievements, aesthetic currents, ideas, movements in art, sense of style, convictions, and

values, as well as religious faith to which neither the Alps nor seas could oppose obstacles. Thus, the entire Mediterranean space was in some way incorporated into European history, since progress from antiquity indirectly via the Islamic education fertilized the continent—enrichment by takeover. The Orient never was far away, so that the Near East or Middle East has been continuously been familiar to the West and a kind of a nostalgic desire. Thus, the Orientalism movement in Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries is comprehensible, since there was in those two centuries not much fear of the political and military danger of the Orient, as there had been before.

In spite of the seafaring which allowed colonial Europe to stride over all inhabited continents in a few centuries and extended its knowledge, meetings with the more distant regions of our globe primarily remained economical, not a spiritual factor. Europe was good enough for herself. In fact, the regions over the sea did not move so near. There were only two exceptions, whose roots could not be geographically further: those currents from the Far East which we call Chinoiserie or fashion for China, an aesthetic fascination which excited educated Europe in the 17th and 18th century, as well as Japonism, which arose from China's neighbor, a fashion for Japan, which in the world of Western art caused an aesthetic ardor through five decades and even longer, arousing the enthusiasm of many artists and art lovers all over Europe.

Japan and China are, in spite of their geographic proximity, astonishingly different in respect to language, culture, and values. But among other criteria they share an obvious similarity. A view from outside underlines these common characteristics: arts and crafts originating from China or Japan were beautiful and well made: porcelain, lacquerware, paper, silk. All these things were valuable and exotic as well. No matter what one knew about these countries, these items were so miraculous, because even the Jesuit missionaries reported and praised their culture, education, and governance. China quite positively influenced the French philosophers of the Enlightenment, who saw a model country that European civilization could learn from. The enthusiasm went sky high. However, most of the reports could only be believed, not checked, a perfect world was created: a romanticized picture Europeans created themselves, a picture which could not be corrected by reality at all. The right ground for dreams to grow!

In case of Japan it was something different. What was seen until the middle of the 19th century as a fairyland with ancient culture, suddenly changed within a few years to an advanced state. Society modernized itself, and the country stepped more and more perceptibly onto the international stage. Until that time, Japan had been such a lovely country, underlined by phantasy, being wonderfully, incredibly, and gracefully put together, a counter-image of Europe, a Europe that did not expect rapid changes or an approach to the West that was not thought of and all the more not wished. The Japonism movement in some ways should be seen as Japoniserie, since the art did not matter, but in many cases, it had Japanese-like properties and requisites in a specific way, as an expression of amazement. In this marveling over Japan there is a hopeful continued existence of the traditional Japan and not of the modern transforming

world. This tradition was created by the onlookers from the West, not from what they saw, but what they wanted to see according to their own images and imagination. There was a mixture of the recognition of the courageous and unmistakable successful Japanese ascent within the concert of the nations, at the same time based on a longing to adhere to a picture on Japan, dismissing its actual progress and reifying a traditional Japan. It is necessary to have a dream.

Notes

- [1] Sir Edwin Arnold: *Japonica*. With illustrations by Robert Blum, New York 1891
- [2] Verwaltung der Staatlichen Schlösser und Gärten. *China und Europa. Chinaverständnis und Chinamode im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert*. Ausstellung im Schloß Charlottenburg, Berlin 1973.
- [3] Gérard-Georges Lemaire, *The Orient in Western Art*. With a preface by Geneviève Lacambre. Köln 2005 (transl. from French: *L'univers des Orientalistes*. Paris 2000)
- [4] Adalbert Franz Seligmann (Ed.): *Carl Leopold Müller. Ein Künstlerleben in Briefen, Bildern und Dokumenten*. Wien-Berlin-Leipzig-München (Ricola Verlag): 1922, pp. 142/143, 175.
- [5] IVES, Colta Feller: *The Great Wave. The Influence of Japanese Woodcuts on French Prints*. New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art & New York Graphic Society, 1974
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Meiji Period. New York: Thames and Hudson, 2013

[6] Mortimer Menpes: *Japan. A Record in Colour*. Transcribed by Dorothy Menpes. London: Adam & Charles Black, 1901, p. 39/40. Menpes visited Japan two times, 1887 und 1896; the book contains 75 coloured picture prints he had painted in Japan.

II. Beyond language boundaries

A study on language policies in the modernization of France: The policy of language unification and regional language and culture

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Problématique

Generally speaking, Europe in the 19th century is called “the period of nationalism.” In fact, the formation and strengthening of the nation state advanced during the 19th century in Europe. The Industrial Revolution is one of the factors which promoted such a tendency. This Revolution made mass production possible, and therefore, economic competition between states intensified as they aimed for more economic growth. As a consequence, every state tried to strengthen its own national frame in order to promote its industrialization and to establish its financial and social basis. Through this movement, the “nationalities” of all of the states were formed. Such a movement also stimulated people to reform their thinking: they became aware of themselves as a nation and this consciousness promoted, more and more, nationalism in itself.

During this time period, especially in France, we can find another factor that promoted the formation of the nation state: the French Revolution. The Revolution, which defeated the absolute monarchism, pushed forward with the unification of France as a nation state. Even Robespierre (1758-1794), well-known as a dictator of the Reign of Terror, organized several revolutionary festivals (“Fêtes révolutionnaires”), and one of them is focused on the unification of the nation. Furthermore, it is said that Napoléon I spread the spirit of human rights and the idea of the nation state widely over the European states. The French Revolution therefore should be considered as one of the most influential matters for the formation of nation states in Europe. In effect, the beginning of the 19th century was the moment of the paradigm shift for European states.

As to the formation of a nation state especially in France, it was the language unification policy that was viewed as the most important means for promoting this formation. This policy influenced the current state and values of the language. It brought about revival movements of regional language and culture. Nowadays, although France seems to be a steadfast country with French as a principal national language, its structure is actually complex, composed of several languages and cultures. Historically, the regions in France wavered with their own identities, against the Revolutionary administration’s policy of the language unification. Therefore, through the national language policy and related issues, the current diversity of language and multi-language coexistence can be discussed.

In this article, we discuss the relation between French language policy and regional languages, especially by taking up the language of Provence, in the southern part of France.


More precisely, we focus on the Provençal language and the “Movement of Félibrige, the revival movement of language and culture of the region. In addition, considering that this subject might link with a present problem on a global scale, i.e., globalization and linguistic-cultural diversities, we also discuss the relation among languages and cultures with human communities.

After the problématique mentioned here, we introduce, in the second section, the policy of language unification under the French Revolution by referring to its background and also to the structure that effectively suppressed the regional language. In the third section, we discuss the revival movement of regional language by focusing the case of Provence, the southern area in France, by introducing the “Félibrige” movement and Frédéric Mistral, one of its founders. In order to understand the case of Provence, in the fourth section, we turn to a Japanese case, especially its language policy after the Meiji Restoration. Finally, in the fifth section, we discuss the influence of the language policy on regional language and culture. Considering that this matter might be related to the present issue of globalization and regional diversities, we then try to clarify the structure of the relation between the nation and the regional societies by applying the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis.

Through the discussion, we attempt to show that in France, the regional language has struggled against the national policy of language unification. Moreover, we also try to shed light on the structure and the formation of modern nation state and its local regions.

The movement of the language unification in France: Its historical background and enforcement under the French Revolution

Historically speaking, there have existed eight kinds of regional languages (les langues régionales) in France. They consist of two genres: the Oil language (la langue d’Oil) of the northern part and the Oc language (la langue d’Oc) of the southern part. The difference between these two genres was derived from the Germanic migration. The northern region of the Loir River had been influenced by the Goths, and the southern region had still kept the Roman culture. Especially in southern France, Occitan, Corsican, Catalan, and Basque all exist as regional languages. Each of them has been, in itself, an independent language and formed its own proper culture. The Provençal language, which is the subject of this article, is one of the Occitan family languages.



Because of the structure, language unification should be an important subject in the relatively early stage of history in France. Initially, French was regarded as a form of collapsed

Latin. However, French secured the privileged position as the national language in the 16th century. François I enacted the “Ordonnance de Villers-Cotterêts” as the unification of language policy in 1539, assigning the highest value to the French language as an official language in France. In addition, the French government was forbidden to use other languages (including Latin, Provençal, Basque, and so on) except French. The movement of the policy of language unification continued thereafter. Richelieu (1585-1642), who was the cardinalate and the chief minister of Louis XIII, established the Académie Française in 1635. The Académie also promoted the standardization of the French language in a nation state of France. With the advancement of the formation of the French language and its diffusion, its superiority was vested as an official language.

Nevertheless, it is between the 18th and 19th century that language unification took place in the whole territory of the nation state of France, along with the development of nationalism. In fact, the 19th century is considered to be the period when nationalism rose up and the modern nation states were formed. Anderson points out that in the 19th century, the nation state and the people, awakened to the realization of identity, rallied their mentality, and tried to promote the unification of a modern nation state. The concept of “national people” was defined as the members composed and integrated in a community within the state. Anderson (2006) continues:

“Nation is an imagined political community-and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”(p.6).

“As observed earlier, the major states of nineteenth-century Europe were vast polyglot polities, of which the boundaries almost never coincided with language-communities...” (p.196).

“The convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation.” (p.46)

Above all, in France, the spirit of the French Revolution played an important role to form the nation and the nation state. Furthermore, as the official French language as a national language spread to the educational systems of the regions of the whole state, the disparity between the French language and the regional languages increased more and more. In fact, during the Revolution, Barère and Père Grégoire, who were revolutionary members of the clergy, stated that a consistent language was the very factor that made France’s historical solidarity and also asserted that its cultural “homogeneity” was rooted in the same territory. They also noted that this ensured that no internal divisions would exist within the popular public awareness of the new nation (Adachi, 2015).

After the 19th century, the state pushed language policies along with a rising sentiment of nationalism, and the use of the various regional dialects became restricted. For example, the Provençal dialects of southern France were regarded as perpetuating unenlightened ideas, and their use was forbidden. State nationalism created a national awareness that could be considered the same across the country through this sort of unification into a single language and culture; however, this result was produced by a cultural movement that created conflict and could be termed as a “mini-nationalism” of regions that opposed the state and this policy condensed within the nation. A considerable number of language and cultural revival movements also arose in the French suburbs.

As mentioned above, the movement of language unification in France has a long history. It became accelerated, however, during the Revolution, when the government centralized all power to develop the exhaustive policy of language unification against regional languages as a hostile language of “ethnic” (regional) nationalism (Tanaka, 1996, pp.147-148). For example, from 1790 onward, Father Grégoire investigated regional languages nationwide and proposed their destruction. Father Grégoire, receiving the results of the investigation, introduced to the National Convention a recommendation of the entire obliteration of regional languages called “les 9 Prairial an II” (the 9th month in the French Revolutionary calendar; June 1793) (Auguste Brun, 2016, p.94).

Barère and Father Grégoire insisted on a high degree of homogeneity. Their ideals can be interpreted as follows. All the national members have to share the Republic’s interests. To this end, it is indispensable to spread the national language (“la langue nationale”). Further, the regional languages (“les idioms particuliers”) should be prevented from expanding. Finally, a national language guarantees the “homogeneity” of the nation state. The republican government thus increasingly centralized its power to form a unified nation state. In fact, the following words could be seen in the Convention national in September 1793 (Baudin, 2010, p.25):

Citoyen! Qu’une sainte emulation vous anime pour bannir les contrées de France, ces jargons qui sont encore des lambeaux de la féodalité et l’esclavage.

(Nation! What a saint emulation encourages you to banish the regions of France. The lingos still rest as a part of the feudal and slavery systems).

However, despite the emphasis of the government, the policy of language unification had many difficulties. In reality, at the end of the 18th century, only half of the French population of twelve million spoke French. Additionally, among them, only three million spoke “correct” French. Even at the present day, more than two hundred years after the Revolution, 30% of the entire population of France do not consider the French language as their mother tongue (Tanaka 1996, p.246; Eugen Weber, 1976, p.67.). This signifies that the regional people have maintained a

deep attachment to their own languages and cultures. And, for this reason, the revival movement of regional language and culture flourished for quite a while after the Revolution.

The revival movement of language and culture in France,

(1) Provençal Language

As mentioned above, in France, there exist eight regional languages (“*langues régionales*”). Provençal language belongs to the “Occitan language,” part of the Roman language family. The region of the Occitan language (including the Provençal language) was called “Occitania.” Occitan is an independent language with a literary expression, which had its roots in the oral tradition of epic and popular folklore. The Provençal language was used in the literary expression by the Troubadour, a group of minstrels, in the 11th century. Their literary activities influenced Italian poets in the Medieval Ages (Valle & Patota, 2008, p.42.). It is known that even Dante Alighieri followed the poem of the Troubadour [Note 1]. This suggests that the Provençal language was established as a literary language.

However, in 1209, Occitania, the southern part of France, was annexed to northeastern France (the region of “*ile-de-France*”) by the Albigensian Crusades (*Croisade des Albigeois*). As a result, the Troubadour and their literature of southern France was declining. Soon after, King Aragon, who reigned Languedoc (the southern part of France, on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea), put Occitania under his rule temporarily. Finally, in 1258, when the Treaty of Corbeil was enacted, King Aragon retreated from Occitania to the southern part of Pyrenees, and the Kingdom of France came to control Occitania. Afterward, three hundred years later in 1539, François I promulgated the “*Ordonnance de Villers-Cotterets*.” As a consequence, the regional languages as well as the Provençal language had been rapidly declining. Not only the languages, but also people’s activities and their cultures lost their liveliness.

(2) The revival movement of the language and culture of Provence: Félibrige and Frédéric Mistral

Since the French revolution, the French government had been promoting the policy of language unification, whereas the men of letters of some regions began the movement to revive regional languages and cultures. In the 19th century, above all, Europe was facing a problem comprising two opposite directionalities. On the one hand, modern nation states were established and were struggling for supremacy against one another. On the other hand, the revival movement of an indigenous movement of culture was gaining strength in each region. France was in this precise situation. In the southern region of France, the revival movement, affected by the “romanticism” of those days, awakened the admiration of the medieval poets like the Troubadour.

One of the most famous revival movements in the 19th century was the Félibrige movement, which rose in Provence. More precisely, it was founded at the Châteauneuf-de-Gadagne near Avignon in the Department of Vaucluse, on May 21, 1854, by seven young Provençal poets: Frédéric Mistral, Joseph Roumanille, Théodore Aubanel, Anselm Mathieu,

Paul Giéra, Alphonse Tavan, and Jean Brunet (Baudin, 2010, pp.27-29.). The main purpose of the organization was to revive the Provençal language (dialect) and the traditional culture, including also the languages and cultures of all the Latin peoples in Pays d'Oc. In other words, the objective of Félibrige was both the reconstruction and the conservation of the history, the culture, the language usage, and the tradition of Provence (also Occtania, more widely). The literature written in the Provençal language was also included.

In order to restore the Provençal culture that had been cast into disfavor by the great French civilization, the Félibrige first established a unified spelling system for the Provençal dialects and then attempted to oppose the French government's heavy-handed centralized language policy by writing poems using this spelling system. The home minister approved Félibrige as an official group in 1877, and for a time, there was a rise in Provençal culture. After World War I, this revival occurred in a region that was so impoverished that it was said to be suffering a slow death, and thus, the revival was passed on in the form of régionalisme.

However, Félibrige did not always go well. For example, Mistral, one of the founders, advocated the federal system in order to keep the identity of Provence. Consequently, Mistral was condemned as separatist. Truly, there existed some complications in the relationships among the Félibrige members.

Here, we focus on Mistral, the central figure of Félibrige. Frédéric Mistral was born on September 8, 1830, in Maillane near Saint-Rémy-de-Provence, where he spent his childhood. In 1845, he met Joseph Roumanille, who became Mistral's good colleague and later founded the Félibrige. Roumanille was also engaged in the revival movement. At that time, there were many labor poets in southern France who wrote their works in the language of their birthplace. They themselves, however, held their own language in low esteem. Roumanille appealed to them to recognize the purity of their natal language, which among other of his admonitions influenced and inspired Mistral greatly.

In the 1851, Mistral graduated from the legal university of Aix-en-Provence and after that began his activities as a poet, strongly emphasizing the literature of southern France and especially the revival movement of the Provençal language. Then, to maintain Provençal language and culture, he focused on the following three points: (1) to animate Provençal culture which has been disparaged, (2) to revive the historical languages in various regions, and (3) to put his ardor into the sublime poets in Provençal language. Then, with these three points as his motto, he began to write his masterpiece, "Mireio", in Provençal language. On February 4, 1858, Mistral finished "Mireio" (later, he also wrote "Mireille" in French). The work was well received in Paris, because of the rhythmic purity of the Provençal language. As a result, he decided to disseminate his ideology of "Félibrige" in Paris (René Jouveau, 1984, p.98-99). In February, 1859, he published "Mireio." Soon after its publication, it gained a considerable reputation and the first edition was sold out by June of the same year. Mistral was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature for "Mierio" from the Swedish Academy on December 10, 1904.

The Nobel Prize conferred a great glory on Félibrige. Until then, it had been considered a secessionist organization that demanded Provençal independence in a federal system, but the achievement changed this situation. In 1877, the Home Minister of French Government approved Félibrige as an official group. And consequently, the revival movement of the Provençal language and culture flourished for a while. In 1895, the French government awarded to Mistral the “Ordre Royale de la Légion D’honneur.” In addition, in 1913, Raymond Poincaré, President of France, visited Provence to meet Mistral. On this occasion, Mistral and the members of Félibrige advocated that Provence continue to be a part of France.

However, the regional movement of language and cultural, which opposed nationalism, could be termed as a regional “mini-nationalism,” at best. Even the standardization of the orthography of the Provençal language as well as the organization of several regional festival signified the existence of Provence only as a mini-nation. After Mistral’s death in 1914, the activities of Félibrige became less powerful, and even the revival movement of Provence decreased more and more. Moreover, from World War II until the present, the movement did not have the impact of the original regional revival movements.

A comparative study: the unification of language education under the Meiji Restoration

(1) The formation of the national language in Japan during the Meiji period

A similar movement with regard to language in the modern state was also observed during the Meiji Restoration at the time of the modernization of Japan. “Liberal education” was carried out in temple elementary, private, and clan schools in Japan before the 19th century. A unified secondary school system with a national language education had not yet been created. In Japan, the dismantling of the shogunate feudal system was accompanied by the formation of a unified national polity, and in 1871, Mitsukuri Rinsho and Uchida Masao, scholars of Western learning, drafted the School System Act. This action led to the establishment of the Ministry of Education and an official proclamation for a “school system.” This step was used as an opportunity to attempt the creation of a modern “Japanese individual” through the standardization of language by the state’s initiative in establishing a common education and the cultivation of a shared normative consciousness. The background of these developments was the Japanese government’s intention of putting Japan on an equal footing with Western powers. Fukuzawa Yukichi advocated in *Bunmeiron no Gairyaku* that this intention can be seen in Japan’s Westernization movement during the Meiji era. For this reason, Japan was pushing forward with modernization by aiming for the Western, and in particular European, principle of “one nation, one people, one language” (Uchida, 2008, p.52). The advocates of a national language policy during that time were influenced by the doctrine of the supremacy of Western civilization, and they studied and emulated the West’s view of language and its phonetic letters. These supporters of a national language policy considered the symbolic system of Chinese characters inferior and had a propensity for phonetic letters. Moreover, Mori Arinori, the first

minister of education in the Meiji government, went so far as to propose the Romanization of the Japanese language, and for a time, he was able to gain a certain degree of public approval. Ueda Kazutoshi also asserted that the Japanese people would be far more strongly unified if they learned a uniform national language (Uchida, 2008, pp.53-54). Furthermore, finally, this ideology of Western supremacy even perceived Japanese people as intrinsically inferior to Westerners and even recommended that Japanese people marry them.

However, these Western-centric policies later fell into ideological chaos. Kato Shuichi stated that the resultant Japanese culture was a hybrid one and that the experiments trying to follow Western or nationalistic principles completely had ended in failure. He criticized the Meiji modernization policies as those simply existing in the same space simultaneously but without seeking a coherent combination of the different thoughts (Maruyama, Masao, 2009, p.63). The process of forced modernization could even be considered to be causing Japan to lose its original identity and cultural roots.

The concept of “regionalism” in Japan was born out of a critical awareness of the issues related to Westernization and modernization, and in 1935, Japanese romanticism emerged. This movement could also be regarded as a type of “regionalism” that criticized modern foreign thought imported since the Meiji Restoration. In Japan, there was a return to farming villages and people’s homelands that preserved traditions and indigenusness that followed the model of the German “Homeland Art Movement” (*Heimatkunstabewegung*). However, it is ironic that in this case, the ideology of Japanese romanticism became the ideology that promoted the wars against Europe and America.

Nowadays, the movements to protect characteristic languages and cultures in every region are currently becoming officially recognized. Nevertheless, the critical situation that minority languages face remains unchanged. In Japan, there are now movements that praise the Ainu or Okinawan languages and cultures, but even more energy needs to be put into these efforts. The reason why the critical situation faced by minority languages has not improved is likely because the knowledge and skills that people need to learn with regard to various political and economic settings within a society have to be learned almost entirely in the national or official language.

(2) Comparison of Japan and France

A comparative analysis of the formation of the nation state and language policy in Japan and in France is worthwhile.

Following the end of the 19th century, regional language and cultural revival movements sprang up in all European countries in response to nationalist movements, and they spread to countries outside Europe too. Many studies on this phenomenon were conducted during the postwar period. Moreover, a more tolerant attitude toward language policies arose, an example being the enactment of the Loi Deixonne in 1951 in France. This was the first time that the significance of teaching languages other than French was recognized legally in France.

Moreover, in June 1982, the French Ministry of Education endorsed teaching “regional languages” throughout the entire education system all the way through to the university level, but it did not specify the names of these regional languages.

Compared with France, the national language of Japan was coined under the modern nation state system by Mozume Takami (Tanaka, 1996, p.145). The national language of Japan is the most analogous to “langue nationale,” a word coined in the middle of French revolution. Namely, it shows the influence that “langue nationale” has on the revolutionary concept upon a field of language. National language intensified the political color and took an important role in the formation of the nation state (Tanaka, 1996, pp.147, 148).

It can be noted here that language policy welled up internally in the awakening of self-awareness in France, whereas language policy occurred by the force of an outside power in Japan [Note 2].

In France, the language policy had the backing of the central Revolution government, and it had at its core the Revolutionary spirit of the people. In short, “langue nationale” had a will. On the other hand, in Japan, the national language was formed by the westernization policy of the Meiji government. The conversion was realized by the centralized Meiji government, not by the citizens’ volition.

Nevertheless, similarities exist between Japan and France in the consciousness of each country’s people deeply rooted to their respective regional language and culture. The movement connected revolution regional language and culture like the Féribrige in France, while it converted into regionalism in Japan. In particular, in the case of Japan, regionalism rose from the criticism of modern ideas of Western Europe, i.e., an external factor. Even so, such a movement of this period in Japan characterizes a kind of recurrence to indigenous life style of tradition. This case is similar to the revival movement of regional language and culture in France. These movements involved implicitly in problems that preserved globalization and diversity.

The formation of the modern nation state and its language policy in a cultural perspective

(1) The relation between language and culture vis à vis the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis

What do culture and civilization mean to human beings? Prof. Shuntaro Ito proposes a model to answer this question. In a community, people’s activities form a sphere that totally synthesizes their sense of value. The sphere consists of its outer shell and inner core, with the outer shell corresponding to the civilization of the community and the inner core to culture. The outer shell would be varied or even ameliorated by outside influences such as technologies and the like. In contrast, the inner core would not be easily mutable, and it maintains its identity. Human language and culture primitively belong to the inner core.

Here, we try to apply the theory of Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis to this model in order to add the factor of language to it.

Simply put, the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis claims that language, which each culture embraces, determines the way of thinking and habits of the culture. According to the hypothesis, human thoughts and behavioral patterns depend on linguistic habits. In consequence, in some communities, people's mental understanding of the world depends on the linguistic structure they possess. It follows that ways of thinking and behavioral patterns vary in communities in which different languages are used.

Sapir, referred to by Whorf (1939/1956, p.134) states as follows:

“Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society... The fact of the matter is that the “real world” is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group”

Sapir's remark implies that language characterizes every human being and society. This suggests also the important function of languages in societies, because language forms each society and its culture.

About the function of languages mentioned above, Sapir (1921, p.236) stated as follows:

“... languages are more to us than systems of thought-transference. They are invisible garments that drape themselves about our spirit and give a predetermined form to all its symbolic expression.”

The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis proposes a fundamental structure of the relation between language and culture. The culture of a community is defined and formed by language. More precisely, the language used in a community “prepares” human thoughts, which determine human activities. When a personal action and utterance are transmitted to other people and influence them, the people's thoughts of the community, in turn, come to form the identity of the society, and their own culture is brought to fruition. Of course, such a structure might be in some ways an extreme theory. It should not be denied however that language and culture interdepend mutually in a community.

Through the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis, we can recognize an aspect of the culture of the Ito Model on culture and civilization. The culture, as an inner core of the sphere for a community, should be formed by its “homogeneity,” the people's common consciousness preserved through their language. In other words, the people's thoughts and customs are wrapped with a skin of common language, and such “homogenous” language community forms a culture. In this case, the common language should be a mother tongue of the community. It is quite possible to say that the mother tongue influences people's everyday thinking and

perceptivity in the community. Therefore, each community could form its own culture. As to this, Isaac Deutscher (2011, p.136) points out, as follows [Note 3]:

“Since ‘language is the forming organ of thought’, there must be an intimate relation between the laws of grammar and the laws of thinking. ‘Thinking’, he concluded, ‘is dependent not just on language in general but to a certain extent on each individual language’.”

After all, the communities whose languages are different from each other demonstrate the “heterogeneity” in each other.

We address here what binds the homogeneous language community. Takatori & Hirano discussed the problem by referring to H. D. Brown’s study. Brown (2007, p.188) states that a culture “is the ‘glue’ that binds a group of people together”. This suggests that the members of a society are tied up with something that forms the community in which their personal and social existence are guaranteed. Culture thus guarantees this binding in the community where members share their cognition and activities. Takatori & Hirano (2014, pp.21-32) point out as follows:

“... people, “glued” by culture, ... (restrain themselves) ... own thoughts and actions by selecting the culture, and for that reason, they are aware of a social existence as a community member defined by the culture. Then, people learn a way of thinking, sensitivity, and daily habit defined by the culture in which they live, and in turn, those human activities characterize a community as culture.”

From the quotation above, it could be concluded that the “homogeneity” of a community is maintained and strengthened through the process of constructing such a common consciousness of the same “tribe,”

(2) The relation between modern nation state and language policy: Homogeneity and heterogeneity

A human learns, at first, his mother tongue at birth. If the nation state into which he is born consists of several regions, and the language of his region is not the same as the national language, he has to learn language through education. What then does the national language mean for him? The national language is the common and standard language in the nation where he is living. Although the national language is not the same as his mother tongue, it is necessary and even obligatory that he use it through his life, because the social system of the nation state is based on it. His mother tongue is merely one of the dialects of the nation state.

On the other hand, the national language can be considered a dialect. It is said that Max Weinreich defines the national language as “a dialect with an army and navy” [Note 4]. This

suggests the possibility that a dialect plays the role of a national language. When a community gets an opportunity to dominate the other communities in the nation, its dialect become the national language under political fiat and social decision. This structure clarifies the relation between the national language policy and the regional revival movement to language and culture. We later apply such structure to the case of France.

Based on the discussion in the last section, we try to examine the relation between national language policies and regional languages, from a viewpoint of cultural and civilization studies. According to the argument over language and culture including the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis, it is quite clear that “language is the structural factor of social community and also the form of social activities” (Takatori & Hirano, 2014, pp.21-32, p.28). In the case of France, each of eight regions had historically maintained its own regional sense of a kind sustained by language and culture. Such a situation is considered to be the coexistence of eight “heterogeneities.” On the contrary, the policy of the unification of French language after the Revolution brought about the reinforcement of the assimilation into the modern national spirit. Moreover, it meant the introduction of the “homogeneous” view of the world under language unification. As a consequence, the policy forced not only the unification of the French language, but also the conversion of regional cultures and people’s thinking. This is a principal reason why various revival movements of regional language and culture such as *Félibrige* rose up.

The introduction of a standard language in a nation might force all of the national people to share a common standard culture. Here, we can find the structure that, as in the Ito Model, the inner core of culture is corroded from the outside. For the people living in each region, it is their own culture formed by language that creates the boundary drawn between themselves and the others. Therefore, such a corrosion should be equal to the invasion of their identity, finally making it unavoidable that their identity, in itself, would become more and more lost.

This tension between the national policies of unification and the regional societies mirrors the modern one between globalization and the maintenance of diversities. In fact, we actually are facing two contrasting directionalities. In such a context, considering the nationalism “modern” and regional society “traditional,” the difference in their potential power is obvious. The various regions were at a disadvantage against the unification of the French language, which was wielded as a weapon to civilize them. The regions were never fully able to compete equally with the nation in their education systems in terms of economic or industrial policies.

In the case of France, before the Revolution, the regions kept the balance of “soft and gentle heterogeneity.” But the Revolution allowed the central government of the nation to overcome the regions with French as standard language, though French was originally one of regional language. As a result, the culture formed under French became armed on the pretext of the unification of national nation and clothed itself with an armor of “modernization.” Such a culture could thus be called a “civilized culture” or a “disciplined culture.” On the

contrary, the culture originally maintained in each region could be called a “native culture” or a “primitive culture” [Note 5]. As such the relation between the national language policy and the regional languages in France is considered a kind of structural domination of the “native culture” by the “civilized culture.” The “civilized culture,” which possesses several powers in politics, economy, science, and technology directed by the central government, comes to surpass the “native cultures” overwhelmingly. Finally, the “soft and gentle heterogeneity” in the nation disappears, and soon, what is left is the “bound homogeneity” of the nation with only a small remainder of the “fragile heterogeneity” of the regions. (Fig.1).




Fig.1

Further discussion

When two communities with different cultures interact on their boundary, two kinds of changes are brought about. The first case is that, under mutual influence, some parts of cultures are maintained, and other parts are varied. The second case is that one culture expands to encroach on the other culture. When one culture involves the other, the latter loses its boundary. The changes could be considered as a transformation of their niches. Here, niche means a set boundary formed by language and culture.

In this article, we discussed the national language policy and the regional language after the French revolution. Ultimately the unification of the French language has overcome the regional language and culture. Through the discussion, it could be seen that, in France, the “soft and gentle heterogeneity” of the regions maintained before the Revolution disappeared because of the belligerent policy of language unification. The regions assimilated into the niche formed by the modern national state. In other words, with only a slight boundary, the native culture was overrun by the civilized culture.

Our comparative discussion of France and Japan leads us to a discussion of the problem of minor languages. Movements to protect characteristic languages and cultures in every region

are currently becoming officially recognized. Nevertheless, the critical situation that minority languages face remains unchanged. In Japan, for example, there are now movements that praise the Ainu or Okinawan languages and cultures, but even more energy needs to be put into these efforts. The reason why the critical situation faced by minority languages has not improved is likely because the knowledge and skills that people need to learn with regard to various political and economic settings within a society must be learned almost entirely in the national or official language.

Amid the globalization of the masses and capitalism, a common language has gained priority as a means of communication in modern societies, and the teaching of an official or universal/international language has become expected. The social demands for a shared understanding of historical or international problems and for the knowledge of a common language have supported these trends. It will be difficult to stop now-living minority languages from dying out unless this system changes. The ever-increasing disparities between official languages and various regional languages have led to the disappearance of minority languages, and the extinction of a language also means the extinction of a culture, its identity, and its knowledge.

Going forward, it is extremely important to consider ways to improve the difficult situations into which a variety of minority languages were forced by the dominant development of civilization.

Notes

- [1] Dante imitated “sestina”, a kind of rhyme, introduced by Arnaldo Danielli, a poet of Provence. Cf. Dante Alighieri (1925), p.222.
- [2] N.B. The “external factor” mentioned here is not the invasion of foreign languages, like English domination today, but one of the domestic policies.
- [3] Deutscher does not absolutely agree with the Linguistic Relativity advocated by Sapir and Whorf.
- [4] It is not sure that Max Weinreich, himself, declared the sentence. It might be in the question-and-answer with somebody in the occasion of his lecture at school.
- [5] The concept of “civilized culture”, “native culture”, etc. was introduced in the discussion with Professor Hirano, in the occasion of the Core-Project Seminar of the Institute of Civilization Research, Tokai University, organized by him. We call the relation between “civilized culture” and “native culture”, the Culture Assimilation Model (Structure). However, the concept of these terms has not been defined so clearly yet. We will discuss it in another opportunity, as well as the idea of “niche” mentioned in the context (cf. Section 6).

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Civilization dialogue between Europe and Japan: Or the strange case of N. F. S. Grundtvig and Japan

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The heritage of hegemony

This article is going to be of quite a mixed nature. It is an article that seeks to develop a notion of an unexpected case of cultural exchange, and it is an article that seeks to enlighten the very problems, originating from a notion of exchange that may be false. And it is an article that in the light of this presents a person, who shows us all some important facts.

The dialogue between cultures

There are many ways in which the co-operation between nations or even regions take place, and there are areas that are more evident than others. If I were to be asked, if I could point out areas where Denmark co-operate with Japan on a cultural level, I would have to consider it for quite a while, and then I would probably say what everybody else would say; Hans Christian Andersen, the Little Mermaid, LEGOLAND and the export of pork. However, we too have gained tremendously from the very special and fine culture of Japan in many ways. Japan has enriched us with an infinite number of self-protection system in the form of Karate, Jiu-Jitsu, Judo, Kendo, Aikido and others that seem to be very well accepted into Danish culture. Culinary novelties such as sushi, sake, wasabi. And had it not been for Japan, a certain, yellow cartoon figure, called Pikachu would never have rampaged our television screens for decades, accompanied by the rest of the Pokémon gang and leading to a whole new interest in Japanese cartoon culture with Manga spearheading this development. Not long after we were introduced to the genius of Hayao Miyazaki and his cartoons.

Cars, cameras, instant noodles, cakes, Walkman, Betamax... the list of the incredible entrepre-neurship of Japan goes on and on. However, when we look a little closer, it can be quite a challenge to spot Japanese culture amid all this. Many of these Japanese products are very well adapted artefacts to so-called Western culture, so where do we spot Japan in all this?

Unknown to most people, one of Denmark's finest and most renown industrial designers, Jacob Jensen, previously chief designer for Bang & Olufsen, was heavily inspired by Japanese architecture, value adding and minimalism when designing for B&O (Olesen, 2003). When less is more, and you are able to add persistent value, the end product will be worth it all, so he stated. So, the interesting observation is that despite an apparent invisibility Japan peeps out between the heavy sheets of Western culture and their defined reality.

In a paper from 2016 the excellent Italian researcher Guiseppina Marsico launches a very fine analysis of the (other) function of borders, in which she states that borders are ubiquitous,

who set, organize and regulate our social and psycho-logical existence. If we take this and use it to observe and analyse a given context this may be able to explain a situation of perceived cultural hegemony and its effect.

As Luca Tateo so precisely puts it, we all tend to observe the World as we see it as a long line of cultural clashes or even crashes (Tateo, 2015), simply because this is how it appears. It can however only be a clash or crash, if the parties involved perceive each other as potential adversaries and therefore react to a threat that may or may not be present.

In an excellent article of 2015, *Interobjectivity as a border: The fluid dynamics of "betweenness"* by Giuseppina Marsico, Kenneth R. Cabell, Jaan Valsiner and Nikita A. Kharlamov, the intricate formation of as well as the identity building block of borders and the fluidness of such borders. They develop with the understanding and the development of the knowledge of the other.

We therefore need to observe a look further into the field of cultural dialogue, which seems to tend towards a monologue, not because of one sides conscious arrogance (at least not any longer) but more likely because we do not pay sufficient attention, neither to the mechanisms, connected with dialogue across cultures nor to the mechanisms that allow us to unconsciously ignore our own predisposition.

This dialogue between cultures can be described along the terms on intersubjectivity. The interesting concept of intersubjectivity is widely used by various disciplines in the academic world, however with varying meanings. In this instance, I take intersubjectivity to refer to the variety of possible relations between people's perspectives seen from a cultural point of view, which seems quite fitting the frame of the inter-culturalism, we discuss in this article.

As it is there are quite a few (at least six) definitions of intersubjectivity in circulation that all need to be considered; intersubjectivity as means of referring to agreements of a shared definition of an object (Mori & Hayashi, 2006). If we go beyond the simple sharing of definitions, it has been defined as mutual awareness of agreement or disagreement and even the realisation of such understanding or misunderstanding (e.g., Laing, Phillipson & Lee, 1966). To refer to the attribution of intentionality, feelings and beliefs towards others, the term has been used to connect it with cognitive approaches (Gärdenfors, 2008). The implicit and often automatic behavioural orientations towards others constitutes yet another approach, focusing on the embodied nature of intersubjectivity (Merleau-Ponty, 1945; Coelho & Figueiredo, 2003). Goffman (1959), Garfinkel (1984) and Schegloff (1992) all emphasize the interactional, situated, and performative nature of intersubjectivity. And last but certainly not least cultural and dialogical researchers have been using intersubjectivity to study the partially shared and taken-for-granted background (Jovchelovitch, 2007; Rommetveit, 1979; Schutz, 1973). While some of these definitions may be incomplete accounts of intersubjectivity (Marková (2003a) and Matusov, 1996), the suggestion must necessarily be that they are not mutually exclusive

and that they all therefore capture a different and important aspect of the phenomenon. It is therefore important to stress that I will assume an all-in definition that preferably includes all the above. Intersubjectivity, defined as the variety of relations between perspectives is itself a conceptualization, where the individual perspectives can belong to individuals, groups, or discourses and traditions, and they can manifest themselves as both implicit, taken for granted and explicit or reflected upon. If we offer an increased attention to intersubjectivity as a tool of evaluating these intercultural interesting connections, we end up with a complete framework. This framework should be used to analyse the intra-psychological and inter-cultural relations between cultures in general, and between the cultures of Japan and Europe in particular. The implicit direct, meta and meta-meta perspectives needs to be emphasized. The identification of dialogical tensions between either explicit and implicit elements, or between the various perspectives and thus evolving into various physical groups could be spot-on descriptive of the Japan-Europe cultural dialogue. It becomes particularly interesting to examine how the perspectives of others (i.e., meta and meta-meta perspectives) are treated within the subjectivity of the given group. Are the meta and meta-meta perspectives treated as foreign objects? Are they stereotyped (Blakar, 1979)? Or are they in fact isolated by semantic barriers that inhibit transformative dialogue, hence the above-mentioned relations (Gillespie, 2008)? Or, conversely, can one observe the engagement in transformative dialogue with the direct perspectives of the groups concerned? It is likely that we need further empirical research and this research will reveal a diverse set of possible semiotic relations between perspectives within these groups as partly stated by Jaan Valsiner (2002, 2014).

Valsiner goes on to suggest that we in the making of social norms eliminate the interest in the roots of these norms, as if there was no history. “That is the mechanism by which developmental issues become turned into ontological ones. The ‘X becomes Y’ is no longer in focus when ‘Y’ is in place and ‘X’ is no longer” (Ibid., 2014). Valsiner thus emphasizes the highly relevant position of the unconscious rejection of relevant data concerning group B by group A to preserve a cultural position and identity.

Following this analysis, we need to include the possibility of yet another idea of cultural exchange: the idea of a cultural hegemony as described by the Italian Marxist theorist and politician Antonio Francesco Gramsci, who introduced the by now World famous and very well-known concept of cultural hegemony (or indeed just hegemony, defined as the result of one powerful force’ – in his case an exploiting class – tendency to wish to control another, subjected class) (Perry, 1976). This concept allows us to see the so-called West as a culturally hegemonious – at least in our own perspective – dominant culture that has a built-in right to dictate ways of life to anyone, differing from this our definition.

Gramsci gave much thought to the role of intellectuals in society. He stated amongst other things that all men are intellectuals, by which he meant that all men (of both sexes) have intellectual and rational faculties, but not all men can have the social function of intellectuals

(Gramsci, 1982).

Modern intellectuals were seen by him as practically-minded directors and organizers who produced hegemony through ideological apparatuses such as education and the media. Furthermore, he distinguished between a "traditional" intelligentsia which sees itself (wrongly) as a class isolated from society, and the thinking groups, which every class produces from its own ranks "organically" (Perry, 1976). Such "organic" intellectuals do not simply stick to describing social life according to science, but instead articulate, through the language of culture, and it is when this happens, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain cultural and scientific equality, should one part of any cultural exchange be perceived as theoretically morally inferior to the other in any such exchange. Gramsci's most interesting ideas cluster around the concept of cultural hegemony. He uses this concept to address relations between culture and power under capitalism, however the implications of those ideas for historians (like myself) or for anyone genuinely interested in the prospect of one side having an upper hand over another side in any exchange are highly intriguing. Gramsci's work suggests new and more comprehensive analysis as starting points for rethinking some fundamental issues in recent interpretations of World history. We need first to recognize that the concept of hegemony has rather little meaning unless off course paired with the notion of domination and the concept that consent and force nearly always coexist, though one or the other predominates. Among parliamentary regimes only the weakest are forced to rely on domination.

Does Gramsci have a case?

In a paper of 2014, *The Birth of Postwar Americanism: The Origin of the Cold War*, Francis O'Halloran from the university of Portland claims that quite a few things indicate a conscious postwar US cultural imperialism based on Americanism and not necessarily on precautionary measures; In a book from 2000, *To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War*, John Fousek, a historian specializing in American foreign policy during the twentieth-century, establishes the claim that Cold War aggression directly resulted from the acclaimed moral American victory of World War II. By fighting a 'good war' and representing the right way of living against the evil empires of totalitarianism, the American postwar mindset began to promote and therefore accept ethical justifications for international interventionism in the name of morality and 'just war.' If you transfer this upon the foreign policy, concerning post-war Japan, Fousek argues boldly that American nationalism provided the ideological glue for the broad public consensus that supported U.S. foreign policy in the post WW2 and the Cold War era. From the late 1940s through the late 1980s, the United States waged cold war against the Soviet Union and against communism as well as any totalitarian regime not primarily in the name of capitalism or Western civilization--neither of which would have united the American people behind the cause--but in the name of America, thereby justifying their right as the victorious party in the terrible cauldron of WW2 to set the standards

for right and wrong, for good and bad and for a dominant culture as opposed to a culture that had to give way to their ways of the World.

Fousek argues that the public continually reproduced the signs of the victorious sentiments of World War II and, in doing so, spread an ideology legitimizing the need for American interventionism during the Cold War for the 'good' of the world. Therefore, Fousek argues, the Cold War never truly began; rather World War II never ended bringing recognition of the justified morality of the American acts of war continued to manifest itself throughout the Cold War, only with a rather different enemy. Meanwhile this led to (or was accompanied by) an anxious and defensively aggressive posture towards the international community, with the fears of a reoccurrence of totalitarian regimes constantly mobilizing, resulting not only in a paranoid state, fearful of the any suggestion of illiberal movements on the international stage but in a state that paved way to the cultural hegemony, thought necessary to secure wealth through the means of capitalism, resulting in wealth, resulting in stability. The Marshall Plan was considered directly instrumental hereof, and – as stated by the historian M. J. Hogan in his article of 1987, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952*, the very survival of several European and Asian countries as entities of independent liberal-capitalist observation seemed in doubt in the aftermath of WW2. Europe's devastated economies and infrastructure struggled to cope (Milward, 1984), and It was against this perceived threat of a new and repeated backdrop of economic crisis and ideological rivalry that the Americans instituted the Marshall Plan. Officially the immediate *and* predominant goal of the Marshall Plan was to provide a direct boost to Europe's economies. However, in the eyes of its architects and postwar US governments it was regarded as 'the key to social harmony, to the survival of private-enterprise capitalism, and to the preservation of political democracy' (Hogan 1987: 428).

It could however very well be argued that this American hegemony begins much earlier as a direct consequence of WW1, where USA again had proved to be a decisive factor (and force) behind allied victory. The US's entry into the war in 1917 marked the beginning of its path to becoming a world power. In fact, according to German social scientist Herfried Münkler, this was precisely the goal of some politicians in Washington. Treasury Secretary William Gibbs McAdoo, a son-in-law of President Woodrow Wilson, was already forging plans to replace the pound sterling with the dollar as the foremost international reserve currency (Münkler, 2001). This is off course of rather minute consequence for the assessment of the new world order with Americanism, Anglicism and eurocentrism in that order reigning the Planet politically as well as scientifically.

So, the not quite elaborated answer to the question of Gramsci's assumption is a 'yes'. Is this important? Another not quite as quiet 'yes' must be uttered. It is of the utmost importance to identify these very powerful factors if we want to engage in true cultural exchange at a level of equality, even though the following clearly demonstrates that with a few good men you can

change the World completely (and sometimes even to the better).

But then it happened anyway

As indicated above, the reader may now wish to ask the inevitable question; Why have I dug myself through this analysis, which can hardly be said to have much to do with Shigeyoshi Matsumae or Grundtvig? Or has it? The predominant task of a historian as well as a cultural psychologist (one of which I hope someday to be considered) is to analyze context, context and even more context, spiced with notions of predominant signs, conclusions and predefined truth. I believe that It is through these lenses we can and must observe and analyse this cultural, so-called co-operation that very much seem to be a one-way street. It adds value to the account of Dr. Shigeyoshi Matsumae and makes the following account even more spectacular.

In 1933, a young engineer from Japan was urged to go to Germany to further educate himself in the field of electrics (and to observe and asses German stage of development). His name was Shigeyoshi Matsumae and he was a remarkable figure, not quite unlike Nikolaj Frederik Severin Grundtvig. Shigeyoshi Matsumae (松前重義, Matsumae Shigeyoshi, October 24, 1901 – August 25, 1991) was a Japanese electrical engineer, inventor of the non-loaded cable carrier system, the Minister of the Ministry of Communications (Teishin-in, between August 30, 1945 and April 8, 1946), politician and the founder of Tokai University (Sakamoto, 1983). He attends a lecture by Hirabayashi on Danish education (Hirabayashi studied in Denmark 1924 – 1928), meets Uchimura Kanzo and takes an interest in Denmark. In 1934, he gets the opportunity to go to Denmark, where he visits many of our folk high schools and is seriously inspired (Matsumae, 1984). Before he reached Denmark, his interest was sparked somewhat quite a bit earlier; While serving as an engineer in Tokyo, he attended Bible classes by Uchimura Kanzō, the founder of the Nonchurch Movement (Mukyōkai) of Christianity in the Meiji and Taishō period Japan. Matsumae was deeply interested in him, especially in his talk on Denmark and education there. It arises further curiosity on the side of the author of this article that Shigeyoshi Matsumae saw fit to evaluate the Danish public high school system. He definitely must have had very strong ideas about Japanese education and the idea that knowledge will counter militarism and totalitarianism and this foresight is the most remarkable feature of Dr. Matsumae. After WW2 Shigeyoshi Matsumae was further interested in seeking the rebuild of the Japanese school system to secure the annihilation of future attempts of totalitarianism. This is where he sought his inspiration from N.F.S. Grundtvig.

Who was Grundtvig? Probably unknown to many Nikolaj Frederik Severin Grundtvig (1783-1872) was and still is considered one of the founding fathers of modern democratic Denmark in a post 1814-Europe, where Denmark had “succeeded” in supporting the losing side of the European battle for domination. Denmark went along with Napoleon Bonaparte of France who was devastated and almost entirely wiped out in 1814 (and definitively annihilated in 1815) (Roberts, 2014), and his defeat resulted in one long detour for Denmark, culminating

with the 1864 defeat by Prussia, decimating the country and almost resulting in its dissolution, not entirely without significant parallels to post-war Japan. After the defeat, the Danes had to take their understanding of being Danes up to reassessment, because the Denmark they had believed in, had failed. The national icons that had been supported before the war had suffered a break (Videnskab.dk, 2012). The threat from their neighbour to the south resulted in a strong national feeling, which spread to the entire population through civil society, public unions and the high school movement. "What is lost outward must be won inward", wrote the poet HP Holst for the industrial exhibition in Copenhagen in 1872 (Hansen, 2008). The words became publicly associated with Enrico Dalgas, who used them as his motto in the work of cultivating Jutland's moorland. This era became very significant for re-discovering, how we could carry on as a nation, and it is in this period, we see quite revolutionary moved towards a modern welfare state. However, it was not least the high school movement's growth that became important in the reunion of Danish national pride. The spoken word, the LIVING word, the spiritual strength especially in lectures, was the principle and the strength of the high school movement. Simple farmers and daughters of peasants often populated these public high school. The greater knowledge the students achieved the better this enabled them to understand the political debate and allowed them to interfere with and take part in it. It was undoubtedly also helping to strengthen the unity of Denmark, and to give even farmers a strong national identity and a sense of belonging (Thaning, 1963; Bugge, 1964; Reich, 1972). It was this strengthening of an intellectualization and political ability of a so far unaddressed population that eventually allowed us to create a whole new country, build from the bottom and up rather from the top and down. It is quite remarkable that an electrical engineer of a great nation, Japan, stumbles across a man like Grundtvig from what used to be a great nation, Denmark, and he must have noticed their similarities; They both to a certain point were opponents to the reigning government, and they both were determent to make the greatest possible difference and change for the better.

Denmark and Japan had something in common in a post-WW2-society, where our soles had been broken, our national self-esteem had been taken away and all had been left in ruins; We both needed a vision, resulting in a mission. It was this situation that led Shigeyoshi Matsumae to decide to try to change this his beloved fatherland to once again emerge from the ashes like a new Phoenix, and based on his travels to Denmark he decided to try and make schools in Grundtvig's image, which means to introduce public education as the founding idea behind a democracy and thereby build a new Japan bottom-up and not top-down.

Grundtvig believed in educating the masses. He absolutely despised lecturing, grades and other similar symbols and signs of control, and he was the advocate of brunerian and therefore vygotskian educational theories, long before they came about. Context, scaffolding (Vygotsky 1926/1997, Bruner, 1960), conversation based teaching (and learning) (Grundtvig, 1820; Vygotsky, 1997). It sounds quite a bit like a vision of tomorrow, when in fact it comes

straight of out yesterday. It is in itself remarkable that an electrical engineer from the other side of the World, representing a totally different way of life, culture, language and heritage, discovers Grundtvig and further decides that he might just be, what Japan needs.

Matsumae develops a system of his own, based on Grundtvig as a strong spiritual leader. This was his true revolution, and this was and is the true reason we need to consider each other's ways of life, languages and culture, before we decide on a hegemonious victor (implying the existence of a battle). Had Grundtvig been alive today I am sure he would have proudly welcomed the presence of Dr. Shigeyoshi Matsumae and his attempt to build a nation, based on spirituality and knowledge all for the good of Japan and thus for the good of mankind. There is a strong tendency to make use of words that suggest dialog, when we seem to be dealing with monologue in disguise. Let it hereby be said that we need to provide Japan with absolutely the same academic possibilities as all other nations, and we need to observe and learn and not only impose. I shall look forward to this increased dialogue.

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The legitimacy of English domination and people's attitudes toward English: An analysis based on a review of course feedback

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Introduction

Many recent studies have emphasized the dominance of the English language in an increasingly globalized world [Note 1] and examined how people feel about the situation. People tend to perceive the English language as one of the indispensable factors in a globalized world (or *globalizing* in the progressive sense); they gradually start to accept, or even *spontaneously consent* to, English domination, having a welcoming attitude simply because it is a worldwide phenomenon. This situation indicates that there is a new dimension to English domination. In the past, the prominence of English was related mainly to arms and forces, or political and economic factors, whereas today it is triggered more by linguistic and cultural aspects (i.e., the current movement toward globalization). Whether good or bad, and whether people like it, people need to receive, accept, and learn English in order to take part in the globalized world and to have a civilization development. The people can be categorized into two types: those with positive attitudes toward English, and those with pessimistic or negative views of the language.

We need to consider what kind of attitude do people have toward English domination. The concept of English as a lingua franca or a common language is widespread, which means that those people who encounter it tend to think English is a very important language. If they view English positively, then they submit, in a way, to the dogma of English domination by embracing entrenched ways of thinking: being capable of or proficient in an English ability and commanding English is the world standard. This hidden dimension to English domination is much more complex and ambiguous than a simple force or power. If people continue to think English domination is legitimate, the status quo will remain; English will retain its unchallenged position.

The focus of this study, therefore, is people's attitudes toward the English language and English-based education. The author reviews course feedback for the following minor classes: Japanese Sociology A, Japanese Popular Culture, International Relations, and Japanese Sociology B. The main reasons for choosing these classes are as follows: (1) the author taught these classes during 2016 [Note 2] and thus could collect assessment and feedback materials from the students and (2) the main purpose of these minor classes was to provide lectures in the English language, (termed "English-language-based lectures" [ELBL]) to all students at the university, thus enabling them to opt to receive education in the English language. In this paper, the author seeks to clarify the relationship between English domination in global culture and

the legitimacy thereof by analyzing the ways in which students perceive English through the framework of hegemony and legitimacy.

The following areas will be addressed in this study: (1) two theories related to the theme—namely hegemony and legitimacy; (2) the method of analysis; (3) the results of the analysis; (4) a discussion of the findings; and (5) concluding remarks.

Theoretical review

To examine the central theme of this paper, it is important to review the concepts used briefly. Specifically, Antonio Gramsci's definition of hegemony and Max Weber's conception of legitimacy are utilized here. Given the similarities between them, in terms of the rules about dominants and subordinates contained therein, the following discussion combines the two ideas to try to clarify the issues at stake.

Gramsci (1971) defined the concept of hegemony as “the “spontaneous” consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group” (p. 12). In other words, his understanding of hegemony refers to domination from a government plus consent from civil people; the situation where something acquires an affirmative agreement. Gramsci's reference to spontaneity also constituted a very fundamental part of his notion of hegemony in terms especially of looking it from a role of subordinates. Gramsci stated,

The maximum of legislative capacity can be inferred when a perfect formulation of directives is matched by a perfect arrangement of the organisms of execution and verification, and by a perfect preparation of the “spontaneous” consent of the masses who must “live” those directives, modifying their own habits, their own will, their own convictions to conform with those directives and with the objectives which they propose to achieve. (Gramsci, 1971, p. 266)

His conception of hegemony focused on the relationship between the dominant class and the subordinates and force and consent. He explained, “if the ruling class has lost its consensus, i.e. is no longer “leading”, but only “dominant”, exercising coercive force alone, this means precisely that the great masses have become detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer believe what they used to believe previously” (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 275-276). Robinson's (1996) understanding of Gramsci's hegemony summed up its relevance effectively: “The Gramscian concept of hegemony as “consensual domination” exercised in civil and political society at the level of the individual nation (or national society) may be extended/applied to the emergent of global civil and political society” (p. 6).

Where the latter concept, legitimacy, is concerned, it has been said that Weber is well known for his extraordinary analyses of the relationship between power or authority and the legitimacy or validity of the domination generated from/attribution to this factor. Weber defined domination as:

The probability that certain specific commands will be obeyed by a given group of persons. It thus does not include every mode of exercising “power” or “influence” over other persons. Domination in this sense may be based on the most diverse motives of compliance: all the way from simple habituation to the most purely rational calculation of advantage. Hence, every genuine form of domination implies a minimum of voluntary compliance, that is, an *interest* (based on ulterior motives or genuine acceptance) in obedience. (Weber, 1978, p. 212)

Weber argued that supporters are required to sustain such a structure and to enable domination, authority, or rule to be asserted. He continued “Custom, personal advantage, purely affectual or ideal motives of solidarity, do not form a sufficiently reliable basis for a given domination. In addition, there is normally a further element, *the belief in legitimacy*” (Weber, 1978, p. 213). Thus, as Beetham (1991) contended, legitimacy is “a relationship of *command and obedience*” (p. 35, emphasis added). Likewise, Bensman (2015) stated, “Weber, in adapting and defining the concept and making it central to much of his political sociology, focused on *the voluntaristic elements* in legitimacy” (p. 326, emphasis added). Weber, therefore, does not focus on how dominants, authorities, or rulers dominate but focuses on examining subordinates, inferiors, or subjects, thus showing how they are dominated and how they legitimize or justify this domination (Takatori, 2016a).

The two concepts are similar in some ways. Indeed, even though their interests are miscellaneous and wide-ranging, we can also find affinities in Gramsci and Weber’s modes of thinking if we compare their theories on how dominative situations are structured. Neither of them did not so much focus on how dominants dominate subordinates, but rather they did focus on how subordinates find the domination valid (Takatori, 2016b). As we have seen, the notion of hegemony is not based solely on force or coercion, an idea which is comparable to Weber’s description of the structure of domination. Sass (2014) cemented this similarity between Gramsci and Weber, stating that “the central challenge for a hegemonic group is to create consensus and agreement to their rule among as many people as possible, or as Weber had said: legitimacy” (p. 10). Ekers et al. (2009) contended that “At a very basic—but important—level, hegemony gives us a convenient vocabulary for understanding why people consent to, and participate in, relationships that are fundamentally unjust” (p. 289). It can be said, therefore, that hegemony is not existed by itself, but it is rather ‘activated’ by people who confront the structure of hegemony.

Sass (2014) stated that Weber defined domination as “the chance that a specific group of people will react with obedience to an order”, and added that “there needs to be some kind of interest to obey on the part of the individuals”. Furthermore, all kinds of stable authority need legitimacy, which indicates that there is dialectical relationship connecting the ruler and the ruled, dominants and subordinates (p. 6). If legitimacy is successfully achieved, it “allows for a honing in on the nature of relationships based on consent and coercion” (Jeffrey et al., 2015,

p. 179). Therefore, legitimacy appears when ‘demand and supply’ from dominants and subordinates is successfully compromised. In other words, legitimacy can be validated when the relationship between coercion from dominants and consent from subordinates is well balanced. In a way, this formation of domination can be considered efficient; it is literally an *economic* way of domination in which dominants do not need a lot of effort but acquire consensual domination with a little effort.

Both Gramsci and Weber focused on how subordinates find themselves valid or make sense of the structure of domination. Domination can be structured successfully even in the absence of territorial colonization by dominants, i.e., without coercion or enforcement by arms and swords, as occurred widely in the 18th and the 19th centuries. Unlike in the past, the method of construction here is not ‘compelling’ but ‘supportive’; instead of simply using armed force, dominants attempt to use linguistic and cultural-based power to acquire agreements from subordinates in current society. In these situations, subordinates take the dominant situation for granted; this is what Gramsci meant by *spontaneous consent* and what Weber defined as the *voluntary obedience* of subordinates. Both these approaches can be understood as less-costly methods through which achieve and establish domination, given that subordinates themselves agree on the establishment of the structure in such scenarios (Takatori, 2016b).

Method

(1) Methodology

To discuss the key issue at stake in this study, two different methodologies can be used: the discovery paradigm and the interpretive paradigm. In this paper, however, we do not employ the discovery paradigm, which mainly involves calculations, the notions of right and wrong, and discussions about the truth or authenticity of data. Because society contains a multitude of attitudes, thoughts, and states of being, we can assume that there is no holistic or absolutely correct answer to the question posed here. Thus, even if certain tendencies arise in the analysis of a data set, we cannot state definitively that “A is A”, or “B is B”; these types of generalizations are more appropriate for use with quantitative research methods.

The interpretive paradigm, on the other hand, which is often represented as being a qualitative research method, does not seek to find a definite truth. Rather, it involves an interpretation of a variety of ideas and thoughts through various frameworks [Note 3]. It should be noted that results can vary with this method; although similar points may be observed, they might be interpreted from diverse perspectives due to differences in participants, scenarios, and theoretical approaches. In addition, one study may lead to several conclusions. Here, for example, we do not pursue one specific answer to the question of why the students want to study English; instead, we endeavor to comprehend a variety of answers by examining the students’ written comments and considering what they mean. The purpose is to determine the relationship between people’s attitudes and the legitimacy of English rather than to suggest that

there is one final answer to the question of the legitimacy of English domination. We have therefore chosen to use the interpretive paradigm and to take a qualitative methodological approach [Note 4].

(2) Courses and participants

In this study, the participants are students who took the following minor classes at our university in 2016: Japanese Sociology A and Japanese Popular Culture (Spring 2016) and International Relations and Japanese Sociology B (Fall 2016). Detailed descriptions of these classes fall beyond the limit of this paper; a few important points, however, should be clarified. We offer these classes to students as part of the *Nihon-gaku* (“Japanese Studies”) minor. The main purpose of this minor is to provide ELBL classes, i.e., lectures in the English language. One of the most significant features of this minor is that most classes are taught by multiple teachers, thus enabling students to learn about the themes covered from many perspectives.

The number of students in each of the classes in question during 2016 were as follows: 16 (Japanese Sociology A), 23 (Japanese Popular Culture), 16 (International Relations), and 13 (Japanese Sociology B). These figures include Japanese students and international students from different majors; the ratio of Japanese students to international students was around 7:3 (with some variations, depending on the class). It could be argued that the sample size here is quite small; we refer here, however, to Lindlof & Taylor (2002), who contended that the size of a data set does not need to be as large for a qualitative study as for a quantitative one [Note 5].

Analysis

As a university, we began course assessments in 1993. At the end of the Spring and Fall semesters, teachers must carry out questionnaire surveys, which constitute mandatory assessments. The students answer these surveys using a five-point scale from 1 (very dissatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied). The surveys, therefore, are quantitative in nature. Obviously, such answers on a scale of 1 to 5 do not suit the purpose of this study because we do not try to find a definite truth but we try to interpret a variety of ideas and thoughts.

In addition to the questionnaire survey, however, teachers can collate written feedback (this aspect of the course assessment is optional). This can be considered a more “real” type of feedback because students can write freely, giving their opinions and comments. This type of response can be analyzed using a qualitative method because the answers are varied. Such data is therefore an appropriate focus for the present study because we wish to examine the diverse thoughts of the participants.

Finally, it should be noted that alongside a list of other definitive questions, the author added an optional question to the written feedback forms used for this study: “What are your impressions of the English-language-based lecture?” The author included this broad question not only because of the ELBL nature of the minor; the question is also designed to induce a

natural reaction from the participants. The answers given to the optional question will be given one by one to show how the students reacted [Note 6]. The following analysis thus attempts to reveal the students' attitudes toward English.

(1) Japanese Sociology A

Japanese Sociology A concentrated mainly on social conditions in Japan and focused especially on three elements: international relations, the Japanese mindset, and language-based issues. Because the themes were diverse, the course had three teachers. Generally, the students in the class seemed to like the teachers and the subject, reacting well to the content, even though some of the themes were difficult to understand. As mentioned previously, the course was conducted mostly in English.

Feedback on Japanese Sociology A

Feedback for this class was generally positive. The total number of the students was 16, and they included Japanese and Korean students. All the students completed the written feedback form, although three of the students gave no answer to the optional question. All of the written answers are listed below:

- [A]: I found ELBLs extremely useful, so I hope that numbers of these kinds of lectures will increase.
- [B]: I could not understand the contents well as the teacher used English for 90% of the classes.
- [C]: I think that ELBLs are good, if the classes are elective.
- [D]: I think that ELBLs are good. However, if students cannot understand the contents, then the classes are meaningless; so, some Japanese (as a language) should be added.
- [E]: I think that it would be interesting to have more ELBLs.
- [F]: "There are many Japanese students and we studied about Japanese Sociology so I think Japanese was better than using English because we have own nuance."
- [G]: I think that it is fine like this.
- [H]: I could not understand the contents sometimes; however, my English skills do improve when the teachers conduct ELBLs.
- [I]: I think that English should be used more in the class.
- [J]: I found it difficult when the English words used in the lecture were not used in my major.
- [K]: I think that ELBLs are effective. However, the teacher sometimes made mistakes in the usage of English, so the teacher should be careful about this. Even so, for us, the students, it is a good opportunity to maintain or improve our English skills.
- [L]: I think that ELBLs are somewhat useful for getting used to the sound of English.
- [M]: I think that ELBLs are very good.

[N]: None

[O]: None

[P]: None

(2) Japanese Popular Culture

The main topic in Japanese Popular Culture was diverse cultures in Japan. The teacher used the NHK TV series *TOKYO EYE 2020* to teach this course. The series focuses on many aspects of Japanese life, ranging from traditional Japanese culture to modern popular culture. Reporters from various foreign countries introduce the themes. The episodes “Gateway to Tokyo: Your Guide to Haneda Airport” and “Shortcuts to Deep Tokyo” were chosen from the series. Generally, the students appeared to enjoy the program, and they reacted well to the course. In addition to the TV show, the teacher prepared worksheets for the class. Again, the course was conducted mainly in the English language.

Feedback on Japanese Popular Culture

Feedback for this class was generally positive. There were 23 students, including Japanese students and international students (from certain Arabic countries, Mongolia, Korea, Thailand, China, and Israel). Of the 23 students, 18 completed the written feedback form, which means that five people were absent. All the answers to the optional question are listed below (four students did not answer the question):

[A]: “I think it is really good!” I am able to improve my English skills.

[B]: I think that the teacher should do what the teacher wants to do.

[C]: I want to have more ELBLs.

[D]: I think that ELBLs are very tough, but good to have. I like being in situation where I have to try to understand the content.

[E]: I think that it is very good to have ELBLs. The teacher added some aspects of the Japanese language, so I was able to understand the contents quickly and enjoy the class.

[F]: It was very good as I could study English.

[G]: I think that ELBLs are very good, but some support (for understanding the content) is necessary.

[H]: “Good. It forces people to use English.”

[I]: I think that ELBLs are very good. However, if all the lectures are conducted in English, it is very difficult to understand, and so some Japanese (as a language) should be added.

[J]: Nothing special. It is good to have lectures like this.

[K]: ELBLs are good for improving English skills.

[L]: The class was pretty understandable as the usage of Japanese and English was well balanced.

[M]: I think that ELBLs are very good, and that these lectures should be continued.

[N]: ELBLs are good if the teacher uses English extensively—even for questions and answers.

[O]: None

[P]: None

[Q]: None

[R]: None

(3) International Relations

The content of the International Relations course was related to not only Japan, but also several global issues. The teachers set three main pillars: (1) the formation of international society; (2) understanding foreign policy and international relations in a) East Asia, b) Russia and the Eurasian states, c) Europe, d) the Middle East, and e) Japan; and (3) the mobility of people, including issues such as immigrants, refugees, and international terrorism. Because the content was diverse, this course had five teachers. Overall, the students seemed to enjoy the teaching and the course, although some of the themes were difficult to understand. As with the other courses, this course was conducted mostly in the English language.

Feedback on International Relations

Feedback for this class was generally positive. The total number of the students was 16, including Japanese and Chinese students. Of 16 students, 10 completed the written feedback form, which means that six people were absent. All 10 participants answered the optional question, as shown below:

[A]: I want to go abroad in the future, and I want to have more friends from overseas.

However, in ELBLs, sometimes I feel anxious about whether I have understood correctly or not; so, some Japanese is necessary for checking the meaning of content.

[B]: I want to study English because it is cool to be able to speak the language. I am not good at English but I want to be a better speaker, and there are many people like me; so it would be good if the teachers could support such people.

[C]: “The reason I study English is that I want to be more global person. Speak[ing] more than two languages is a huge advantage for me in the future. I think English class is very good. I can practice my English skill, and have [a] chance to have talk with foreign teacher.”

[D]: I think that English is indispensable for adopting cultures and gaining knowledge from different countries, not only Japan. Being able to speak English also allows me to broaden my worldview, so I think that ELBLs are great. English lectures given in the Japanese language do not improve my English proficiency, so I hope we could have more ELBLs.

[E]: I want to get a job as an international entrepreneur and to live in a foreign country, and

ELBLs make my English skills better. I think it would be better to have both the Japanese and English languages used in lectures.

[F]: I want “to communicate with people from other countries.” “The class would be very small since instructors use English to teach. However, it is good for English learners.”

[G]: I think that English is absolutely imperative for the global society and also for my future, so ELBLs are challenging and rewarding for me.

[H]: I think that ELBLs are good as they expose me to English. However, sometimes I could not understand the contents well, so some Japanese is needed as a supplement.

[I]: I find ELBLs to be a very valuable experience as I have the chance to use English and to think about various international issues in English. I think that it is a very good opportunity to acquire English abilities in many different ways.

[J]: I know that there are other ELBLs at this university, and there are a few ELBLs in which students are actually able to take part in the lectures; thus, I think that ELBLs are very good as they allow me to speak and to study international issues. Also, as this course is held not only for students from my major, but also for people from other majors, I find it interesting to be able to interact with others and to listen to their opinions.

(4) Japanese Sociology B

Japanese Sociology B focused mainly on Japanese social circumstances. Throughout the course, the teachers examined current situations and issues including the necessity of university, low rates of marriage, high rates of suicide, and the relationship between Japan and the United States. There were two teachers on the course because the content was broad. Overall, the students appeared to be interested in the key themes, although they found some of the material difficult to understand. Again, the course was conducted mainly in the English language.

Feedback on Japanese Sociology B

Feedback for this class was mainly positive. There were 13 students from Japan, China, Korea, and Arabic countries. Of the 13 students, 12 completed the written feedback form, and one person was absent. Two students gave no answer to the optional question, but all the other answers to that question are given below:

[A]: I think that ELBLs are good, but native language education is mandatory and should be provided beforehand.

[B]: I think that ELBLs are good because I was able to discern my level of English ability. It was also very nice to listen to English being spoken not only by Japanese people, but also by foreign students and foreign teachers.

[C]: I think that ELBLs are good.

[D]: I find ELBLs difficult sometimes, but they are enjoyable.

[E]: I do not have much chance to give my opinion to other people in English, so ELBLs offer a useful training forum and a good opportunity to practice English.

[F]: ELBLs are very meaningful for me because they enable me to study English.

[G]: “I think it is good to do some classes in English depending on the topic. I think it is important to express your opinion in not only Japanese.”

[H]: I think that ELBLs are very nice because it is just like being in in a foreign country and studying abroad.

[I]: I find ELBLs to be good as I can improve my English skills and deepen my knowledge, although some people who hate English may feel despair at them.

[J]: “It depends. Because if some students does not understand what teacher says, the lecture can be mean[ing]less for some of us.”

[K]: None


[L]: None

Discussion

Looking at the data collected for this study, we can safely argue that the concept of English domination has legitimacy. The interpretive paradigm framework demonstrates the students’ attitudes toward English. For instance, we can see that the students’ various answers demonstrate their awareness of the importance of English. Many of the answers refer to ELBLs as being important for improving English ability. The students want to develop their English skills, regardless of how challenging ELBLs are and the teaching methods used. This point alone appears to legitimize the dominance of English and English education. It must be considered, however, that students taking the *Nihon-gaku* minor will chose to do so in anticipation of attending ELBLs; thus, it is natural for them to react positively toward exposure to English. Nonetheless, it should also be noted that (1) the students taking the courses are never forced to learn English as a language or to take an ELBL—it is their choice; and (2) because *Nihon-gaku* is a minor subject, students can graduate without taking the subject—however, the participants in the study select it specifically, indicating that they want to participate ELBL type classes. From the perspective of the legitimacy of English domination, this study therefore suggests that the dominant situation of the language is sustained by people who support its structure. The students upon whom we focus in this paper are (fortunately or unfortunately, according to one’s view) a part of the structure. In other words, this structure creates and maintains English domination, reinforcing the strength and influence of the language. By extension, we can state that hegemony exists not only as a theoretical or ideological idea; it can also be found in, or closely related to, our everyday lives (Yoshimi, 2001).

Yoshitake (2006), who referred to the concept of “spontaneity” or “self-acception”, states that it is not just that the language and culture of English penetrate everything (for good or

bad); many people are also attracted to them and long to be part of them. This is one of the main reasons why English has influential power and considered as an epidemic and ideal figure. People aspire to understand and consume English ways of thinking and being, leading them to try to acquire the associated values and standards—“cultural packages”. Indeed, the image of English as the global common language or *lingua franca* is created by those who claim it to be so and who create many discourses and stories around the idea. Whether it is due to a particular aspiration or a sense of expectation or hope, English learners are instilled with “a motor for learning English by their will” which, in other words, is “spontaneous consent”. These attitudes do not develop naturally; they are imprinted on one by society or social conditions. “English continuously propagates just like a virus proliferates with a vector”. Here, Yoshitake (2006) suggested that we have “the self-justification process for discourse and choice in English learning” (p. 62), as shown in Figure 1.



【Figure 1】 The self-justification process for discourse and choice in English learning

Figure 1 gives four factors and three steps that explain the reasons why we choose to learn English. The four factors are: (1) the discourse that “English as lingua franca”; (2) the idea that English education is the “apparatus” for English-language learners; (3) internal motivations, i.e., an aspiration, or a sense of expectation or hope; and (4) the language choice, i.e., choosing English specifically. The three steps are as follows:

- (1) Learners start to think and feel, “We want to learn English” or “We need to study English,” because it is the language of the international situation.
- (2) Learners “spontaneously” choose English based on the idea that English education is a type of apparatus and various other motivations.

- (3) Finally, learners choose English as the most fascinating language, and people realize that English certainly is an international language, again based on the hidden, deep emotion of voluntary obedience.

In Figure 1, there are also arrows at the top and the bottom representing “direct justifications,” i.e., the idea that English is chosen because it is an international language. English hegemony is reinforced here since the “circle” can start from any of the four points (factors), and people tend to follow the circle once they become embroiled within it. Since most of the participants in this study had positive attitudes toward English and English education, their attitudes could be encompassed by the four factors given above. According to the participants’ answers, the participants tend to think that English is one of the most useful languages in the world as it works as a communication tool (i.e., the world’s *lingua franca*). When we provide English education—ELBL classes—, then it functions as one of the apparatuses of their studies. With aspirations and sense of expectation or hope as their motivations of the study, they choose English and select ELBL classes. All these elements let them think English positively.

Conclusion

In conclusion, most of the participants in this study agreed with the concept of the ELBL as indicated by the feedback obtained from them. Some of the participants, however, had a somewhat critical attitude toward these English-language lectures. In addition, some of the participants had slightly different perspectives, which provide rich ground for areas of future research. This study demonstrates one part of the structure of English domination; the results obtained indicate that English, both in popular perceptions and in reality, is the dominant language and is in a position of supremacy. We can assume that across the world, English is the leader in terms of language education since people want to acquire further English skills. In such circumstances, taking part in the English-dominant structure constitutes the path of least resistance. In other words, it is easier for us to accept, unconsciously and uncritically, that English is one of the most important languages, if not *the* most important/best language, in the world. However, given that language could be considered an essential or core element of human existence, it is crucial to consider the meaning of the acceptance of English more objectively [Note 7]. Here, we must regain consciousness of the reasons why English is important and think about what kinds of effects are created if we allow ourselves to receive English in this way.

How should English learners obtain this kind of awareness, then? First, this study would like to suggest that teachers should change their outlooks; they comprise the first group that must attain a level of consciousness about the relationship between English domination and its legitimacy as the dominant language. To put it plainly, teachers should not believe simply that one should study English because it is perhaps the world’s *lingua franca* or because it is natural

to accept English domination; they should seek to understand more about the reasons behind the situation. The roles of other languages and cultures should also be considered here. It may be that if teachers began to advocate the meaning of other languages and cultures, students would refocus themselves on areas beyond that of English.

Of course, to interpret different cultures—to achieve “cross-cultural understanding”—we must understand and respect not only our own cultures but also other cultures. We should remember that the cultures from which we hail are significant facets of our identities. As mentioned previously, the linguistic and even cultural dominance of English has the power to invade and influence our ways of thinking because the way in which one speaks and the manner in which one lives constitutes who one is. Whether consciously or unconsciously, we may start to have a positive attitude toward English because of its seeming importance or the apparent legitimacy of English as the dominant language, as it has been termed in this paper.

One of the most effective ways through which we can enforce awareness and consciousness of other languages and cultures is education. Takatsuka (2000) reinforced this point in relation to the outlook on English education, stating that we should not simply connect other languages and cultures to the English language and cultures brought with the language, which today are synonymous with American ways of life. Rather, he claimed that we should recognize the presence of other languages and cultures and avoid being biased against them. In other words, we should not judge the superiority or inferiority of a language or a culture based on the prosperity, usage frequency, and population associated with that language or culture. As Yoshida (2013) stated, there is no rank or hierarchy between languages; every single language and culture is significant and precious to those to whom it belongs. Similarly, Yoshitake (2006) insisted that to learn other languages is “to rediscover an existence of a new world” in the face of increasing global standardization (p. 73) [Note 8]. By developing wide-ranging standpoints on education, students could gain a newfound awareness of other languages and cultures, thus challenging voluntary obedience with English domination.

Notes

[1] For example, see Yoshida & Takatori (2013), and Takatori (2015).

[2] The first two courses took place in Spring 2016, while the other two were held in Fall 2016.

[3] For more on the differences between these paradigms, see Kvale & Brinkmann (2009)—especially p. 117.

[4] Where theoretical perspectives are concerned, the views of Lindlof & Taylor (2002), Merrigan & Huston (2004), and Kvale & Brinkmann (2009) are considered in this study. The present paper focuses on their comments and thoughts by means of a content analysis method. In order to leave much space as possible for the analysis section, this paper does not explain the method in great detail. For more information on the method, see Weber

(1990) and Krippendorff (2013).

[5] For further details, see p. 129.

[6] Please note that most of the answers were written originally in Japanese and the author has translated them into English. Where the original answer was written in English, it is given in quotation marks here, for the sake of identification.

[7] For example, Tsuda (2008) claimed the meaning of English domination critically—see especially p. 47.

[8] For discussions on how to manage multilingual and multicultural education in our multicultural world, see Mizoue & Shibata (2009) or Guilherme, M (2002).

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III. Practical aspects of cultures and civilizations

The case of the vase: How to overcome traumatic life ruptures by mediating signs of civilization?

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In between Culture and Time

Culture is inherent in humans' everyday life. Its particular manifestations within the person change during the lifespan as the self gets transformed and sometimes even seems to vanish out of one's personal point of view, but its impact on human life cannot be denied participating in a more and more globalized growing world. This statement might be shared quickly on a level of common sense by many as examples of miscommunication can be found easily detecting "transculturality" in their focus of attention. But being more precise, it needs to be clarified that culture itself cannot be understood as an exclusive factor which sheds light into various areas. It can only develop and be identified within a mutual correspondence of human beings and needs to be understood in a processual way. Having that in mind, a deeper understanding of cultural processes and its impact on human beings seem not only eligible but also possible to investigate on. Culture is about meaning making processes and gets mediated by signs. The goal of this theoretic paper is to detect such scopes of meaning making processes by investigating metaphorically on collective ways of handling life course ruptures, some of which become viewed as "traumas". Traumas are inherent to human experiences and surpass the individual and group capacity to deal with situations. Being traceable in both, individual as well as collective level, it needs to be clarified that the major interest of this work can be found in its collective entity. In the latter case, the focus of this paper, we pay special attention to the role played by culture. Indeed, culture acts as a tool mediating the process by which human beings struggle with traumatic situations. Obviously calling something 'culturally mediated' does not explain, but itself needs explanation, whereas on the following pages it will be tried to give exactly such explanation by the use of two specific metaphors of sign-mediation over time, using culturally established techniques of reformation. More precisely, on the one hand by giving an example of a "restorative" process; and on the other hand, borrowing a concept from the Japanese context, so called "Kintsugi", a process we could denominate as a "joinery". Cultural mediation happens through signs – which are presentations (*Vorstellungen*) where something is made to represent something else for some function. Types of signs are variable

and need to be understood in the life course and concept of irreversibility of time. Concluding this manuscript, a first interpretation of irreversibility of time, its impact on culture of daily life course and exemplarily the function of culture should be made visible.

Why Trauma?

The interpretation of cultural tools in a metaphoric way dealing with trauma might look farfetched at the beginning. Attention and insight to this phenomenon was growing first by given quotes of patients in psychoanalytic sessions who suffer from trauma: “If I would simply be able to travel back in time and change my past” example wise, shows the gap in patient’s perception between the desire of “turning back the clock” and living in today’s reality. This often seems insurmountable for them. Shame and fear of being judged often play a massive role within these therapeutic alliances focusing abuse in many ways (e.g. war, rape, sudden death, etc.). But trauma doesn’t necessarily mean to be understood as trauma, reading contemporary literature. It occurs as necessary to clarify that even if in everyday discourse the term trauma is often used interchangeably if not even synonymous with the word stress, but doesn’t mean the same at all. Trauma can stimulate stress and lead to an increased stress level but also functions on various levels, as the Webster online college dictionary (2017) points trauma out as “a painful emotional experience, or shock, often producing a lasting psychic effect and, sometimes, a neurosis.” Of course, a definition given in an American college dictionary represents the common language use and lacks the specific detail of time, which Moore and Fine (1990) seem to be more precise about, as they specify trauma as a

[...] disruption or breakdown that occurs when the psychic apparatus is *suddenly* [marked by the author] presented with stimuli, either from within or without, that are too powerful to be dealt with or assimilated in the usual way. A postulated stimulus barrier or protective shield is breached, and the ego is overwhelmed and loses its mediating capacity. A state of helplessness results, ranging from total apathy and withdrawal to an emotional storm accompanied by disorganized behaviour bordering on panic. Signs of automatic dysfunction are frequently present. (p. 199)

The framework of time seems to take an important part in traumatic experiences, as the wish of redoing or reinventing the past is a core element in patients’ perception. Moreover, the illusionary idea of reversibility of time might point out a more general need of concrete stability in life actions which fits exactly Benight and Bandura (2004) who describe the general need of self-efficacy as a coping strategy in recovery from different types of traumatic experiences.

Using the words of a patient that would mean, it is about “me being in the position of taking decisions and not decisions taking position upon me”. As mentioned earlier, trauma can operate on diverse levels, whereas the so far described individual level is only one to be talked about. Trauma does not necessary imply to be more than an individual process but also can be detected on collective levels, also called by the name of cultural trauma in literature. Alexander (2004) says that „cultural trauma occurs when members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identities in fundamental ways” (p. 1). Still having definitions of individual trauma in mind, it seems that the only difference between collective and individual trauma is detected in a certain number bigger than one to call it collective. Therefore, the segregation of individual vs. collective trauma only makes sense for quantification but does not add any information to the quality of traumas’ phenomenon. Furthermore, the segregation between individual and collective traumas seem artificial, as trauma always will be understood by patients in a personal way affecting individual as well as collective life strategies. This suggests for current considerations that it is more suitable to speak about events/triggers who cause traumatic reactions. Events/triggers can be called collective if affecting plural individuals versus events/triggers provoking single cases be assumed individual. The reason for this precise differentiation can be found in its explanation of the way of response to single/multiple case triggers/events. Responses on a traumatic situation are individual whereas these individual responses are at the same time covered by collective strategies. Furthermore collective responses also get collectively interpreted in a framework of culture, as Foucault (1987) points out that “[...] mental illness has its reality and its value qua illness only within a culture that recognizes it as such” (p. 60). Figure 1 tries to clarify the relationship between collective and individual strategies by pointing out these connections. Starting with an inevitable traumatic event (encircled cross) in the past, the current evaluation in the present of the event leads to a response for future evaluation of the traumatic event. This response is individual as well as collective at the same time. In Figure 1 I try to amplify that responses are generated simultaneously whereas collective/cultural responses always include individual responses.




Figure 1: response strategies on trauma

My further interest in this paper is to investigate on collective responses. The following examples will show the possibility of variation in response and need to be understood metaphorically. In daily reality, these sort of “ideal types” might not be detectable that clearly, whereas for more concrete explanation this figurative way might be succeeding. Strategies need to be understood as social representations, dealing with trauma.

Culture as a “tool”: Restoration vs. Integration

Collective response strategies or its’ social representations do vary in high quantity. The following examples do not shoe entire possibilities, they are moreover chosen to deal as borders framing the phenomenon being detected in between. More precise, talking about a “restorative” process on the one hand which defines itself by generating the state of origin and, on the other hand, borrowing a concept from the Japanese context, by a process we could denominate as a “joinery”, called Kintsugi. Processes of conservation are also part of restoration but only symbolize stagnation whereas there is no need in further discussing in here. Let’s imagine that a vase has flown into pieces and we consider that as a traumatic event or at least as a noteworthy rupture in life events of the vase. The following examples should show how to possibly deal with this rupture:

In the first case, the underpinning idea is to bring a broken object, such as our example of pottery, back to this original form. In this case, the goal is to reassemble the “pieces” of an original model to cast its first form. The transformations underwent by this object, or in other words, the “traumas” it went through, over time are considered to be flaws or “distortions” that deviate the respective object from this primal version. As a consequence, we could say that the

central goal of the restorative process is recasting the “original” state of a certain object before it suffers any “decay.” This wish of original conditions emerges a problem on two diverse levels: The first level is to be detected in acknowledging irreversibility of time. Therefore, once our symbolic vase is broken, it might be glued and it is nearly not possible to see any scratches in between broken fragments, but still they are there. Restauration in this case is an illusion which always make trouble focusing reality due to irreversibility of time. On the second level, a more metaphoric one, psychoanalysis comes into play. Following the psychoanalytic framework, memory can be repressed but cannot be erased, as Freud (1963) points out. Using his model of memory, he outlined in his book “the interpretations of dreams”, Billig (1999) summarizes precisely that “the mind retains the original ‘memory-trace’ (or ‘Mnem.’), left by the perceptual experience, but the memory-trace cannot enter consciousness” (p. 150), which leads to compulsive repetition in its outcome. This repetition can be also found in the idea of restauration as well as contemporary psychotherapeutic treatment. Billig writes:

“[...]. These repressed memories continue to haunt the adult psyche, whatever in recalled memories, dreams or in the symptoms of neuroses. Because the original traces, or memories, have not been erased, they can be recovered in the course of careful therapeutic work. Once they are exposed, the adult problems – or the haunting of the psyche – will be alleviated.” (Billig, 1999, p. 150)

A statement which gets highlighted by Kihlstrom (1996) who points out that “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it” (p. 297). To overcome trauma reintegration of problematic experiences into humans’ personal lifespan is needed, which restauration cannot offer. So now the question is, how to proceed with our example of the vase?

Offering the possibility of integration: Kintsugi

In contrast, the Japanese cultural history offers an opposite approach for “traumatic” events, here understood as the process of transformation of an object or experience over the course of irreversible time: Instead of aiming at the restoration of a ‘primal’ version of a given object, the focus is enhancing the process by which such an object could incorporate, as part of itself, all the flaws or imperfections (i.e., the “traumas”) it has been facing over time. This cultural-regulated process is known as *kintsugi* (“to patch with gold”) or *kintsukuroi* (“to repair with gold”), translated by Holland (2008). For our considerations Kintsugi channels the psychological experience in such a way that faults are considered as being part of the history of an object, rather than something to be disguised or overcame. In our practical example this would mean that our vase will be renewed using gold (see figure 2) and in contrast to the idea

of restoration, the sites of fracture are made highly visible, using this precious metal. Instead of reducing the vase to functionality, value gets detected in its rupture.



Figure 2: Mishima ware hakeme type tea bowl, with gold lacquer kintsugi repair work, 16th century

Originally applied to the context of the pottery, both these cultural-framed paths could be taken as apparently opposing metaphors dealing with the struggle of traumatic situations in its boundedness to time whereas the second example of Kintsugi allows the possibility of reintegration of the event into personal lifespan and therefore possibly overcome trauma.

Conclusion: The idea in generalizing?

Acknowledging pre-discussed examples on a more abstract level, the main interest can be manifested in the occurrence of time. Only because of the existence of time we can consider terms like e.g. insanity or mental diseases and identify them as social representations. Foucault (1987) mentions that although it is possible to describe the appearance of illness, its conditions are still unknown:

“It would be a mistake to believe that organic evolution, psychological history, or the situation of man in the world may reveal these conditions. It is in these conditions, no doubt, that the illness manifests itself, that its modalities, its forms of expression, its style, are revealed. But the roots of the pathological deviation, as such, are to be found elsewhere.” (p.60)

These roots might be detectable looking at diverse civilizations and their multiple ways in treatment of symptoms e.g. trauma as described previous. Figure 3 gives a summarizing overview about current findings: Whereas the inevitable event is a necessity in producing trauma, its response can lead to disrupted (e.g. restauration) or continuous (e.g. kintsugi) understanding of time.




Figure 3: comparison of trauma strategies over time

Preliminary Riegel already pointed out in 1977 that “development and change is possible but requires a radical reversal in our basic conceptions” (p. 4). He brings it exactly at the point by figuring out that science needs

“to be founded upon the notion of contradictions between concrete events for which identity, balance, and abstract competencies are merely special and momentary states that immediately converge into the flux of new changes. The foundation for such a science of development and change has been laid in dialectical logic. One of its most important and intriguing concepts is the concept of time.” (p. 4)

Current discussion should underpin Riegel’s understanding by accepting that dialectical logic is found the following: It is not preliminary about memory or time, it is about the connection of both of them. Memory of inevitable events/ruptures in life evaluated with the necessity of time in producing individual and collective personality traits.

Taking a look into future

Furthermore, previous described example shows that culture can also be seen as a common collective good. Trauma is not only about the problem of suffer in personal life and its

individual coping strategies but also about the existence of collective answers through culture. The reintegration of individual life time into collective perspectives seems eligible. Further research is desirable attempting the possibility in generalizing from the example of trauma to more universal validity. I conclude with the words of Kellermann (2008) that

“life cannot be cured. The best we can do is to offer the patient the ability to develop tools with which to struggle, and to struggle better” (p. viii).

Complementing on this quote it needs to be said that some tools might already be offered by the collective by agreeing in the construct of time.

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Figure 3: comparison of trauma strategies over time

Recovering a missing link for the future: The essential connection between civilization and psyché analyzed *through* the practice of pilgrimage

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Introduction

This chapter contributes a suggestion to a *basis* for a dialogue between *civilizations* focusing on *meaning-making* in pilgrimage which leads to realizing that humans are creators of ideas to understand themselves with. Over time this becomes *collective culture* which transforms due to driving forces of history. The human psyché changes alongside this change as do institutions. What does *not* change is *the need* to cultivate oneself as a person for a life in *any* culturally organized institution at any time and place. And the need for material resources to sustain a life.

After a brief introduction to the cultural psychological approach, the terms *civilization* and *culture* are discussed emphasizing the non-foundational approach taken here and by providing a critique from Wæver (2002) on the idea of a clash of civilizations. A linkage is made to how psychological theory has attempted to settle persons perception on Selves mediated by culture as an entity. The discussion emphasizes culture as a process about negotiation of personal and collective culture made possible by meaning-making which is in this cultural psychological understanding as *semiotically mediated*. Based on a process-view, the interpretation of pilgrimage is possible, when combined with a Weberian perspective which is introduced. Pilgrimage is may then be analyzed as *practicing meaning-making* oriented towards oneself, social others and divine forces, but also understood as related to “getting well on in life”. A conclusion is drawn up, suggesting a dialogue of civilization to focus on egalitarianism with regards to access to resources, as this has historically been the key to conflict, and not ideas. The point is to promote the idea that civilization and pilgrimage are, broadly speaking, *one phenomenon*.

The cultural psychological approach

Cultural history is part of human *being and becoming human*. Studying pilgrimage in the framework of a cultural psychology is studying the *psyché* in *a framework of humanistic science* that aims for generalization, as do the natural sciences. But this idea is not new. Already *Giambattista Vico* (1668-1844) suggested that we can understand ourselves by what we create as cultural practices and artifacts noted by Danesi (2017). These may be as various as mentioned by Valsiner (2014) below, pointing out the position of this cultural psychology;

“As a discipline that focuses on value-based phenomena, cultural psychology entails a radical break with psychology’s empirical traditions. Instead of looking at the lowest

levels of the functioning of the psyche, cultural psychology purposefully begins at the highest levels. Hence notions of religion, ritualizations, life philosophies, literature, theatre, music, cinematography, and their uses by people in their everyday lives, constitute the phenomena from which psychology as a science begins.” (ibid., p. 256) Vico said; “It is through an investigation of all kinds of human ‘artifacts’ from myths to languages, that the nature of human thought will reveal itself” (Danesi, 2017, p.12). Understanding products of the human mind as reflecting *human consciousness* would be following Vico and align with the aim of cultural psychology *as a science of universality of culture* (Valsiner, 2014). Cultural psychology approaches its subject-of-study *dialectically* – by which is meant that as *oppositions, contradictions, movement, change and interrelatedness* is the stuff that is seen as “making up reality”, the human mind constantly needs to create *objects* to stabilize the world (Rosa, 2007). These objects are mental and physical, and in pilgrimage they merge into one in *meaning-making*. Sometimes objects are *made* sacred.

Culture and civilization are intertwined

Culture and civilization have different etymologies, are interconnected and frequently used as synonyms. *Culture* has at least two meanings and several uses. The meaning of *culture* may be inferred from its concrete use in discourse which typically is as a *container* applied *deterministically* synonymous with the use of *religion* and *nation*. The use is *explanatory* relying on *essentialism* but creating *demarcation*. On the one hand this relies on the assumption of a “something” which may be referred to *as such*. On the other hand, it is the use that reveals the purpose which is to *explain* differences, and potentially, the origin of conflicts or differences in *behavior* or *self-construal*. Culture and civilization achieve meaning in their uses as categories for perceived *things-in-the-world*. In psychology, creation of *things* from *cultural inventions* (ideas) is frequently observed; “personality”, “character”, “aptitude”, “IQ” or “temperament”. The context is here the *driver* for the creation of such terms. This context has a rationale which is *explaining* differences simplistically, causally and (sometimes) one-dimensionally, by referring to the presence or lack thereof of specific “essences” which may be judged *morally* as inferior or superior, or *utilitarianistically*, as compatible or not – with *needs* of a current form of organization. This is mixing *necessity* with the *natural*, thus becoming *also* a moral (normative) act of judgement which in effect *reverses* ideas into natural *things* by means of e.g. quantitative measurement of answers in questionnaires and “objective” cognitive tests.

An older and rarely applied understanding is to *culture as a verb* and thus a *process* concerning the relation of the human psyché and the environment acknowledging that this border is *permeable*. This understanding is based on the axiom of the human psyché as an *open, dynamic system* full of opposite dimensions always interacting with the environment and social others, and oriented towards goals. This idea is old, for etymologically, culture is related to

cultivation. Something to *come forth* and grounded in the need for *becoming* was already referred to by Cicero;

“Whereas philosophy is the culture of the mind: this it is which plucks up vices by the roots; prepares the mind for the receiving of seeds; commits them to it, or, as I may say, sows them, in the hope that, when come to maturity, they may produce a plentiful harvest” (Cicero).

Generally speaking, *civilization* is a deliberately organized structure of many humans living within an area, typically urbanized and sedentary, having social layers and means of symbolic communication. Control of *resources* whether in the *natural environment*, or the *human sort*, is a characteristic of civilization. Means of control and exploitation of the natural resources is reproduced with regards to the latter. As also is creating hierarchies with explicit tasks assigned to social layers that hereby are subjugated to the needs for upper layers by division of labor, and thus exposed to domination and management of *elite groups* seeking to establish improved conditions for themselves at the cost of precariousness for everyone else. The term civilization has been a supporting pillar in the teleological self-realization project of “the West” as a *superior*; “*The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism*” (Fukuyama, 1989). The singular “idea of the West” took around five hundred years to emerge as an *untouchable*. This reification relied on colonialism, wars and exploitation of natural resources and human beings inside and outside the geographical borders of Europe. Eradication of populations is an integrated practice of a “Western civilization”, but a hall-mark of most civilizations, also. The idea of the supremacy of the “West” came to capture the specific conditions of that which lead to increased economic and material growth of a relatively minor part of the world’s population; the *secularized, technologically and politically* advancements which relied primarily on making war and creating competition as legitimate practices, and capitalistic liberalism as the overall ideology. The origins are traceable to the Protestant Reformation in the 16th C. and the idea of Protestant *work ethic* suggested by Weber, gaining momentum in the Enlightenment Period in the 18th C. with the increasing focus on *inventions, industrialization and rationality* expressed normatively in what is *proper* human conduct and thinking. Ideas on what it means to be human follow changes to how *materials* for life are produced for and by whom. Being “*civilized*” meant being “Westernized” or cultivated by ideas and practices that were perceived to be emblematic of the “West” as if it were a fixed entity. The need for psychology to assess humans as practices and *rational or purposive-driven* thinking came into demand which created ideas and techniques that came tools of collective culture of “Westernized” educational, mental health and vocational contexts.

The desire to promote Westernization culminated at the end of the 20th C, as noted by Danish professor Ole Wæver, now of the *Centre for Resolution of International Conflicts* (ric.ku.dk). In Wæver (2002) it is argued that as the Cold-War was coming to an end, there

appeared literature as an answer to the need of policy makers in Washington (USA) to provide answers to the grand strategic question of “What’s Next?”. Wæver identifies Fukuyama (1989), Huntington (1993) and Kaplan (1994) as belonging to a group of texts that claimed to provide more or less the same answer. E.g. Fukuyama states that “*What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.*” (ibid.). The “Western” civilization was superior, and “liberal democracy” and capitalism marked the end of history. This statement disregards the price paid for supremacy with regards to the strain on natural environments and human resources, and it is worthwhile acknowledging that there is no *hard link* between capitalism and “liberal democracy”. The former thrives under other forms of rule. The hypothesis suggested by Huntington (1993) of the imminent *Clash of Civilizations* as the *next thing* is noteworthy and created an international debate. Huntington is criticized on four accounts by Wæver; Firstly, Huntington applies *culture-essentialism* which claims that even if politics are changed in a society, *culture* will always prevail, in effect making culture a “thing” that *determines* conduct. Secondly, that conflicts arise between those who are *very different*. Wæver states this is *not* the case, rather conflicts seem driven by Freud’s “narcissism of minor differences” (ibid.); thirdly, that the perspective on conflicts is *USA-biased* in looking for conflicts from “the above”, whereas conflicts are typically experienced as arising locally and have nothing to do with disagreements about the “world order”. The idea of clash of civilizations seems to rely on the idea that there is a “plot at global level” and a need for catchy headlines. Fourthly, *Clash of Civilizations* may have been a reckless and self-fulfilling prophecy which should never have been proposed.

Within psychology, and without being necessarily intentionally tied to any other purpose other than creation of psychological knowledge, the seminal work of Markus & Kitayama (1991) reflects the application of the *framework* of perceiving human psychology congruent with how an ideology perceives humans (per individualism and liberalism). It suggests two types of self-construal; *collectivistic* OR *individualistic* and argues along line of thought with Huntington for the equivalence of these to *specific nations*. However, Markus & Kitayama begins from the single *individual* and merely *adds* a “*social*” dimension as a *deterministic* “appendix”. It is a reuse of an existing framework for perceiving the single individual as determined, now not by “inner character”, but a larger entity; *culture*. This larger entity explains per causality the “effect” of a *thing* on another (here *self-construal*). As a *framework*, it is unsurprisingly congruent with Huntington in perceiving culture as *essentialistic* and *deterministic* and positioning these on a map of the world congruent with a top-down USA-biased simplistic perspective. However, the act of *explaining through categories* humans that are perceived as “different” has been a European tradition that goes back to Herodotus who referred to those *who did not* speak Greek and therefore *sounded* differently, as “barbarians”.

Historians claim he achieved the somewhat negative title as a *Lover of Barbarians* (The Archaic Smile of Herodotus Stewart Flory). Showing interest for Otherness implies gaining a perspective on one's own "backyard", too. It may be the only way. But it is risking a *stigma* of being non-patriotic, an apostate, or a potential traitor. This phenomenon has a history of at least two thousand years in Europe which bears testament to the affective dimensions of *categorization of humans*. Outside the European context, categorization of humans is found in ancient Chinese civilizations for differentiating between potential clerks in administrations. Interestingly, for a long time, both civilizations regarded themselves as *The Civilization*. So, the idea of perceiving one's "own" civilization as *superior* – regardless of whether this is deserved or not (who can be the judge of that?) – may be a characteristic which should be added to a formal definition of this term.

Curiosity into Otherness leads easily to a critique of one's "backyard", but is rarely interpreted as suggestion to tolerance and psychological growth through an expansion of understanding. Rather it is interpreted as an expression of *non-devotion* to the "home-team" as a "sacred" social framework beyond reproach. Conclusively, categorization reveals affective dimensions. This is a noteworthy psychological phenomenon which exemplifies that the border between what the social framework is perceived to be and how the psyché organizes itself by creating *objects* that *act back* on the person, are *reflections* of the same mechanism. It may be perceived as a psychological need for creating firm objects out of a perceived chaos that appears inexplicable and thus potentially *threatening* to any system, be it the psyché, a social framework or a civilization. These firm objects are *affectivized* (a Valsiner term) to guide conduct towards or away from them. Where the line is set between *approach* or *avoidance* appears to be a complex question to answer but may be understood when tracing cultural history, changes to activities of how life was sustained and to what was perceived as governing life and the world.

The *agricultural* metaphor used by Cicero is useful for several reasons, and is essential to the view-point of this chapter at two levels. Firstly, because agriculture as a practice of sustaining life, meant a fundamental change, for it created a *sedentary* life-form that allowed for civilizations to foster new ways of organizing humans. The notion of 'another place' is noteworthy, for as Valsiner (2007) also explains, it is only among civilizations of sedentary life-form that pilgrimage arose. Nomadic peoples show no preference for *place* which makes sense if there is no differentiation between what is *home* and *not-home*, making the notion of *nation* irrelevant, too. "Home" for nomadic peoples could be where a temporary settlement was established, for *here* meant *resources*. With the rise of agriculture as the primary practice for securing resources for survival, came the need for permanent housing, villages and only recently *nations*. Gradually *large organized pilgrimages* developed which became a useful tool both for the individual and for those who sought to establish a "sacred" social framework as

nation which relied on inclusion of some and exclusion of those who were portrayed as *not* possessing the needed inner and “sacred essence”.

Change in *activities* for life-sustenance lead to the *creation of civilization*. Incidentally, this *material* change gave rise to new ideas to understand the “new order” on par with how psychology much later create ideas and practices as a response to the material changes of life-sustaining activity that came from the shift from agriculture into the complex multi-faceted work-related activities of modern society. It is essential to point out that it was the *sedentary life-form* which fostered the idea of *home* and perceiving some places as *more sacred* than others which gave rise to residential, organized religions. Civilization, in this sense, is the necessary *organization* around large scale and various *activities* for upholding the life of *many*. The production of surplus food for storage meant that those who possessed the means of production by holding physical and mental control of others (slaves, employees) could spend their own time with activities other than acquiring food. These activities could be aimed at understanding and predicting the forces that upheld the world as it was known. This meant the ability to relate to and thus stand in direct relation to *divine power*.

As mentioned, civilization meant the possibility for organized religion centered around the notion of *sacred place* which one could or had to visit. Organized religion and its practices (rituals) is therefore inextricably intertwined with social structures, and typically offer suggestions to understand how the world is organized, what one’s moral obligation in the sense of role is in it, and how one achieves goals and achieves success in life. Basically, as Weber put it; *how one gets on in life*. This is the second point, for the *cultivation* of the personal culture, was also catered for by practices in organized religion through rituals, explicit social norms and well-defined roles, confessions and spiritual guidance. This type of cultivation has morphed in modern society into *services* such as mental health *therapy*, *career and life coaching* and *assessments* as in personality psychology testing aimed at “finding one’s proper place” and for “self-realization” of the “inner essence and ambitions” in contemporary organizations and society organized according to capitalistic principles of wage-work which there is the primary life-form for sustaining oneself. The practically oriented (applied) psychologies have filled out the abandoned niches previously taken up by the religious clergy, but essentially, society, and at the larger scale; civilization, relies on there being also guides, idols and managers of the mental or spiritual dimension of life. Humans use what is available at any time, to create their personal culture, and are directed towards what the social frameworks appropriate as *proper* tasks and goals. The *appearance* of guides, idols and managers may change with historical time, but any complex organization (civilization and society) still needs humans to fill out roles and to “share” a collective meaning-system to some degree. Likewise, is the human need for *becoming a person* through creating (cultivating) *personal culture* mandatory. In the following, the culturally organized environment of

pilgrimage is therefore analyzed as a *tool for creating oneself as a person* and as an *arena* for expressing *devotion to a social framework* as per Valsiner (2007).

Civilization and culture may be united. Any civilization, or any institution “in it” as a *culturally* organized environment. By this is meant that any context, be it a royal court, a parliament, a school, a tribe, an army, wage-laborers harvesting crops or doing factory- or service-work, a religious temple or a shopping center serve specific purposes deemed of necessity for, or in service of, a *social framework* to such a degree that the activities performed in these environments become *normalized*. So, finding one’s “role” is an expression of normality and leads to inclusion. And as humans create themselves by what is created and thus suggested or enforced, and especially by what significant others portray as good guidance, it is natural to adapt to and seek to “acquire” an acknowledged position in *any* social framework at any time and place in history. This is the basis for the argument that creation of personal culture is a universal psychological phenomenon for humans.

Personal and collective culture

The construction of *personal culture* is *culturally, materially and biologically grounded* and takes place in interaction with social others in goal-oriented activity in *culturally organized institutions* under those conditions of life that are specific to a time and place in history. Valsiner (2014) gives primacy to *personal* culture;

“The collective culture is person-anchored – it extends from the person to the social space in-between persons. It is not a “property” of social units, neither is it an isomorphic projection of the personal culture into the social world around the person”, and continues “The collective culture entails communally shared meanings, social norms, an everyday life practices, all united into a heterogenous complex – yet the anchor point in this sharing is the person” (ibid., p.214).

The question is how does the creation of personal culture take place? It is fundamental to understand that creation of personal culture is a *negotiation*. All humans in a social framework *are not the same*. Shared meanings are never really uniform from one person to another, and never completely alien either. The point is that nothing ever enters the meaning-system of a person without becoming transformed and retransformed upon exit in conduct and speech. Otherwise it is completely ignored. The consequence is that “shared meanings” and norms make up a *heterogenous complex*, as Valsiner puts it. It is in this mid-point that humans create their “*personally, idiosyncratic semiotic systems of symbols, practices, and their personal objects, all of which constitute the personal culture*” by drawing on collective culture to conduct themselves meaningfully in practices with others (ibid.). The following subsection presents how meaning-making may be understood as a continuous *sign-mediated* process.

Meaning-making

The driving force of history of the production of material according to Marx, creates and transforms institutions and ideas and by this *totality* of collective culture which is both of material and ideational form. What does *not* change is that humans need collective culture to cultivate themselves for conduct and meaning-making within culturally organized institutions set up for purposes that change accordingly. The general definition of *meaning-making* is as a complex socio-psychological phenomenon of making sense of what happens in the world, to oneself and others. Zittoun & Brinkmann (2012) defines it accordingly albeit in the context of *learning*; “‘*Meaning making*’ designates the process by which people interpret situations, events, objects, or discourses, in the light of their previous knowledge and experience” (ibid., p.1). However, *meaning-making* is much larger phenomenon than one which goes on in the mind of the individual. The process is *cultural-historically organized and mediated* by available *tools* to allow for forming and expressing knowledge and experience, respectively. In a nutshell, Marx described this as “it is not the consciousness of man that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness”. This implies, that if conditions of social existence are changed, so will the consciousness hence also meaning-making. Huntington would unsurprisingly, not agree, as “culture” would override the effect of any such changes.

Semiotic mediation in meaning-making

Creation of personal culture is a *semiotic mediated act* that allows for distancing from the immediate, creating an *object*. Valsiner (2007) explains its general form;

‘The *person* constructs *meaning complex* “X”...

...*objectifies* it by *fixing its form* (e.g. internal – internalized social norm, or external – monument, picture of deity, figurine)

.....and starts to act *as if* the objectified meaning complex X is an external agent that *controls the person*’ (ibid., p.61).

Valsiner’s point is that human thinking is culturally organized. Semiotic mediation suggests that pilgrims are guided by suggested ways of creating meaning, by which is meant that a best potential explanation is not *handed over*, but is *invoked* and follows socio-cultural-historical tradition grounded in conditions of life. Invocation of *ways of making inference* turn sacred in *ritual* when emotions are invoked, and become *belief (religious faith)*. Here, belief would be *inference to the best potential explanation (abduction per Peirce)* explained as “The surprising fact, C, is observed. But if A were true, C would be a matter of course. Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.” (Valsiner, 2007, p. 275). This form of meaning-making is used in the everyday, also, and may be understood as purposive and aligned with the Weberian perspective on a purpose of religion as for *getting on well in life*. The form of *inference* is simply invoked as a way of understanding the world and managing oneself and others.

Pilgrimage, in the perspective of *cultivation* and as a *socializing* practice performed in a specific environment for purposes that lie *beyond* its immediate context, but deemed of importance to social existence in a framework of others, is characterizable by the *creation of objects of control* per semiotic mediation in meaning-making. However, it is worth remembering, that even if the practice appears very different, it follows along the same line of creating objects like “personality” or “attitude” that are also perceived as objects *in control the person*, albeit positioned *inside the person*. From this follows that one’ cannot rely on the benevolence of a deity, but was to work hard (Protestant work ethic), and success in life is entirely the person’s *own responsibility*. This idea is highly useful in a society dominated by “Western” capitalistic-liberalism. The individual is the single procurer of *success in life*. There is no-one else to turn to.

Interpretation of conduct in pilgrimage

Pilgrimages traditions show variation in *ornamentations* of *bodies*, appearances of sacred *places* and ritualized *conducts*. To interpret their *meaningfulness* relies on including the *not-presented*. To exclude oneself from this, would be comparable to removing a No-Entry signpost from its position on the road, isolate it in a laboratory, where it *does not refer to anything* as it is *no longer* a sign, but a metal rod with a symbol attached to the end. It has lost its *purpose*, but it is still possible to define its *properties* (color and material), and by *quantitative measurement*, its *dimensions* (length and weight), and *capacities* (strength). It is reduced to a *thing* by a *techne* which also could be used to produce it. However, to understand pilgrimage as *meaningful* needs perceiving mental processes as *doings* that are *conversational* as per Brinkmann (2016), and that humans – even if they are biological and hence physical entities, they are not only that, but something unique which needs its own methodology to study.

A Weberian perspective of religion

Goal-orientation links cultural psychology to religion

The German sociologist, Max Weber’s perspective on religion is compatible with the applied cultural psychology of Valsiner (2007, 2014), for they both give importance to psychological *goal-orientation*. According to Boudon (2001), Weber refers to the Book of Deuteronomy [Note 1] in stating what religion achieves; ‘we follow the precepts of religion “that it may go well with thee . . . and that thou mayest prolong thy days upon the earth.” The objectives of Deuteronomy’s prescriptions are no different from those pursued, for example, by religious theories of a Chinese character.’ (ibid., p. X).

The *goal of religion* is that *things may turn out well* for a person. Religion is orientated towards also to *this* life on Earth; and Weber suggested that “*to understand religious practice in any society, including the building of magnificent sacred spaces, we need to know something about people’s everyday lives, their ‘days upon the earth’*” (Scott, 2011, p.211). This *basic*

purpose of religion may be seen in e.g. prayer. Speaking generally, this linguistic practice is a human invention (a cultural *tool*) that creates as well as relies on the idea of *forces* overseeing and care-taking, to which one may turn for several practical purposes in this life, but also for the future, and in times of trouble, or for achieving personal or collective goals. Pilgrimage is the same type practice, but is of non-linguistic, as it is moving the body. It becomes also *socialization* to such practices ways of understanding oneself and social others suggesting meanings to feelings, prescribing conduct, also outside of the pilgrimage environment. Hence, pilgrimage is a *cultivating* practice whose “product” is *personal culture*.

Valsiner (2007) states that psychological functions are *goal-oriented*; They are “...are historical, in the sense of being bound within the irreversibility of time. Their directionality can be described in terms of goal-orientedness. It is posited here that human lower psychological functions are goals-oriented (rather than goals-directed), as their directionality can be specified (but specific goals can not be, as these are constructions about some possible future). Similarly, signs are specifiable by their presentational orientedness. A use or invention of a word depicting something not only refers to the denoted referent, but presents that referent for some purpose or direction.” (ibid., p. 62-63).

In this perspective, *religion* is a possibility for organizing basic *human psychology* through establishing a meaning-system which is coherent with *orientedness* under given conditions of life. This explains the purposefulness of understanding the human mind *through* religion! By this is meant that religious conducts and concepts must be understood *not by merely* by what they refer to, but as *giving orientation* to lower psychological functions.

The Weberian perspective is *continuist* defined as “*adherence to any belief, religious or scientific as well as juridical, is explained by the fact that the subject has strong reasons to believe it, and that this belief makes sense to him*” (Boudon, 2001, p.IV). Boudon suggests that it is up to the sociologist to reconstruct reasons for beliefs. Here, it is a cultural psychology which interprets “religious” beliefs as using *interpretants* in a *meaning-making process, which is anything but irrational*. “Religious” versus “rational” thinking would be *Kulturbegriffe* per Weber hence (mis)constructions of the Enlightenment Period used explanatory by a dichotomy of *logic/non-logic* (ibid.) grounded on perceived applicability creating true or false knowledge. To exemplify further, Danish professor and theologian Johannes Sløk, sees “religious” thinking as about *values* which he puts *beyond* scientific inquiry, and as *instinctive* meaning-making *to be found* in “primitive understanding of nature” (Sløk, 1960). This signifies a *discontinuist* perspective which “*regards religious beliefs as fundamentally distinct from other kinds of human thought*” (Boudon, 2001, p. III). “Religious” versus “rational” thinking may have entered common language through a need for training specifically in natural sciences in education. The rationale for this would be *economic* growth and development of Western societies with its characteristics of social organization of work by *bureaucratization*, demands for increased specialization of work content (*technicalization*) serving mass-production of

commodities and services based on *division of labor* that *separates conceptualization from execution* for maximizing *profit* and thus share-holder payback.

Weber would relate a decline of the openly “religious” symbolism and practices in these societies, to the *disenchantment* following living and working under conditions with the beforementioned characteristics. Accordingly, changes to ways of “thinking of thinking” follow *material changes*, and changes to how production of what sustains life is *socially organized*. This creates a *normative* of a *moralistic* dichotomy of good/bad which maps onto one of useless/useful, but fundamentally based upon *currently available means and conditions of living a life in a community at a given point in history*.



Fig. 1. *Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī* (c. 870–950). Born in Farab (Kazakhstan), died in Damascus. Philosopher and musician. Ref. Germann (2016). Public Domain.

The role of religion

Understanding the role of religion in civilizations is an arduous task. But understanding the creation of *personal culture* using *collective culture* (Valsiner, 2007, 2014) found typically in religious contexts, e.g. in pilgrimage, serves to exemplify *meaning-making* that takes a “semi-permanent” form and is of affective dimensions essential for future conduct within a social framework. Understanding this relationship is fundamental for understanding *conduct*. How is religion *collective culture* for living in a society? Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (fig.3b) wrote: “*religion is suited to direct the members of society towards human perfection and thus to contribute simultaneously to the attainment of individual happiness and the well-being of the city*” (Germann, 2016). Al-Fārābī was called “The Second Master” after Aristotle. He preserved original Greek texts during the European Middle Ages per Germann. His answer aligns remarkably well with Weber, which is no surprise, as Islam is one of the Abrahamic religions;

“If the first ruler is excellent and his rulership truly excellent, then in what he prescribes he seeks only to obtain, for himself and for everyone under his rulership, the ultimate happiness that is truly happiness; and that religion will be the excellent religion. (*Book of Religion* 1: 93, slightly modified)” (ibid.).

To Al-Fārābī, religion prescribed opinions and actions for a community to follow, set down by its first ruler, based on his own actions, making religion not a goal in itself, but an instrument, also of rulership, and for the happiness of oneself. Pilgrimage – is following in the footsteps of others – as Beckstead (2012) puts it, may be understood at two levels; as an *instrumental practice* performing the actions of the “first ruler” and all other of his followers, and an expression of *devotion* to a social framework.

Defining pilgrimage

There are many ways to define pilgrimage. In the following four definitions are suggested, and they are brought to converge into synthesis in the conclusion. Firstly, in an *objective* sense, pilgrimage is the ancient, contemporary, temporary, large-scale practice, involving millions of human beings, moving within and across borders of nations. Taking this perspective makes it apparent that traditions have different historical, mythological and religious groundings. Yet the idea to gather substantial encyclopedic knowledge thereof as in Davidson & Gitlitz (2002), gives a clue to the reasonable assumption of there being a unification possible. Something connects diverse traditions together at a *conceptual level*. Secondly, in a *symbolic* sense, pilgrimage is *moving* a body to *more* than a special, or sacred place, as it is a *symbolic* expression of *devotion*. The practice refers to something else, making the conduct understandable *as a sign* itself, and the pilgrim into a *signifier* of the meaning of the end-goal. Without such signification, the conduct would be *meaningless*. A pilgrim from a Japanese and a Spanish tradition, are shown in fig.2 and 3 (resp.), set apart by thousands of kilometers and religious frameworks. Yet they appear strikingly similar, as do the choreographed setups that purport devotion. Therefore, in the *abstract* sense, pilgrimages are unified by having *telos* (purpose) which is the *meaning* understood only when including the social framework that supports them. The social framework extends beyond the tradition in terms of time and place. Thirdly, a *developmental, psychological sense* sees pilgrimage as a potentially *personalizing* and *socializing* journey, which supports creating personal culture *using* collective culture.



Fig. 2. A Japanese pilgrim, framing himself in front of a picture of Fujiyama. By Kusakabe Kimbei (1841-1934). Public domain.



Fig 3. From an old postcard. Two Santiago Pilgrims, one from Spain (standing) and one from Germany (kneeling), Roncevalles, Spain. (early 1900). Public domain.

The question of defining pilgrimage is *which frame of reference* is used. This provides the purpose of defining. Beginning in etymology provides a first-hand understanding, but is here bound to a specific of *pilgrimage* [Note 2];

“pilgrim (n.) c. 1200, pilgrim, from Old French pelerin, peregrin "pilgrim, crusader; foreigner, stranger" (11c., Modern French pèlerin), from Late Latin pelegrinus, dissimilated from Latin peregrinus "foreigner" (source of Italian pellegrino, Spanish peregrino), from peregre (adv.) "from abroad," from per- "beyond" + agri, locative case of ager "country, land" (see acre).”.

Using this definition may lead to assuming *equivalence* to all others. On the other hand, the official view in Catholicism on pilgrimage today is noteworthy for its *telos* suggesting a fourth level of definition. One which is specific to a particular tradition; “The word “pilgrim,” derived from the Latin *peregrinum*, conveys the idea of wandering over a distance, but it is not just aimless wandering. It is a journey with a purpose, and that purpose is to honor God.” (Villarrubia, 2010, p.1). Historically, this is unsurprising considering the influence of Aristotle in Medieval Christian ethics, normally attributed to Thomas Aquinas according to Wogaman (2010), but made accessible by *Muslim scholars*, who were preservers and users of Aristotelian thinking, in Toledo (Spain); once the cultural capital of Europe.

Pilgrimage is not giving way to modern, secular life styles everywhere. Dubisch (2012) notes that pilgrimages “enjoy a continuing and even increasing popularity in the contemporary world, ranging from localized journeys to national and international ones” (ibid., p.992). In other words, this phenomenon is alive, and worth researching for here lies a potential for an understanding of the psyché as embedded and expressed through cultural context. Dubisch (2012) adds even that “some analysts have also challenged the category of pilgrimage itself, pointing out that in many languages, there is no exact equivalent to the English term...” (ibid., p.996), and that

“to refer to certain kinds of religious activities or certain kinds of travels as “pilgrimage” may obscure their connections to other kinds of ritual behavior, on the one hand, and may blur the significant differences between the various activities we term pilgrimage, on the other.” (ibid.).

Still, a single tradition may hold characteristics found in all instances of traditions, depending on *which* perspective is taken, and *what* is being generalized. Three characteristics and three beliefs from Dubisch (2012) and Davidson & Gitlitz (2002) are essential. The characteristics are based on what *gets done in practice*, and the beliefs expresses how meaning-making appears. All six components appear universally; *journey, place and body* (characteristics) and beliefs in *forces* infinitely larger than humans, the possibility of establishing *relationship* to forces, and they have *residence* in places. *Characteristics* and *beliefs* may be referred to as *components* without implying that the terms are comparable. They belong to different domains. *Characteristics* refer to the “positively present in the world”, whereas beliefs are broadly speaking, *ways of inference* (meaning-making process) whose “presence” may only be inferred.

Valsiner (2014) makes a differentiation where *characteristics* would be properties of “material objects”, whereas *beliefs* are “immaterial entities” appearing in a *communication process* through *internalization/externalization*.

Journeying to establish relationship with a force

Humans perform temporary journeys to places of *significance* [Note 3] such as work, tourist sites, sport-events, entertainment, consumerism, political meetings, demonstrations, cathedrals, monasteries and even libraries. They also go into war, and journey to *sacred* places, which typically are referred to as *pilgrimage*. Whereas the former type destroys life, the latter seems concerned with preservation. That dichotomy will, however prove insufficient. A synthesis of the two practices would show that they share *sacrilization of area* which follows from the need, or the construed need, of securing *resources* and *maintaining* oneself.

An attempt at defining *pilgrim* in a European historical context can be traced to *Dante* in *La Vita Nuova* around 1295; “*And I said ‘peregrini’ in the general sense of the word: since ‘pilgrims’ can be understood in two senses, in one case generalised, and in the other specific: in general to the extent that whoever travels from their country is a pilgrim* (Dante, 1899/2012). The general sense need not have anything to do with religion, but the specific sense *Dante* is also referring to, is of a *person* travelling to pay *worship* in foreign lands. The Medieval *Palästinalied* by *Walther von der Vogelweide* from the 13th Century, is an example of the *special sense* of pilgrim; a religious devotee who advocates being a crusader, too. At *Dante’s* time there were in Europe, three different terms to denote a religious devotee who traveled to pay homage at a sacred site, differentiated by their end-destination. The term *pilgrimage* nowadays is used for various *practices* that all have *journeying* across *distance* to a special *place* in common as per *Dubisch* (2012).

Journeying can be about displaying *devotion* to nationhood, freedom, democracy or any other concept, or idea - that is not *physically* tangible object, but uses a *place*. What *justifies* journeying to a place within a given context, would then be ideas or beliefs that guide towards goals for sustaining order with a dimension of affect embedded in it. The ideational is manifested in special places which makes journeying to those places *meaningful moral conduct* and from the standpoint of the person, also *future-oriented* action, even if it commemorates *deceased persons* or *past events and miracles*.

Places where forces reside, infinitely larger than humans

What sets journeying to special places off was already realized by *Dante*. It is that “[p]ilgrimage is one way of entering into a relationship or connection with the spiritual world and spiritual beings” (*Dubisch*, 2012, p.992). This is the specific sense, and would associate pilgrimage with religion and experiencing the *transcendent* [Note 4]. The common aspect here is that there is *something worth journeying to; a place*. That would include journeying to various places, as

Elvis Presley's Graceland, a Vietnam war-memorial, Mecca and Sct. Peter's cathedral in Rome, as those who journey there would reckon these as *special places*. If all these count as sacred in the sense of religious, places, or for experiencing the transcendent, is another matter which opens up for *why journeys* are undertaken. Dubisch (2012) provides *several reasons for pilgrimage*; as a prescribed act of religious piety, a commemoration of significant event, to memorialize the dead, an expression of national or ethnic affiliation, acquiring the spiritual blessing of a holy figure (often deceased, but not necessarily) or holy place, fulfillment of a vow or for physical or spiritual healing.

The role of Body

Movement of a body in making a journey is a fundamental characteristic of pilgrimage, per Davidson & Gitlitz (2002). This is a physical phenomenon, so pilgrimage in body seems to bind ideas and conduct through an affective dimension. The common aspect of Dubisch's various reasons lie in the *affective dimension* they all (potentially may) share. This affect is related to having a body. That is, by journeying to these places, experiencing affect, is often endorsed by different means. Experiencing the *transcendent* in the sense of that which lies beyond the limits of ordinary experience is a typical aspect, too. It may be caretaking of one's soul, or the souls of others, revering the grace of God, seeking benevolence, a need of redemption, or for reviving one's affect for someone. Reasons have a dimension of *affectivity* which justifies making the effort of a journey, but there is also a *moral aspect* which points to *devotion* to a social framework. Being at special place usually means participating in communal activities that *create* and *release* affect, and simultaneously acknowledges the transcendent, whereby one is also able to establish and express a *personal culture*. In simpler terms, the communal activities create a basis for constructing personal culture rooted in ideas and values that are themselves created out of activities performed by humans meant for a specific social framework.

Comparing sacred places

Pilgrimage is symbolic, physical and (can be) personally meaningful conduct. It may be understood as an act of *devotion to* a social framework's practices beliefs and ideas, and for *ensuring* life-conditions by the ritualized conduct of making a *hard* journey to a place of significance which symbolizes this in various ways. Sløk (1960) remarks that it was necessary to stand in good relationship with powers that make existence possible. Following Sløk, humans turn to forces that ensure resources for living in a specific *place* under certain *conditions*. These forces became synonymous with sacred places. It was (is) necessary to stand in good relationship with powers which, in inexplicable ways, provide(d) the means of survival and who were (are) in control of conditions, and of life and death. This conduct then becomes *necessary* and *value-able*. It appears natural then that pilgrims were (are) granted passage and

resources to uphold themselves because of their respectful undertaking in making a *journey of significance which potentially applies to all participants of the social framework*.

Pilgrimage is an act directed at also *collective interests*. Care-taking interests may stretch beyond oneself, to one's present family, country or village, and into the *after-life* or *next-life*. To redeem oneself, make a transaction and present an offering to such forces appears as "*rational*" even if Sløk attributes it to the opposite when terming it *cultic-religious* with regards to the irrational in assuming the *actual* intervention of forces *due to* the "magic" of a ritual. The concept of *Axis Mundi* may to have grown out of this reasoning, for certain places perceived as where the sacred resides. It is no wonder that miracles were important in Medieval time, for this was seen as an expression of divine intervention which craved devotion, attention and respect, for humans could benefit from miracles. It made sense to travel to places where the forces resided or expressed themselves. In Catholicism, pilgrimage may be care-taking of living as well as deceased social others in the "beyond". It is a socially oriented practice, as also elsewhere. In Catholicism, it was typically seen as most *efficient* to journey to those places where the most highly regarded saints were buried. It was also regarded as the greatest expression of devotion. In Medieval time, deceased members of the framework were still part of a social framework, and could help the living, for the dead were perceived to be closer to the top of the hierarchy per Scott (2011) of the divine *modelled upon* the hierarchy of societal structures.

Sun-light is shining through one of the twelve apostles in the image of a glass-rosette in fig. 21, symbolizing the hierarchical structure around the central figure (here Virgin Mary) while mimicking also structure of the Medieval society. Art is here in the service of faith, and the latter is in the service of justifying hierarchical structures (based on power). To interpret the art relied on *symbolic thinking* and perceiving an *idea*. This would be *meaning-making* based on *iconicity* (resemblance). The art exemplifies Marx' notion of religion as a "celestialised form" which "corresponds" to existing social relations (Rigby, 1998, p.180). A comparison may be made to fig. x, where a Muslim mosque displays calligraphic inscriptions on the outside praising "the Fourteen Immaculate Ones (i.e. Muhammad, Fatimah and The Twelve Imams)". Inside "one is drowned by the endless waves of intricate arabesque in golden yellow and dark blue, which bless the spectator with a space of internal serenity" [Note 5].

The Catholic cathedral, and the Muslim mosque both use art, albeit somewhat differently. They rely on *iconicity* and *symbolism* in meaning-making, but the former uses evocative images



Fig. 4. *The House of Light* or the *Pulchra Leonina*. A glass-rosette in the Gothic cathedral in Leon, Spain. Evocative art.

of *sacred persons* whereas the latter uses *artfully written language*, and more indirect evocating devices aimed at sensing the serenity of Heaven by looking at beautiful art. The former achieves the same. Both rely on the ability to transfer feeling from a place beyond to “here” and to feel it. This is an example of how a feeling-of-something gets a symbol, a name; Heaven as in “this is what it is” by “how it feels”, and signifies a creation of a sense of the sacred through meaning-making. Valsiner’s suggestion of the social framework may thus be expanded. The social framework includes the transcendent as it extends *back* and *forth* in historical time (temporally), and between *here* and *there* (spatially). Art assists in communicating this; The image in fig. 21 supports *imagining* how Heaven and society is organized, to suggest one’s own current and future position in it, *through symbolic thinking of an idea* by *iconicity* (resemblance).

Suggestion exist in sacred sites, in general, that endorse conduct (rituals) to influence life-conditions of oneself and others. These tools may be confession, prayer, sacrifice, transactions, and *pilgrimage* directed at divine forces. Such tools are collective culture and are used as tools by the person creating personal culture, but for purposes that are *specific* to *this* person, and therefore provide personal meaning.



Fig.5. The Shah or Jaame' Abbasi Mosque, Isfahan, Iran. Also using evocative art.

Conclusion

Pilgrimage is expressing devotion to significant objects, places, ideas and social frame-works. It can be a practice on par with other religious rituals for ensuring *conditions* of living, both *here* and in any perception of an *after-life*. The creation of a *sacred* house (temple, cathedral) mimics the creation of a *permanent house for oneself and creation of nation*. But all too often have entire populations of the world paid a high price for the latter “sacred” idea.

Sacred places are not always purposively, and but may be mountains or rivers, but this matters less for the *synthesis* in seeing that pilgrimage expresses the important relationship between the ideational and material life-conditions and basic needs for survival. However, the need for making meaning of life-experiences and -conditions is sought for. Culturally organized institutions of civilizations including pilgrimage traditions provide this, albeit differently. Religious thinking is on par with “non-religious” inference in the everyday life, understandable as a use of semiotic tools made available in practices acknowledged by social frameworks organized by *activities* for gaining materials needed for living.

Conflict is an unavoidable part of life when access to resources is at stake. What we need is not a clash over ideas or resources, but *civilized egalitarianism* with regards to access to materials and cultivation. It starts from understanding Otherness in a lens provided by a revitalized cultural psychology.

Notes

- [1] Book of Deuteronomy: “The fifth book of the Torah (a section of the Hebrew Bible) and the Christian Old Testament.” Ref. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Book_of_Deuteronomy
- [2] <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=pilgrim> (downloaded 29-05-2017)
- [3] Significance: The quality of being, having or expressing a meaning; indicative; suggestive ref. <http://www.dictionary.com>
- [4] "Beyond or above the range of normal or physical human experience” (<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/transcendent>)
- [5] ref. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shah_Mosqu (downloaded 29-05-2017)

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The Usefulness of Mathematics in Renaissance Art Theory

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Introduction: On the theory of human proportion by L. B. Alberti

(1) A discussion from the viewpoint of the cultural history of mathematics

I previously discussed some elements of Renaissance mathematics through the analysis of the theory of human proportion in my study, “*An aspect of Renaissance Mathematics revealed in a study of the theory of human proportion*” (Nakamura, 2017). This article was written from the perspective of the cultural history of mathematics. This perspective explains that the theory of human proportion has pursued the universal standard of the ideal beauty of the human body called the “*Canon*,” understood as a mathematical ratio. It can be considered, therefore, that this theory has been introduced at the intersection of art and mathematics. Theorists have used various mathematical methods to attain the *Canon* in history. This fact suggests that the characteristics of individual theories are influenced by mathematics or some mathematical thought appearing within the same historical and cultural context. Therefore, the study of the theory of human proportion is not only meaningful for art history but also for the cultural history of mathematics.

In that study, I analyzed the theory of human proportion by Leon Battista Alberti, a typical humanist and theorist of art from the early Renaissance period which is not only an important part of European art history but also the history of science and mathematics. This is because it can be considered an age of preliminary steps or gradation to the next period called the *scientific revolution*. It is also a phase in the history of the theory of human proportion; so, we can find numerous theories based on new, interesting ideas. Above all, Alberti’s theory and in particular, the mathematical method he used included some epoch-making conceptions. This study aims at grasping some elements of Renaissance mathematics through the analysis of these conceptions. In doing so, a new approach to knowledge emerges consisting of a shift from methods based on geometrical thought to focus on practical influential power, which should be called the “*usefulness of mathematics*.”

(2) Problématique: From the viewpoint of civilization studies

What is the *usefulness of mathematics*? Originally, mathematics itself was not only a pure theoretical construct but also had power to produce cognitive methods and concrete techniques that could directly influence human life. In most works on the history of mathematics, the origin of mathematics is believed to have been caused by some primitive and practical necessity for actual human life (Kline, 1953, p.13., Boyer, 1968, p.1.) [Note 1]. From antiquity, people have used the concept of *number* (numerical words) to solve various tangible problems of ordinary life and, for this purpose, have developed some mathematical concepts, methods, and

techniques. This is because the mathematical method can be conceived as a powerful *weapon* for human recognition or understanding of nature.

Here, we acknowledge a predominant *usefulness of mathematics* for human activities. This *usefulness* does not just mean practically *convenience* for us, or rather, its basis on the essential feature of mathematics. In other words, because mathematical thought originates from the depths of the human mind and possesses internal potential itself, it may be applied universally to various human activities. Such activities which represented in numerical words gain a kind of power from mathematical thoughts. Further, it enables the human activities to develop more extensively.

Mathematics has been considered a special science in European civilization since ancient times because it has a kind of metaphysical meaning. The theory of human proportion has also been a cultural activity since ancient Greece. It had been connected to the *absoluteness* of pure mathematical theory and its metaphysical value. However, especially after the modern times, it seems that the theorists has been realized not so much the *absoluteness* as another function as a *weapon* against nature.

In the Renaissance period, people clearly had begun to be conscious of the *usefulness of mathematics* that introduced an influential cognitive method . In fact, people had been interested in real nature and life as citizens, and this movement had been signified a deviation from the world view of the Middle Ages. During this historical change, it can be observed that the *usefulness of mathematics* as an effective approach to nature has been used actively in various human activities.

This study discusses the new approach to knowledge found in the Renaissance art theory and its influences on the later development of Europe from the viewpoint of civilization studies. The concept of the *usefulness of mathematics* is the key phrase of this study. Since this concept is an element based on modern science and technology, derived from European civilization, it is more important to consider an aspect of its historical construction.

A discussion by Alfred Crosby

Crosby investigated the reason European imperialism had achieved incomparable success in world history (Crosby, 1997), and believed that a decisive factor was the significant change in human cognitive methods that emerged in the late Middle Ages to the Renaissance. The model view of reality shifted from a traditional type that emphasizes the nature of objects to the new model that considered existence as a quantity. Through this important shift, European society headed toward a world view featuring quantitative, naturalistic cognition (and later toward mechanical cognition) from the world view based on the qualitative, teleological cognition that had existed since ancient Greece.

Crosby said “we look upon them as initiators of revolutionary change which they certainly were” (Crosby, 1997, p.10). Crosby also reveals how the meaning of the concepts of

Time and *Space* changed, and some human activities such as *mathematics*, *music* or *paintings* changed through this revolution. This occurred through the new concepts of *quantification* and *visualization*. Crosby's book insists that the biggest cause of the success of European imperialism was not the development of science and technology itself. Contrary the consensus view, Crosby thinks it was instead the European way of thought that granted Western people their overwhelming supremacy.

“Westerner's advantage, I believe, lay at first not in their science and technology, but in their utilization of habits of thought that would *in time* enable them to advance swiftly in science and technology and, in the meantime, gave them decisively important administrative, commercial, navigational, industrial, and military skills. The initial European advantage lay in what French historians have called *mentalité*. (Crosby, 1997, p.10-11.)

This *mentalité*, the peculiar thought common to Europe is regarded as a driving force of the revolutionary shift from the old model to the new model of the world. It has a strong effectiveness on reality and an influential power that can reach beyond the area of European civilization.

“The New Model, visual and quantitative, was one of its antidotes for the nagging insufficiency of its traditional explanations for the mysteries of reality. The New Model offered a new way to examine reality and an armature around which to organize perceptions of that reality. It proved to be extraordinarily robust, providing humanity with unprecedented power and many humans with the comfort of a faith—it lasted for centuries—which they were capable of an intimate understanding of their universe. (Crosby, 1997, p.239.)

A key phrase of this paper, the *usefulness of mathematics*, could also be a factor of this *unprecedented power*. Crosby's discussion suggests that the analysis of Renaissance art theory is meaningful not only for the history of art but also for the history of science and civilization studies. Specifically, we can finally ask the following question: If the European way of thought is peculiar to European civilization, and it has been formed with various human activities of Westerners, why was European knowledge able to develop globally? This indicates a problem concerning two aspects of European knowledge: cultural particularity and scientific universality.


The three types of mathematical method in the theory of human proportion

The Theory of human proportion is based on various mathematical methods. It is classified into three types in the period before Renaissance. This section introduces the characteristics of them [Note 2]

(1) The Fractional Method

In this method, the length of each part of the human body is expressed as a simple integer ratio

to the height of the whole body (v., Fig.1). The *Canon of Vitruvius* (Roman architect, 1C.) is the most famous example using this method. Vitruvius had developed a theory of human proportion in his book, *On Architecture (De architectura libri decem)* (Vitruvius, trans., 1962). It had functioned as an object of inspiration throughout the history of the theory of human proportion. It is clear that his theory inherited the tradition of ancient Greece, with its emphasis on the “*geometrical harmony*” that brought with it an idealistic symbolism.




(2) The Modulus Method

In this method, a standard “unit” for the height of the human body is set at the beginning. This is called the “Modulus,” for example, the length of the head might be used as the Modulus (v., Fig.2). In most cases, the “Modulus” is subdivided into shorter lengths to give the length of each of the details of the human body. The proportion of a human figure is expressed by calculating the “Modulus.” It excels with respect to practical convenience in the figurative arts, placing emphasis on the technical element of the theory of human proportion. This method developed during the European Middle Ages. Cennino d’Andrea Cennini (Italian painter, 14C.) had used it in his book, *The Craftsman’s Handbook (Il Libro dell’Arte)* (Cennini, trans., 1954).

(3) The Geometrical Construction Method

This method represents the contours and structure of the human body using geometrical construction. With this method, plastic artists used basic properties of mathematical figures like circles or squares and were easily able to determine the size and action of human figures (v., Fig.3). However, it would be too much to say that they got conscious of the logic of Greek

geometry. This method was particularly utilized by Gothic artisans in the Middle Ages. The “*Sketchbook*” (*Le Carnet*) of Villard de Honnecourt (French architect, 13C.) is a very valuable document of the methods employed during those times. Villard showed how to draw the outlines of creatures. His method has been called “*Portraiture*.”



[Fig.3]

The Geometrical construction Method

We have presented three kinds of mathematical methods in the theory of human proportion, but it seems that the third was an epigone of the Fractional Method. Naturally, the Gothic artisans must have had a sort of geometrical knowledge, which should be called “practical geometry.” However, this would probably not have been pure Greek geometry but only a kind of practical know-how.

Therefore, at least before the Renaissance period, it seems probable that mathematical methods were divided between the Fractional Method and the Modulus Method. Each had a different mathematical basis. The first method was based on geometrical thought and reflected one of the characteristics of Greek mathematics with a preference for continuous quantities. In the geometry of ancient Greece, the rational quantity (even its square root) to basic quantity as a standard unit could be constructed geometrically. In contrast, the second method had an arithmetical thought as its basis, which makes it speculative regarding the influence of an inclination toward a mathematics consisting of discrete quantities, like algebra. It can be observed, then, that the theory of human proportion has a common basis with mathematical thought.

Alberti's theory of human proportion

In contrast to these three methods, Leon Battista Alberti (1404-1472) proposed a new mathematical method for the theory of human proportion. In his book *On Sculpture (De Statua*, c.1430 or after 1464) (Alberti, trans., 1992 & 2000), he outlined an objective method of anthropometry using some instruments. At first, a measurement system and some instruments were invented by him, with one instrument called the "*Exempeda*." This instrument is a wooden ruler that matches the height of the human body to correspond to the object of measurement. This system is today known as the "*Exempeda* system."

The *Exempeda* system has the following structure: first, an *Exempeda* is divided into six segments and each segment is called a "*Pedes*." Second, a "*Pedes*" is divided into ten segments, each of which is called an "*Unceola*" (another name for this is the "*Gradus*"). Third, an "*Unceola*" is divided into 10 segments, each of which is called a "*Minuta*." The *Exempeda* system thus consists of the following four units: $1 \text{ Exempeda} = 6 \text{ Pedes} = 60 \text{ Unceolae} = 600 \text{ Minuta}$. Alberti used this measure on people who were selected by experts as having beautiful bodies. According to his book, Alberti had measured no fewer than 50 parts of the human body. That is, it was possible for him to measure in detail the length, width, and thickness of each part of the human body. With this objective measuring method, Alberti had gathered numerical data about the ideal human body and, on the basis of this data, found its standard (*Canon*). Here, it needs to be observed that Alberti had developed a kind of method such as the ideal of statistical manner present today. Besides, there is a table that represented his *Canon* in his book (Alberti, trans., 2000, p.168-177). Immediately, we can find a similar idea to that of the decimal fraction in this table. It is generally considered that the decimal fraction was formed in Europe by Simon Stevin (1548-1620), in his book called "*The Art of Tenths*" (*De Thiende*, 1585). But previously, Alberti naturally might have needed a more rational and useful method for precise measurement, namely, more smaller units that could be used for anthropometry. In fact, the size of a *Minuta* means $1/600$ of the *Exempeda*, which is only 3 mm for a person who is 180cm tall.

Analysis of Alberti's method

What is novel in Alberti's method as compared with previous mathematical methods? There are two points that should be discussed here.

First, Alberti used real human bodies to obtain the *Canon* instead of using an idealistic, geometrical method. He devised a kind of "ruler" to measure various human bodies in detail, simply and easily. Naturally, Alberti's method is not a complete objective measure like the metric system. The *Exempeda* is a kind of relative scale. Its fundamental idea is based on the fractional system. Besides, this "ruler" can be divided endlessly to a visible range, and each unit of this scale is calculable as a kind of "modulus." This allows people to more easily represent the proportions of each part of the body to the whole body as a piece of comparable

and universal data. In other words, it seems that Alberti had learned the mathematical methods that appeared in history as the Fractional Method and the Modulus Method. Moreover, he mixed the advantages of each method and tried to propose a more simple and effective new theory.

Second, Alberti showed a new method for notating the results of his measurements. He indicated it as a table, and, consequently, was able to adopt the notation of the quasi-decimal fraction that can be translated into a digit value for a numerical figure. We cannot judge how Alberti realized the meaning and potential of his method himself. However, we can at least point out that his attempt included some new ideas that connect with the next generation. Incidentally, as mentioned above, it has been noted that the formation of the decimal fraction appeared in a Flemish mathematician's book in the latter part of the sixteenth century. It is difficult to connect directly the work of Alberti with Stevin, but, at least, it is possible to record advancement in human knowledge on the basis of the common context of the age (cf. Hirano & Nakamura, 2015).

Alberti produced a more useful system and set of instruments that can closely comprehend nature, including that of various actual human bodies. We can find here the *usefulness of mathematics* as an element promoting the new development of human cognition, which simultaneously also has its base in historical tradition. Besides, it is important to recognize that this development was able to bring the sharing of clear and precise cognition through the process of the quantification of existence into reality. From today's perspective, we can recognize some florets of mathematical or scientific ideas of the next age but this is just potential. We should first examine what the development of knowledge during the Renaissance meant for people at that time.

Renaissance people had been interested in reality or nature, so they needed more effective, practical methods of cognition to confront it. These demands may have reflected an intention or expectation for development of proper human knowledge for a new age. Moreover, it also could have been linked to the development of human knowledge in the future. For instance, it cannot be ascertained whether Alberti's *Canon* was drawn from inductive, "scientific" method. In fact, it has been already indicated that his *Canon* actually was correlative to the traditional *Canon* or the denomination system in Florence at the time (cf. Alberti, trans., 1992, p.158-170). However, it has been suggested that human proportion, which is quantified and generalized using the *Exempeda* system, eventually provided people with the concept of a "*standard*" or "*ideal*." This is so despite the fact that, initially, the measurement of Alberti may have just been an anthropometry for the individual human body. However, when people realized that the size of each part of the human body could be expressed precisely as a ratio of the whole body, we can expect that its indicator of human proportion had been functioning as an objective, universal "*measure*" enabling comparison of human proportions.

In this manner, it seems that a notional idea has been embodied and become able to be

shared with anyone having taken root in human life and society. In such a process, the *usefulness of mathematics* exercises a stronger influence. It will be a trigger for expansion of the areas that human cognition and technique can influence, and, consequently, its progress may invite further development of human activities.

This would indicate that Albrecht Dürer (1471-1528), a German painter of the Renaissance Period, inherited the quantificational cognitive method in the *Exempeda* system by Alberti. Moreover, it suggests that this method was developed by him such that it became more complex and detailed (cf. Dürer, the second book of *Four Books on Human Proportion*, trans., 2011, p.86-168). Quantificational cognition is oriented to a more objective, universal method. Such characteristics, i.e., a trigger that is pulled at once, promote further development of cognition, further invention of tools, and have affected human life directly and extensively.

Further discussion

Through the analysis of previous sections, we have examined a process in which the methods or tools of human cognition could develop. Initially, they were designed as an idea for some specific purpose. But once they were embodied and stayed in reality, such methods and tools gradually developed independently into more universal and applicable ones. Besides, various “embodied” tools of human knowledge can have more extensive, stronger, and influence with respect to the development of civilization.

As mentioned in section 2, although European science and knowledge itself is a product of the area of a civilization, it has been gradually stripped of some indigenous, cultural elements such as philosophical thoughts or values. And in this process of expansion, contrastingly, the European civilization would obtain higher *abstractness* and *applicability*.

European science and knowledge has mathematics at its core and is equipped with such abilities. It has a dynamism proper to itself and can always create new concepts, methods, and tools by itself. As a sequel to such function, it has been gaining immeasurable influence in the real world. As Crosby puts it, the state of the way of thought, including such applicability, is a *mentalité* of the Renaissance.

However, contrarily, can we really declare that the indigenous elements of European knowledge have already been lost? It seems that we are simply overrating the universality of European science and knowledge as a premise. Now, observing many conflicts between European civilization and others, it seems to be most important that we reconsider the way of thought of Europe and its characteristics especially with regard to cultural and philosophical meaning rather than scientific universality.

Notes

[1] For example, Kline said in his book (1953) as follows: “We should mention in passing that

simple mathematical steps were made in primitive civilizations. Such steps were no doubt prompted by purely practical needs. The barter of necessities, which takes place in even the most primitive types of human society, requires some counting.” (p.13)

[2] This section is organized briefly around a section of a study published in 2016 (p.23-25). (Three figures of this section are prepared by the author and are also used in that article.)

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Reflections on contemplative practices in education

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Introduction

The practices of meditation and ‘mindfulness training’ recently became subjects of great interest in various professional and scientific fields, from psychology to neuroscience, from philosophy to medicine. This broad scientific interest in the meditative practice follows the gradual spread of popular interest, which mainly began in the '60s of the last Century in the United States and then has been disseminated throughout the Western world. This phenomenon in both scientific and popular realms is part of a general influence that the Eastern culture has had on the Western society, an influence that is of great interest from a sociological viewpoint. There are various reasons for this ‘soft colonization’ and one of them has certainly to do with the fascination that *body-mind practices* and theories such as zen, yoga, thai chi, and meditation itself have on Western people. The scientific interest for contemplative practices – named ‘contemplative turn’ (Davidson, 2012; Ergas, 2017; Hattam & Baker, 2015) – has mainly two roots: embodied cognition theory (Varela et al. 1991) on one side, a research program within cognitive science that re-evaluated the role of the body in cognitive functions; and, on the other side, mindfulness meditation programs (Kabat-Zinn, 2005), meditation-based medical and psychiatric interventions. These two roots have given scientific backup to the Eastern body-mind practices invasion patronizing their massification and legitimation. Indeed, while up to few years ago yoga and meditation could still appear exotic, religious or spiritual practices, nowadays they are among the most common leisure activities and we can easily find them in the gyms or fitness and wellness centres.

Neurocognitive aspects of mindfulness meditation

Results within the neurocognitive science of meditation are frequently discussed with respect to neuroplasticity, as several findings suggest that extended meditation training may lead to functional as well as structural changes of the brain (e.g. Davidson et al., 2003; Lazar et al., 2005; Lutz, Dunne, & Davidson, 2007; Pagnoni & Cekic, 2007). Here I review some of the most interesting results from the educational viewpoint, with regard to functional cognitive aspects of meditative practice, in particular cognitive, emotional and, more in general, functional changes resulting from short or extensive meditation practice, where meditation is often conceptualized in terms of mental or cognitive training (e.g. Cahn & Polich, 2006; Carter, Presti, Callistemon, Ungerer, Liu, & Pettigrew, 2005; Lutz, Slagter, Dunne, & Davidson, 2008).

The study of the mind has been the object of interest for both Eastern culture and Western philosophy and psychology. These two approaches provide different perspectives that

contribute to a broader understanding of the processes and effects of meditation practice. In an attempt to align western psychological and Buddhist thinking on this topic, Wallace (2007) provides a framework that facilitates the integration of such different perspectives. Drawing from Buddhist sources as well as psychological theory and evidence, he proposes a four-component model, outlining areas for development that contribute to overall psychological well-being. According to the mental balance model, the components conation (motivation, intention), attention, cognition and affect/emotion need to be developed and balanced to achieve profound well-being. In particular, though not exclusively, the components attention and cognition bear a close relationship to mindfulness (see Moore, & Malinowski, 2009), which has been conceptualized in terms of self-regulation of attention and orientation towards one's experiences (Bishop, Lau, Shapiro, Carlson, Anderson, Carmody, Segal, Abbey, Speca, Velting, Devins, 2004). Also Kabat-Zinn's operational definition of mindfulness as «the awareness that emerges through paying attention on purpose, in the present moment, and non-judgmentally to the unfolding of experience moment by moment» (Kabat-Zinn, 2005, p. 145) acknowledges these two aspects. Thus, mindfulness meditation encompasses various aspects of attention as for instance the ability to focus and sustain ones attention and a reduced proneness to distraction. Cahn & Polich's (2006) definition of meditation as «practices that self-regulate the body and mind, thereby affecting mental events by engaging a specific attentional set» (Cahn & Polich, 2006, p. 180), also indicates that training of attentional functions is an essential aspect of any form of meditation practice. In a similar way, traditional Buddhist texts describe the practice of bare attention, the attending «to the bare facts of perception without reacting to them by deed, speech or mental comment», as a corner stone of mindfulness (Wallace, 2007, p. 3). To cultivate mindful awareness, attention needs to be combined with a non-judgmental orientation towards an openness for the flow of one's experiences.

Thus, as we have seen right now, speaking about mindfulness meditation implicates speaking about different cognitive functions, as attention, memory, self-regulation, self-perception, emotional balance, metacognitive skills, well-being. But depending on different traditions, we can have different forms of attention training. For instance Lutz and colleagues define two kind of attention: *open attention* (OA) and *focused attention* (FA). These styles are found with some variation in several meditation traditions, including Zen, Vipassana and Tibetan Buddhism (Austin, 1999; 2009). Both styles are implied in secular interventions that draw on Buddhist practices, such as mindfulness based stress reduction (Kabat-Zinn, 1985). The first style, FA meditation, entails voluntary focusing attention on a chosen object in a sustained fashion. The second style, OM meditation, involves nonreactive monitoring the content of experience from moment to moment, primarily as a means to recognize the nature of emotional and cognitive patterns (Lutz et al., 2008).

Another theme is age-related cognitive effects of meditation training. This topic can

clearly have an impact on the training strategies to tackle cognitive aging – a topic close to *Life-Long Learning* theory and *Adult Education*. In their study, Van Leeuwen, Müller and Melloni (2009) explore whether mental training in the form of meditation can help to overcome age-related attentional decline. They compared performance on the attentional blink task between three populations: a group of long-term meditation practitioners within an older population, a control group of age-matched participants and a control group of young participants. Members of both control groups had never practiced meditation. The results show that long-term meditation practice leads to a reduction of the attentional blink. Meditation practitioners taken from an older population showed a reduction in blink as compared to a control group taken from a younger population, whereas, the control group age-matched to the meditators' group revealed a blink that was comparatively larger and broader. These results support the hypothesis that meditation practice can: (I) alter the efficiency with which attentional resources are distributed and (II) help to overcome age-related attentional deficits in the temporal domain.

Educational aspects of meditation: Meditation as experiential education?

Let us have a closer look to where education and meditation meet. Here the question is if we can consider meditation as a form of *experiential education*, a *learning by doing* activity. (Francesconi, 2011; 2010; 2009; Francesconi & Tarozzi, 2012; 2013). The word experience (*experior*: to try, to understand by doing something repeatedly) has always been very important in educational science and practice, and recently it has become of a certain interest within cognitive sciences as well. We must recall the subtitle of the book 'The Embodied Mind' (Varela et al., 1991), which is 'Cognitive Sciences and the Human Experience'; indeed, the big step taken by the initial proponents of the embodied approach was to put at the center of the scientific discussion both the subjective nature of human experience and the role that the body plays in it.

Within the phenomenological philosophical tradition, experience is not conceived as modeling the external world, like a cast of the objective reality. Knowledge is not the mirror of nature or the manipulation of symbols (Thompson, 2007). What is interesting for educational science is rather the 'meaning-laden' experience, which is always and undoubtedly embodied, situated in place and time, and enacted by an intentional subject. In 2002, Dreyfus proposed the Skill model (cf. Dreyfus, 2002), which is a 5-step model for skill acquisition from novice to expert [Note 1]. This model is based on Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, in particular on his notions of intentional arc and maximum grip (Dreyfus, 2002). In the model, a progress in skills is described where the learner moves from being dependent on explicit rules given by a teacher/instructor to the expert level where he is able to act with an «immediate intuitive situational response» (Dreyfus, 2002, p. 372). The Skill model is a critique of a representationalist's account of learning. That is, according to the Skill model, the expert is

capable of action without the need for mental representations: «What one has learned appears in the way the world shows up; it is not represented in the mind and added on to present experience. That is, according to Merleau-Ponty, what the learner acquires through experience is not *represented* in the mind at all but is *presented* to the learner as a more and more finely discriminated situation, which then solicits a more and more refined response» (Dreyfus 2002, p. 373).

The work of Dreyfus is based on Merleau-Ponty phenomenological position. The French philosopher stresses that a *situ-ation* taken as a whole is not something merely attributed to a compound of stimuli, because these stimuli are integrated into structural processes that play a regulating role: «they establish *a relation of meaning* between situation and response [...] It is to the extent that relations of this kind emerge and become efficacious by themselves that the progress of behavior is explicable» (1963, p. 103).

What is brought forth here is a critique to atomism that lies at the heart of behaviorism, where any situation could be – indeed had to be – decomposed into its constitutive parts in order to discover the stimulus/stimuli that causally lead to that specific behavior. Against atomism, Merleau-Ponty evokes the notions of “form” or “structure” that he takes from the Gestalt psychologists [Note 2]. As opposed to atomism, Gestalt psychology holds that the whole of a system is not equivalent to the sum of its isolated parts, but are rather «defined as total processes which may be indiscernible from each other while their ‘parts’, compared to each other, differ in absolute size... the systems are defined as transposable wholes» (Merleau-Ponty, 1963, 47). The notion of gestalt, or structure, serves us, according to Merleau-Ponty, to better understand how a relation of meaning is established not between the stimulus and the response, but between the total situation and the response.

So, the act of learning is an act that happens into a *lived experience*, an experience where the body is central, even when it is not in motion, as in meditation. Indeed, embodied experiences do not depend on motion/movement activities in order to be embodied. The embodied dimension of human experience consists in the unavoidable grounding of any experience into a *defined situ-ation*, where perceiving and recognizing the emergence of the mind during any kind of activity, ordinary or extraordinary, is what awareness means. It is not simply a pedagogical work on self-perception that needs to be done; we need to promote a work on crafting sensitivity, perception and ability to be surprised by the phenomenon that the encounter mind-world is. In this sense, we can say that experiential education through meditation should aim to educate the perceptual sensitivity – and the description/interpretation of the experience by an embodied self – as a proper and refined way of feeling the world: a sort of learning to perceive.

Mindfulness meditation can be considered as experiential learning because it has the basic characteristics of every experiential education setting (Beard & Wilson, 2006):

- it is done out of the formal educational system and out of its settings, like a classroom (even though it is getting applied more and more in schools);
- it is a practical/physical activity;
- there is a notable role of reflexive practice in experience;
- its aims are deeply pedagogical: self knowledge; self development; well being; social skills; ethical skills.

Getting closer to how meditation can be considered a form of ‘learning by doing’, we can take a look at the didactical structure of a meditation session or lesson. Following Varela (Varela et al., 1991, 25-26), we can say that typically mindfulness/awareness is trained by means of formal periods of sitting meditation, where the experience itself consists of nothing else than sitting and breathing. The purpose of such a period is to simplify the situation to the bare minimum. The body is put into an upright posture and held still. Some simple object, often the breath, is used as the focus of alert attention. Each time the meditator realizes that his mind is wandering unmindfully, he is to acknowledge nonjudgmentally that wandering (there are various instructions as to how this is to be done) and bring the mind back to its object. Breathing is one of the most simple, basic, ever-present bodily activities but it does not seem to be the easiest. Yet beginning meditators are generally astonished at how difficult it is to be mindful of an even so uncomplex object. Meditators discover that mind and body are not coordinated. The body is sitting and usually not perfectly still, but the mind is seized constantly by thoughts, feelings, inner conversations, daydreams, fantasies, sleepiness, opinions, theories, judgments about thoughts and feelings, judgments about judgments – a never-ending torrent of disconnected mental events that the meditators do not even realize are occurring except at those brief instants when they remember what they are doing. Even when they attempt to return to their object of mindfulness, the breath, they may discover that they are only thinking about the breath rather than being mindful of the breath. Meditation is a practice that, differently from other physical activities, deeply involve the phenomenological mind, the subjective enquire about what is going on during the meditative session. The request to stay still and focused only on the breath is not only quite unusual, especially for Western people, but also completely surprising both in a positive and negative way.

Through this specific kind of bodily experience, the mind gets definitely surprised, awakened, questioned, thrown in an unusual condition of uncertainty, which could be a stall, but also a pedagogical and cognitive resource (Dallari, 2000; Mortari, 2002). In this condition, the subject is called to face a situation where a seemingly easy physical experience turns into a truly complex bodily/mental one. With the risk for the subject to lose control on it. To become mindful means exactly that: to know what is going on at a specific moment, letting it go on without trying to get mental control of it, letting it happen and staying in the flow of consciousness without judgments (Kaltwasser, 2013).

What do we learn when we study to meditate? Let us see the model of mindful learning

offered by Langer (1997). In Langer's own words (1997, 111) «When we are mindful, we implicitly or explicitly 1) view a situation from several perspectives, 2) see information presented in the situation as novel, 3) attend to the context in which we are perceiving the information, and eventually 4) create new categories through which this information may be understood.» For Langer (1997) these features of multiple perspectives, novelty, context and new categories are the essence of mindful learning. Baer and colleagues propose another model. Mindfulness training has been operationalized to reach some learning goals (Baer et al., 2006): 1) non-reactivity to inner experience; 2) observing/noticing/attending to sensations, perceptions, thoughts, feelings; 3) acting with awareness/not on automatic pilot/concentration; 4) describing/labeling with words; 5) nonjudgmental of experience. These can be summarized with the words: no react, observe, act aware, describe and no judge.

Within Zen's tradition, it is common to say that consciousness will always be one degree above comprehensibility. This concept is close to the phenomenological distinction between *pre-reflective self-consciousness* and *reflective self-consciousness*. There is an unreachable level of being aware that consists in the fact that there is a gap between being conscious and describing and comprehending the states of consciousness. But who works within the educational field knows that the real problem doesn't concern the level of consciousness of a subject, his ability to be aware; this is just the first step that an educator has to tackle when facing this question. The real problem is related to the conditions for a development of the awareness, that is the pedagogical condition to allow the subject to make a step, from a level of competence to another level of competence. This is what 'becoming aware' means.

How is it that mindfulness/awareness can be developed? Varela and colleagues make a comparison between the mindfulness as mind-training activity and other physical trainings. Mindfulness can be considered a skill among others, like reading or writing, and its development can be treated as the others. Through training mindfulness is strengthened, like a muscle that thanks to specific training can perform harder and longer work without getting tired easily. The authors of *The Embodied Mind* believes that the mind has been temporarily obscured by habitual patterns of delusion. «As all these habits are cut through and one learns an attitude of letting go, the mind's natural characteristic of knowing itself and reflecting its own experience can shine forth. This is the beginning of wisdom or maturity (prajna)» (Varela et al., 1991, p. 26).

The ability of being aware is strictly related to the conduction, interpretation and comprehension of the daily, ordinary, phenomenological life. What people learn during meditative courses is nothing miraculous or transcendental – at least within mindfulness meditation courses – but it is something very concrete and pragmatic. Thanks to meditation, people can learn to look at the world in a different way, changing their gaze, and so switching from experience to *lived experience*, where the subject is fully present and can better appreciate what is going on in its meaningful dimension.

Conclusions: On becoming aware

As well as other cognitive functions – like writing, reading, speaking, calculating – being aware is something that can be learnt and improved. This idea can be summarized with the concept of *learning consciousness* (Francesconi, 2010; Gallagher & Francesconi 2012). Learning consciousness is the consciousness that learns to be aware, awake and in contact with the reality, a consciousness able to stay in the flow of experience and making meaning from it.

The development of awareness is a fundamental pedagogical theme (Marton & Booth, 1997) and it should be the main goal of meditative practices: that is why we can talk of meditation as a form of education. What we learn when we do mindfulness meditation is nothing else than being able to use our awareness to deepen our presence in the world. It is the embodied presence that gets improved by meditation; it is a sort of cognitive posture that can be promoted.

Finally, in consideration of the long and rich contemplative tradition of Japan, it appears to be necessary to take the effort to establish a dialogue between the Japanese and Eastern traditions on one side and the Western traditions on the other, on the topic of contemplative education from the viewpoint of educational sciences and philosophy of education. This will facilitate the creation of a theory for the implementation of meditative practices within educational systems.

Notes

- [1] The model has been developed to include a sixth and seventh level: mastery and practical wisdom (Dreyfus 2002, p. 373).
- [2] It is interesting to note that the French word structure is usually used to translate Gestalt from German to French (Priest, 1998). This gives a clear meaning of what kind of structure Merleau-Ponty investigates in *The structure of behavior*.

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IV. Individuality-Collectivity and society

The Body as the Intersection Between Individuality and Collectivity

Shogo Tanaka (Tokai University)

Beyond Cultural Dichotomy

The contrast between individualism and collectivism is often arises when explaining cultural differences observed in human behavior, especially between Western and non-Western cultures. In the field of psychology, we can trace this tendency relatively far back in time. For example, during travel to North Africa in 1921, Carl Jung (1962) observed structural differences in the selves of Europeans and Arabs. The self (“ego” in Jungian terminology) in modern European culture is established as a rational individual entity and disconnected from the unconscious, whereas the self in Arab culture is lively and connected to the depths of what Jung calls the “collective unconscious” through emotions. Jung wrote as follows:

These people live from their affects, are moved and have their being in emotions. Their consciousness takes care of their orientation in space and transmits impressions from outside, and it is also stirred by inner impulses and affects. But it is not given to reflection; the ego has almost no autonomy. The situation is not so different with the European; but we are, after all, somewhat more complicated. At any rate the European possesses a certain measure of will and directed intention. (p. 242)

Although Jung was careful enough to pay attention to the continuity between Europeans and North African Arabs (“The situation is not so different with the European”), he observed that people in Europe have their autonomous self (“ego”) with individual will, which is mainly given through self-reflection, whereas people in North Africa tend to be moved by their inner affects, which stir them to behave in an impersonal or un-individual manner [Note1].

This contrast can also be found in the recent literature. Richard Nisbett (2003), a well-known researcher who explores cultural differences in cognition, has pointed out the difference between Westerners and Easterners as follows:

To the Westerner, it makes sense to speak of a person as having attributes that are independent of circumstances or particular personal relations. This self—this bounded, impermeable free agent—can move from group to group and setting to setting without significant alteration. But for the Easterner (and for many other peoples to one degree or another), the person is connected, fluid, and conditional. . . . The person participates

in a set of relationships that make it possible to act and purely independent behavior is usually not possible or really even desirable. (pp. 50–51)

Here, the contrast is between the Westerner’s “bounded” and “impermeable” self and the Easterner’s “connected” and “fluid” self. Compared with Jung, who emphasized autonomy of the self in European cultures, Nisbett emphasized the boundary that enables the self as an independent agent in Western cultures. In both cases, the meaning of individualism and collectivism also varies to a certain extent. However, it is possible to find a dichotomy between Western and non-Western cultures in which the self is considered individualistic in the former and collectivistic in the latter.

The aim of this paper is to go beyond this sort of cultural dichotomy. As Hermans (2001) pointed out, such a dichotomy or categorization in cross-cultural psychology implicitly views culture as internally homogeneous and externally distinctive. On this point, Valsiner (2014) contrasted two views on culture: culture as a container and culture as a process of relating. When culture is viewed as a container, individuals are thought to belong to a certain culture that has a defined boundary (Figure 1). Indeed, this view supports discourse in cross-cultural psychology that regards the self as individualistic in Western cultures and as collectivistic in non-Western cultures as if the self were essentially characterized by culture. In this paper, I would like to account for both individualistic and collectivistic characteristics of the self from the perspective of embodiment rather than from the perspective of culture as a container. Furthermore, we can view constitution of the self as either individualistic or collectivistic regardless of cultural background when we focus on the embodied experiences that shape the self.




Figure 1. Culture as a container (Valsiner, 2014, p. 40): Boundary of culture is assumed to be rigid and defined. This view has a tendency to presuppose that persons belong to a certain culture and determined by it.

The Embodied Self

The emergence and development of a discourse on the embodied mind (e.g., Gallagher, 2005; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Thompson, 2007; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991) produced radical change in “mind sciences” such as psychology and cognitive science. The epistemological basis of mind science resides in modern mind-body dualism, which is mainly derived from Descartes; therefore, the functions of the mind, including perception, thinking, and memory, were not viewed as arising from any specific bodily form (Pfeifer & Scheier, 1999). By the same token, the self was viewed as an abstract and disembodied entity (i.e., transcendental subjectivity) that integrates these mental functions (Varela et al., 1991).

However, an embodied view of the mind has generated a broad range of discussions on the self (e.g., Bermúdez, Marcel, & Eilan, 1995; Fuchs, Sattel, & Henningsen, 2010), with most based upon the phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. As is well known, phenomenology has changed the way one views the body. From a mind-body dualistic viewpoint, one’s own body is a mere object for the mind to move or perceive. Phenomenology emphasizes two different ways to experience the body (e.g., Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012; Thompson, 2007; Waldenfels, 2000): the objective body (*Körper*) and the lived body (*Leib*). The latter body is in question here. At the most fundamental level, one never experiences the body as an object: Through and from my body I perceive the world, and through and with my body I act in the world. The body is a sort of mediator of all of one’s experiences. As Husserl (1952/1989) claimed, the body constitutes the absolute “here,” which is the point at which I perceive things with a spatial orientation such as near–far, up–down, and right–left. In addition, my body retains this status of absolute here no matter where I move. Thus, the body is only “lived” by oneself and does not appear as an object.

The lived body is always and already in contact with the world through concrete actions. Thus, the notion of the embodied self does not begin with self-reflection, but with action in the world. For modern philosophers such as Descartes or Kant, transcendental subjectivity that can be represented as “I think” formed the foundation of the empirical self. In contrast, for the phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012), the self is always involved in concrete action toward the environment as a “being in the world” [Note 2]. For example, the self is engaged in concrete and embodied action in a prereflective manner while walking toward a bus station, having dinner with friends in a restaurant, reading a book in the library, or cutting grass in the garden. In other words, all actions are accompanied by a prereflective sense of self that I am the one who is undergoing this experience (Gallagher, 2012).

Even when the self is not involved in any concrete action, it engages with the world through the body that is itself built up with skills acquired through past experiences and is prepared to act skillfully in the present situation (Dreyfus, 2005). For example, if one knows how to swim, a river becomes a place that one can do so. If one knows how to play the piano, any piano would appear as an instrument that can be played. The surrounding environment potentially invites one to act in a skillful manner, and one knows how to act in the given situation based on one's embodied knowledge (Tanaka, 2013). Therefore, according to Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012), the embodied self is represented as "I can" instead of "I think." He writes that "consciousness is originally not an 'I think that,' but rather an 'I can.'" (p. 139) [Note 3].

Based on action, the embodied self is necessarily ecological (Kono, 2011). Here, the term "ecological" signifies a self that is intertwined with and extended to the surrounding environment. Human beings do not exist in a vacuum, but rather belong to a certain environment that enables their actions. For example, playing tennis requires balls and rackets to use, a court large enough to run about, and a partner to play with. Drawing on the work of the ecological psychologist James Gibson (1979), one's actions are possible in only ecological niches that afford them. The niche is a set of affordances that provide one with action possibilities. The surrounding environment—which includes not only nature, but also artifacts, buildings, social institutions, communities, and interpersonal relations—affords acting as one does in daily life. From this viewpoint, the embodied and ecological self are the sum of all action possibilities provided by the environment. Thus, the self and surrounding environment are, so to speak, two sides of the same coin.

Taking into consideration the body, action, and environment in this manner, we can now articulate our question as follows: What kind of environment facilitates the self to be either individualistic or collectivistic? We can also ask this follow-up question: What kind of action toward (or interaction with) the environment represents the individualistic self or the collectivistic self? Before tackling these questions, let us confirm the definition of individualism and collectivism. In terms of social tendencies, individualism is a tendency to value independence, emotional detachment, and personal achievement, whereas collectivism is interdependence, emotional closeness, and group achievement (Triandis, 1995). In terms of self-construals, individualism is a tendency to view oneself as an independent entity whose behaviors are motivated by personal standards, whereas collectivism is a tendency to view oneself as an interdependent part of an ingroup whose behaviors are motivated by social roles

and expectations (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

Bodily Constitution of the Individualistic Self

I would like to underscore Markus and Kitayama's (1991) description of the individualistic self ("independent self" in their usage) in Western cultures. They wrote that "achieving the cultural goal of independence requires construing oneself as an individual whose behavior is organized and made meaningful primarily *by reference to one's own internal repertoire of thoughts, feelings, and action* [emphasis added], rather than by reference to the thoughts, feelings, and actions of others" (p. 226). The individualistic self clearly is constituted by selective focus upon one's own internal mental states rather than those of others. From a psychological perspective, self-reflection promotes one's focus on internal mental states. Through metacognitive function involved in self-reflection, one gains explicit knowledge of one's own thoughts, feelings, and needs for action. Borrowing terms by William James (1890/1950), one's own internal mental states correspond to what he called the "Spiritual Self," which constitutes a part of "Me" (i.e., the self as object). The self-reflection in question here is a circular process, in which "I" (i.e., the self as subject) think of "Me" in order to organize meaningful behaviors of oneself. This is the most basic psychological process that constitutes the self as individualistic.

Although this process seems to be purely mental, self-reflection is preceded by embodied experiences. According to Merleau-Ponty (1950/2012), the most apparent example is the experience of self-touching. When I touch my own body, my body appears as the perceiving subject on the one hand and as the perceived object on the other. In addition, this relationship between "the touching" and "the touched" is reversible. If I touch my left hand with the right, the left hand first appears as a touched object, but also becomes a perceiving object the moment it feels the texture and temperature of the right hand. In self-touching, the double sensation occurs within one's own body. The reversibility involved in the double sensation shares the same structure of reflexivity experienced in self-reflection: When "I" think of "me," the thinking "I" as subject is open to the possibility of converting to "me" as object through another higher reflection. Following Merleau-Ponty's argument, Ichikawa (1992) stated that "the double sensation is, so to speak, an externalized reflection" (p. 89). From a genetic viewpoint, "I" have the experience of "I perceive me" through my own body, before having an experience of self-reflection that occurs as "I think of me." Self-reflection is not purely mental but continuous to bodily self-perception.

In terms of environment, particular settings might promote one's self-perception and

self-reflection. With reference to the geographer Yi-fu Tuan (1982), who pointed out the architectural change behind the birth of individual consciousness in modern Europe, segregated space (e.g., a private room) is one of the symbolic places for the individualistic self. A private room allows for diverse personal activities such as collecting one's favorite things, keeping a diary and preserving it, immersing oneself personally in movies or music, and decorating a room to one's own taste. Importantly, these are all self-oriented activities in which self-perception and self-reflection occur in a continuous manner: One sophisticates one's likes and dislikes, confirms one's own personality, recalls past experiences, and deliberates about future plans, all of which strengthen individualized narratives of the self. A private room offers rich possibility for practicing self-reflection, and its material aspects represent the internal mental realm of the self.

In public spaces, one's personal space plays a similar role in maintaining the individual self in the presence of others. As is well known, personal space refers to the sense of invisible space that surrounds us (Hall, 1966). I would like to reconfirm how the psychologist Robert Sommer (1969) defined personal space in his classic work where he wrote that personal space is "an area with invisible boundaries surrounding a person's body into which intruders may not come" (p. 26). In other words, maintaining a certain distance from others in public spaces functions as an invisible boundary that preserves a sense of privacy in the individual self. Notice that personal space is not fixed, but varies depending upon interpersonal circumstances and physical settings. Although Edward Hall (1966) originally emphasized cultural differences as they relate to personal space, we now know that one's personal space is also related to age, gender, personality traits, and other factors (Gifford, 2007). Also, cultural background is not the decisive factor in how one practices personal space in public. In fact, embodied interaction with others through interpersonal space is one of the practical ways to maintain the self as individualistic—and as collectivistic, as we will see later.

Bodily Constitution of the Collectivistic Self

Turning to the collectivistic self, Markus and Kitayama (1991) described being a collectivistic self ("interdependent self" in their usage) as "seeing oneself as part of an encompassing social relationship and recognizing that one's behavior is determined, contingent on, and, to a large extent organized by what the actor perceives to be the thoughts, feelings, and actions of others in the relationship." (p. 227)

A helpful concept here is "intimacy" as developed by philosopher Thomas Kasulis

(2002). Intimacy is one of the cultural orientations that can appear in diverse realms such as worldview, politics, ethics, aesthetic experiences, and knowledge. In the realm of interpersonal relationships, intimacy appears as an inseparable relationship *among* people or *between* persons (Figure 2). Kasulis writes that “interpersonal intimacy requires opening up the innermost— one’s thoughts, feelings, and motives—in order to share them with the other” (p. 28). Once intimacy is established among people, the members belong to each other in a way that does not sharply distinguish each member as an individual. Intimacy is not a relationship in which a member *belongs to* the group as a part of it, but one in which all members equally *belong with* each other within the same group. Thus, a self that is intimately involved within a group can easily know another member’s thoughts and feelings through empathy. In short, the self is so intertwined with others that it becomes rather natural for the self to organize its behaviors in conformity with those of others. Intimacy is the prototypical interpersonal relationship that shapes the self as collectivistic (Figure 3).




Figure 2. Intimacy between persons is represented as the figure on the right side, in contrast to the one on the left side (Kasulis, 2002, p. 37). Intimate relationship between persons has a characteristic of “belonging-with” (right side), instead of “belonging-to” (left side).




Figure 3. The self of Intimacy (Kasulis, 2002, p. 61). Through intimate relationship among the group, the self is constituted as collectivistic.

From an embodied perspective, the first point of contact between individuals is their bodies. One's body appears as a perceivable object not only for oneself but also for others: I can look at and touch my own body, but my same body is also an object for others to look at, touch, listen to, and even smell or taste. This is the most fundamental part of "me" (the self as object) that constitutes our social experiences (Mead, 1934). My body as an object for others appears in diverse contexts and co-constitutes social experiences with them. For example, "I" may be talked to in conversations, paid attention to in public, taken care of by my family, or treated violently by a stranger, all through my body as object ("me"). In these cases, including even negative ones such as violence, the self is never constituted outside the presence of others. Thus, the self is interdependent or at least relational by its very nature. In any given context, focus on the body as an object for others would lead to the self inevitably being experienced as relational, whereas focus on the body as an object for oneself would lead to self-reflection as the dominant experience.

It is mutual embodied interactions that intertwine persons into an intimate ingroup. As discussed in an earlier work (Tanaka, 2017), a musical ensemble is a good example of the process of intertwining. Ideally, an ensemble would not be guided by a musical score (i.e., externally imposed rules) or led by an expert in the group (i.e., the distinguished leader). Instead, each player would perform his or her own part equally and spontaneously, with the sum of the performance forming a harmonious whole. On the one hand, each player performs an assigned part; on the other hand, players' individual performances interlace with tempo markings, accents, and melodies sufficient to form unified music. After much practice, the group gradually achieves a shared feeling of intimacy among its members. As Kasulis (2002) has emphasized, intimacy involves somatic and affective dimensions that are primarily gained through embodied interactions among people.

As for nonverbal aspects, events during embodied interactions of interpersonal communication are quite similar to those during a musical ensemble. As evidenced by interactional synchrony (Bernieri & Rosenthal, 1991), listeners slightly coordinate their movements to a speaker's utterance rhythm: Repeated turn-taking between speaker and listener occurs at a certain tempo, with this meshing of bodily gestures creating a beat of interactions and each interactant's speech accent and intonation providing a melodic element. As in the case of music, interactional synchrony among members generates emotional tones in the interpersonal field. Among ingroup members, implicitly shared emotions often precede or underpin explicitly shared messages through verbal communication. Emotional tones

permeating the interpersonal field create a mutual sense of understanding and function as shared context for the explicit understanding of verbal messages (Tanaka, 2015). Thus, in more precise terms, behaviors of the collectivistic self are not determined by “the thoughts, feelings, and actions *of others* in the relationship” as Markus and Kitayama have suggested, but the thoughts, feelings, and action plans *among* the ingroup.

Concluding Remarks

The field of cross-cultural psychology has traditionally had a dichotomy that contrasts Western and non-Western cultures and presupposes an essential difference between them, especially in the modes of self. Along these lines, contemporary studies in psychology have postulated culture as an independent variable that brings about differences in the modes of the self. In fact, the publication of Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) theory led to a number of empirical studies due to its apparent success in providing a systematic account of the typology of self-construals. However, these empirical studies have not been very supportive of their theory. For example, one study reported that over 70% of Japanese university students were classified as individualists based on an individualism-collectivism scale (Matsumoto, Kudoh, & Takeuchi, 1996). Even larger-scale studies across more countries have reported similar results (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2003). In addition, individualistic and collectivistic modes of the self can be understood from an embodied perspective without appealing to cultural differences. As discussed earlier, a key to understanding diverse modes of the self, which typically appear as the individualistic self and the collectivistic self, is the different focus of embodied experience in any given social context. As far as we view the culture as a container, it is not the factor that decides the mode of the self.

Footnotes

- [1] According to Jung, this cultural difference between Europe and North Africa has its root in historical differences. In contrast to Arabs, Europeans gained their autonomous and individualistic selves during the process of modernization, which emphasized the role of reason in controlling the power of impersonal effects.
- [2] Needless to say, the term “being in the world” derives originally from Martin Heidegger’s (1927/1962) *Being and Time*. Merleau-Ponty preferred to use *être au monde*, which literally means “being toward the world” rather than “being in the world.” Merleau-Ponty

seems to emphasize that the self is always involved in a concrete action *toward* the surrounding world.

- [3] Merleau-Ponty's usage of "I can" (*je peux*) derives from Husserl's same expression (*ich kann*), which refers to the self's capability of perceiving and acting through the body (Husserl, 1952/1989). Husserl claims that the fundamental role of the body for the self is to have any experience in the world.

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The body of knowledge: the allegorical personification in Positivism

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Introduction

Looking on the Internet for some images of the 2016 Donald Trump's presidential campaign in the USA, I was not able to find any image but those directly referring to his person (figure 1).



Figure 1: internet images of Trump's campaign in 2016

It seems that all the political communication during the campaign was focused on Trump's person, his face, his body, even his peculiar hairstyle. Trump's discourses have been strongly punctuated by his gestural expressiveness. I could hardly find any image somehow referring to ideas, issues or concepts related to campaign issues (figure 2).



Figure 2: image of Trump's campaign slogan

In the course of such a relevant event, the campaign to elect the president of the most powerful country in the world, one would expect that a part of the messages should contain references to some common ideas, values or expectations. Instead, it looks like the iconography of Trump's campaign was all focused on the candidate's person itself: on Trump's *body*. He and his staff have created a powerful iconography that sets the man's figure at the center of the stage. "Donald Trump has positioned himself as an Old Testament-style supreme judge who determines who goes to heaven and hell" (Hochschild, 2016, p. 688). Rather than *talking about*, Trump has been trying to *personify* "the iconography of belief: images of a long-awaited judgment soon to come, when merciless vengeance will be wreaked on evildoers, wrongs will be righted, and untold blessings delivered to the deserving" (Hochschild, 2016, p. 688).

However, some abstract concepts and ideals – such as "justice", "faith", "progress", "free market", "homeland", "freedom", "democracy", "truth", "protection of life", "security", "stability", even "world peace" – can be highly ambivalent, evasive and hard to grasp. It seems that they have the capability to affect people's lives. One cannot touch, smell or see those concepts, one cannot throw, eat, steal or pass them to our offspring.

We are in presence of two interesting phenomena: on the one hand, we have a *body* which is apparently carrying nothing but its own affective charge (Trump), while on the other hand one can see a lot of cases in our contemporary troubled times of human beings acting as if concepts were existing *real objects*: trying to "export democracy" (as if it was a commodity), or other human beings killing in the name of the "true faith" or even in the name of the "sacredness of life", (as if faith was not an individual construct or life was not a state belonging to a specific organism and there was something like a "life" outside the living individual).

According to Branco and Valsiner (2012), human conduct is regulated by the deeply affective relationships that people establish with socially suggested specific types of "objects", that can be called *values* or *ideals*. These are particular types of *signs*, that are personally constructed within specific collective cultural contexts and loaded with some affective potential. During the ontogenetic and sociogenetic process of individual development, these potentials are suggested and canalized in specific directions by the institutions operating in the particular context (Branco & Valsiner, 2012). These network of (often ambivalent) suggestions are interacting with the individual agency (Tateo, 2015; 2016a), leading to very complex and heterogeneous negotiations from which the process of meaning-making emerges. Thus, one cannot interpret the work of values and ideas in meaning-making without taking into account the interplay of *both* the social canalization *and* the personal affective construction of meanings. Humans construct abstract generalizations of individual experiences and bring them into the realm of values. On the other way round, they treat abstract concepts as if they were real things and bring them into the realm of everyday life (Tateo, 2016a; 2016b).

"our non scientific culture abounds in the legendary, including (for me) Akron, Ohio, the dollar crunch, mugging, etc. We readily mix perceived, conceived, and received

terms in the play of our minds, as convinced of the reality of the remote and contrived as we are of the near and simple” (White, 1976, p. 668).

Actually, “dollar”, “America” or “faith” have no agency. Only people acting in collectively coordinated ways possess agency. Nevertheless, one can say “faith can move the mountains” and the conduct of a particular individual, such as participating in a ritual, can become “a sign of faith”.

“Society creates regulated acts of imagination, demanding not that the unseen be dismissed from human experience but that the unseen is permissible only within acceptable frameworks of justification, verification, and inference. This regulatory apparatus we generally characterize as “reason,” but reason, logic, formal operations are not the stuff of thought. They are to thought what the adversary system is to law, not the stuff of justice but the mechanism by which justice is recreated in the midst of a social framework” (White, 1976, p. 669).

The affective metonymy

Concepts, signs (including iconic and indexical ones) and affects are in metonymical relationship. *Metonymy* is a rhetorical figure in which either one name is replaced by another or one part stands for the whole (Meehan, 2013). It is different from metaphor (in which the replacement is made by creating a short circuit of meaning) and from analogy (in which two different objects are put together by similarity). In metonymy two objects/ideas stand for each other, in such a way that substitution is *at the same time an identity and distinction relationship*. For instance, when a politician says “the people (or the nation, or America) requires X” (substituting the abstract for the concrete) it means:

- A= “the party currently ruling (or me-as-candidate) requires X”;

It is at the same time establishing a distinction evoking the opposite side:

- NON-A= “the party which is NOT currently ruling”;

Such a distinction is also establishing a relationship between parts of a whole:

- A+NON-A= “the two parties form the people”;

Thus, the distinction A/NON-A, once established through the metonymy, is also creating an internal asymmetry between the parts of the whole:

- A is MORE “people” than NON-A;

This also implies that NON-A (the NOT ruling party) must conform to “A” in order to fully become “people” or “America”.

By producing a single metonymical sign (that creates a concrete entity from the abstract concept of “people”), a distinction is established (A/NON-A). It creates an asymmetric relationship between parts (A+NON-A=people) and a normative condition (A is the model for NON-A). The metonymical relationship is also dynamic and contextual, so the abstract and the concrete terms can always be substituted within specific contextual conditions (e.g. “people” can become “race” or “religion” or “stability”, etc.).

In the case of Donald Trump message in figure 2, the metonymical substitution is operated on the term “America”, which is, as a matter of fact, an abstract “concept” like “homeland” or “nation”, through Trump’s personal image. “America” is at the same time a form of abstraction and generalization (detaching the image from the sensual experience, I cannot touch “America”) by distinction, but also of analogy and replacement, in which the abstract idea comes back into the field of experience as a reified quasi-object. Then it comes back as something different, as an affective and value loaded product of “the activity of imagining, which takes different forms according to what is being perceived or imagined” (Thomas, 1999, p. 223). Any form of image is value-loaded: “The simplest images of matter, the most common qualifications, are established in a realm of values” (Bachelard, 1994, p. 62). This metonymical relationship is the way values go back to the realm of objects.

I am interested in the point of junction between ideas and images, a multifaceted content in which the idea and the image live together metonymically as two sides of the same coin: “metonymy is the key trope of empiricism” (Meehan, 2013, p. 303). I will try now to discuss this process using an unusual example: the allegorical personification of abstract concepts in Positivism.

The case of allegorical personification

Personification and anthropomorphism of concepts are very common in the history of civilization. They are cultural artifacts that create abstract generalizations from concrete experiences and build stable systems of sense-making for the future events. The Positivism era was characterized by an ambivalence towards the relationship between humans and Nature: the reduction of the psychical to the physical, the irreducibility of the psychical to the physical and the reduction of the physical to the psychical, roughly corresponding to positivist, idealist and symbolist positions (Gamboni, 2002). In any case, the primacy of human mind over Nature was clearly accepted (either as a privileged part of Nature or as a transcendent entity) as the anthropocentric and andro-centric *Weltanschauung* of the Century (Wertheim, 1995). It is not a case that the emerging form of expression during Positivism was photography, which implies “the belief that reality is hidden. And, being hidden, is something to be unveiled” (Sontag, 2008, p. 120-121).

Nature becomes an object of DESIRE to human consciousness, a commodity, a dominion, subject of knowledge and transformation. Once “intentioned” by human consciousness, some

already existing ideas became specific objects of affection and value: the already existing idea of “nature” assumed for instance a different meaning. Although the allegorical representation of “nature” as a “woman” was already available to the imaginary, during the 19th Century its representation acquired new forms. This new formation of the imaginary field is based on the process of metonymical substitution through allegorical personification.

For instance, *Nature Unveiling Herself Before Science* is an allegorical sculpture created in 1899 in Art Nouveau style by Louis-Ernest Barrias (figure 3). The sculpture represents a woman, personifying Nature, removing a veil to reveal her face and bare breasts. The sculpture, now in the Musée d'Orsay, was commissioned for the Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers.



Figure 3: Nature Unveiling Herself Before Science, photo by Tateo, 2015

The sculpture unites the ancient trope of *the veil of Isis*, meaning Nature’s desire to hide her secrets, with the modern fantasy of the (female) Nature willingly revealing herself to the (male) scientist, without violence or artifice” (Daston & Galison, 2007, p. 244). Another example can be found in a completely different but almost contemporary context (figure 4). Marie-Jean-Léon Le Coq, Baron d'Hervey de Juchereau and Marquis de Saint-Denys (1822 – 1892), published anonymously in 1867 a singular book: *Dreams and how to direct them*. It is an account in form of a diary of the techniques he used to guide his own dreams and it is

considered one of the first serious attempt to study dreams. Marcel Proust, Sigmund Freud and André Breton referred to it.




Figure 4: Hervey de Saint-Denys: *Les Rêves et les moyens de les diriger* [detail: frontispiece], 1867. Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris.

On the frontispiece of the book are depicted some of the author's dreams. In particular, there is one in which his former painting teacher appears at a meeting accompanied by his most beautiful model completely naked (Gamboni, 2002).

The third example is to be found in Lisbon. It is the marble statue of the writer Eça de Queiroz (figure 5) by the sculptor Teixeira Lopes (1903). The figure represents "Truth" as a naked woman whose body is imperfectly veiled by a gauze covering. Above and behind it is the writer's bust. On the base is engraved a quote of the author's which was the sculptor's inspiration: "On the strong nakedness of truth the transparent veil of fancy".



Figure 5: On the strong nakedness of truth the transparent veil of fancy, photo by Tateo, 2015

The first common aspect to catch attention in the three examples is the fact that the naked female body is used in the context of artistic representation to express abstract concepts (nature, science, truth, desire) in different contexts of human activity exactly during a historical period (30 years from the end of the 19th to the beginning of the 20th century) characterized by some prudery. Yet the public display of almost bare female nakedness seems to be admitted under specific conditions. What is portrayed is not the body of a beautiful woman, rather the body of an *idea*. Yet, one cannot deny that what is represented is actually an attractive female naked body. Such a representational ambivalence is constantly shifting from the abstract concept to the concrete image in a figure and background interplay.

They mutually feed into each other, obtaining the effect of immediately and synthetically establishing an affective and aesthetic value-laden relationship with the *Gegenstand*, that is with the constituted object of the imaginative process of consciousness. With the same metonymical process, the abstract concept acquires the “panerotic mode of experience” (Gamboni, 2002, p. 65) and the female body becomes the condensed metonymical image of the abstract concept (e.g. nature, truth, knowledge, etc.).

“A metonym is a condensation of its context [...] metonymy conserves perception of the world of objects, conserves their quiddity, their particular precisions” (Hejinian, 2000, p. 149-151). In the context of the Positivist imaginary a woman is the subject of male sexual power.

“Nature” is a “woman” (figure 3) and both nature and woman become legitimate objects of domination. In the opposite direction, if “woman” is “nature”, all the disinterestedness of scientific enterprise can be used as justification for female subjection “for the sake of science”. What is represented in a single imaginative act of allegorical personification is the *lust* for unveiling both “nature” and “woman”.

In the case of Teixeira Lopes’ statue (figure 5), the movement goes in the opposite direction. Here the *lust* is in veiling a naked woman. Yet the statue remains ambiguous in this respect, only the caption explains the direction to follow to interpret the movement as “veiling”.

Desiring is a complex negotiation between individual agency and social canalization (Branco & Valsiner, 2012), that requires to gather into the same object ambivalent or inconsistent traits. The allegory personifies an abstract idea by relating the concrete image and the intangible concept into an *affective and value-loaded* relationship. The human reception of the shift from concept to figure and from figure to concept is basically affective.

Conclusion

Human conduct is mediated and regulated by the use of signs (Valsiner, 2014). There are particular types of signs, we can call “values” or “abstract ideas” or even “non-existing objects”, such as “truth”, “faith”, “culture”, “market”, “freedom”, “nation”, etc. that we nevertheless treat as if they were concrete objects. Human beings can so firmly believe in the existence of something like “freedom” or “free market” to be ready to die or kill for it. Yet these phenomena are based on a kind of affective logic, which is operated through a metonymical process in which an idea, an image and an affect are at the same time distinct, interchangeable and bounded. As example, I have presented the phenomenon of allegorical personification, through which a concept can become an object of desire. On the other way round, an object of desire, a body, can become the affective stem for the generalization of an abstract concept. This is also the process through which an individual construct (the affective relationship with an object of desire), together with a collective construct (the existence of a shared general value or concept) come to constitute a complex and whole object of human experience.

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Against the dualism of individualism and collectivism and for the necessity of individuality and sociality

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The source of human consciousness and freedom should not be sought in the internal world of the intellect, but in the social history of mankind. Vygotsky, 1931.

Introduction

The semantics of individualism and collectivism can rely on some intuitive anchoring, according to which individualism is oriented toward privileging individuals and collectivism respectively toward privileging collective units. But besides that there is no consensus on the content of those concepts – they vary from describing features of cognitive functioning of individuals to the broadest cultural frameworks.

Nevertheless, or may be even thanks to the semantic flexibility, individualism and collectivism are probably among the most frequently used conceptual tools in psychological research in the last decades, especially in cross-cultural, cultural and social psychology. The quantity, diversity but also ambiguity of research on individualism and collectivism reached at the beginning of the 21st century led to an extensive meta-analysis of the research on individualism and collectivism, pointing out its many limitations (Oyserman, Coon, Kemmelmeier, 2002) which was followed by several critical commentaries on assumptions on which the most research on individualism and collectivism has been conducted, but also on interpretations derived from them in the meta-analysis (Bond, 2002; Fiske, 2002; Kitayama 2002; Miller, 2002) Needless to say that critics received a reply which basically kept on original interpretations in the meta-analysis, claiming that the concepts individualism and collectivism are „worth saving“. (Oyserman, Kemmelmeier, Coon, 2002)

Beyond the scientific domain individualism and collectivism are used as broad descriptions of cultural frameworks. At least in present time and given the political status of the country mostly associated with individualism (USA), individualism and collectivism occupy opposed normative positions, meaning that individualism is dominantly associated with positive evaluations at both individual and collective, societal levels and collectivism respectively with lower or even negative evaluations.

However, it should be noticed that meantime, especially after 2000 more differentiated analyses and interpretations are starting to appear which aimed at deconstruction of the opposing relation between individualism and collectivism. For example, in a comment on overview of research on individualism and collectivism it is concluded:

individualism and collectivism may be conceptualized and measured as separate, not

necessarily bipolar, constructs at the individual level; the omnibus constructs of individualism and collectivism are multifaceted, permitting many different operationalizations; attention to intellectual developments in psychology from collectivist cultures may provide the field with valuable approaches to understanding and measuring individualism and collectivism at the individual level. (Bond, 2002, p. 76)

Another way of overcoming dichotomy in dealing with individualism and collectivism makes references to evolutionary psychology, deriving arguments from there for adaptive value of both individualism and collectivism. Thus, “an evolutionary perspective suggests both the ‘basicness’ of independent and interdependent processing as well as the likelihood that all social systems are inhabited by individuals who can do both and draw on one or the other depending on their immediate context.” (Oyserman, Kimmelmeier, Coon, 2002, p. 116)

Even though the transfer of evolutionary arguments on both personality functioning and social history is problematic in many sense, given the easy acceptance of explanations of evolutionary psychology among general public, may be this evolutionary reevaluation of collectivism could initiate a broader shift in assessing individualism and collectivism and their relationship, especially their normative status. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that in a long term perspective these descriptive and analytical turns can have also normative implications.

Against this background I would like to approach individualism and collectivism first from a historical perspective and then from a theoretical and epistemological standpoint. Both analyses are led by an interest to provide arguments to question the dualism of individualism and collectivism as conceptual and axiological pattern and to argue for individuality and collectivity as indispensable modes of both human thinking and self-understanding and principles of organizing community and society.

A brief historical reconstruction of Western individualism

A brief historical reconstruction of the genesis of Western individualism should provide insights into economic, social and cultural processes at the turn from medieval to modern times which were constitutive of modern individual and its theoretical and political articulation in the form of individualism.

The rise of the Western figure of independent, autonomous, self-confident individual is associated with the Renaissance, first of all with Italian cities, which brought about a radical change in life conditions comparing to the previous medieval theocentric world order. (Bloch, 1972). With the Renaissance a humanocentric world order and world view has started which presupposed that human being had to occupy the place previously occupied by God. Instead of heteronomy the principle of human self-determination, i.e. autonomy started to rule human activity (Blumenberg, 1988). Due to many reasons, including the challenges imposed by the question of how the omnipotent and just God allows evil to exist, the legitimacy of theocentric

world view started losing its credibility. This was just one of the symptoms of the deep crisis of medieval order which reached all domains of life – economic, social, political, spiritual, including also cosmology.

Therefore the Renaissance is seen as one of the most radical changes in human history. The humanocentric shift was followed by self-liberation of peasants from their landlords, their move to cities, initiation of new forms of economic activities (for example, banking), affirmation of the individual as *homo faber*, as entrepreneur, as subject of new forms of labor (first manufacture, later on industry), as epistemic, observing and experimenting subject, as subject of pleasure in observing the beauty of nature, but also the beauty of human body, as political contractual subject etc. Only these changed material conditions provided conditions for constitution of individualized subject as economic and political subject. It is under these conditions that individuals could develop self-consciousness as individual, free subjects capable of knowing natural laws and using them for improving labor and life conditions, but also interested to shape common life in accordance with new principles that all humans are born free and equal, and no less interested in shaping individual life on rational grounds, in a long term perspective.

It is thanks to these conditions that the term “individuum” changed its previous referent – anything that cannot be divided, that is firm, strong, unique, as for example, defined by Boetius when translating the Greek “atomon” into Latin “individuum”, to a specific human referent, namely individual human subject. (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1974)

Thus, it is through historical, social changes that the individualized forms of life and thinking arose, even more - through such changes individualized forms were made possible at all. Individualism is then a cognitive and evaluative centration on individual, but it presupposes achievements of the real individuals, which are again conditioned on social, economic, i.e. collective processes. Western individualism as a preferred form of understanding of human subject and its world which serves as a cultural framework is thus itself a mostly unrecognized product of collective social processes. As a consequence, due to cognitive and axiological repression of its social and cultural origin and genesis, in order to reinforce the supposed autonomy as the main feature of individuals, the individual is opposed to society.

The other side of the same strategy consists in cognitive and axiological marginalization, devaluation and even repression of collectivity, society, where, as it has been shown, conditions of possibility of individuals themselves lay. The contemporary neoliberal version of such strategy could be recognized in the model of minimal state, i. e. state which withdraws not only from economy, but also from health and education system. The state is seen as an obstacle for entrepreneurial freedom, but also as a danger for individual liberties in general.

Therefore, I would claim that Western individualism, which cognitively and axiologically focuses on independent, autonomous individual, epistemologically relies on social and cultural amnesia, i.e. amnesia of its historical, social, cultural origins. The same

cognitive strategy produces also motivational outcomes, i.e. reinforces further individualization (and privatization) waves, which in their turn are new resources for articulating normative claims favoring individualism as a value attitude.

Our brief historical reconstruction has reached a point where historical analysis meets epistemological analysis.

Epistemological analysis of individualism

Individualism and linked to it dualism of individual and society are conceptual patterns that can be recognized in many psychological theories, with rather few exceptions to the dominant trend. Reducing society and culture to variables influencing the already existing supposedly asocial and acultural psychological functions is widely used research and explanatory strategy of psychology. George Herbert Mead (1934) and Lev Vygotsky (1931/1997) are valuable exceptions to the individualism prevailing in psychology. On the one hand psychology inherited tenets of modern individualism, on the other it reproduces and reinforces it.

As already shown above, individualism has its marked and the other, repressed side, i.e. it is founded on marking the supposed autonomous individual and repressing its historical, socio-cultural origin. By adopting individualism as a general framework psychology reproduces also its socio-cultural amnesia.

What could be learned from Mead's and Vygotsky's theory about human ontogenetic development is that it would not be possible at all without tool mediated interactions with others. Other subjects and tools are not just external variables influencing the development - they are internalized into structures of psychic functions. Human consciousness and self-consciousness are not given, they are developmental outcomes.

Through others we become ourselves, and this rule refers not only to the individual as a whole, but also to the history of each separate function. This also comprises the essence of the process of cultural development expressed in a purely logical form...In psychology, the problem of the relation of external and internal mental functions is posed here for the first time in all its significance... For us to call a process 'external' means to call it 'social'. Every higher mental function was external because it was social before it became internal, strictly mental function; it was formerly a social relation of two people. The means of action on oneself is initially a means of action on others or a means of action of others on the individual. ... We might say that all higher functions were formed not in biology, not in the history of pure philogenesis, but that the mechanism itself that is the basis of higher mental functions is a copy from the social. All higher mental functions are the essence of internalized relations of a social order... (Vygotsky, 1931/1997, p. 105 -106)

Both Mead and Vygotsky argue for a socio-genetical explanation of development of the consciousness and self-consciousness instead of assumption that these human capacities are

given or that they autopoetically evolve. However, the processes are more complex than it is visible in the expression “copy from the social”. Even in metaphorical sense mental processes are not a pure copy from the social. The social becomes transformed in the process of internalization, but what is important is that it provides higher mental processes with social origin and social character.

However, it is in the complex, active, constructive nature of mental processes also the possibility to forget or repress their own social origin and to claim their unmediated autonomy and independence of the subject of these processes. Reasons and motives for mental repression are diverse. In psychoanalytic accounts, repression of mental contents is result of incompatibility of human desires and social norms, represented also in mental structures (Super-ego). More generally, or at the second level social and cultural norms themselves can favor ahistorical or decontextualized attitudes. These are exactly features of individualism at both individual and cultural level as shown in many researches on individualism and collectivism. Thus, in forgetting and repression of social origin and assumed autonomy of the subject there is also a reproduction of the cultural patterns which discourage historical and contextual approach. And it is only from an historical and contextual perspective that social origin of mental processes could be seen and understood.

The same applies if the cultural norms entail preferences for historical, contextual approach. However, it is important to note that no culture is homogenous. Therefore, even if the prevailing, dominant cultural norms endorse individualism, it is not just theoretically possible, but also empirically, factually based, that alternative or critical approaches argue against the individualism and in favor of collectivism.

There is an historical example worthy of analysis - Critical theory of society, known as Frankfurt School.

In thirties of the 20th century – after dramatical historical events which shook the oldest political systems in Europe (February revolution, October revolution, Weimar Republic) and foreboded even more dramatical ones, in the times of the crisis of the European sciences (interpreted by many as an expression of the crisis of humankind) a new socially saturated theoretical conception started developing known under the name Critical theory of society. (Jovanović, 2017, in press)

A new socially saturated and critically oriented theoretical conception started reconceptualizing even the basic notions and ways of understanding – starting from human perception:

Even the way they see and hear is inseparable from social life-process as it has evolved over the millennia. The facts which our senses present to us are socially preformed in two ways: through the historical character of the object perceived and through the historical character of the perceiving organ. Both are not simply natural; they are shaped by human activity. (Horkheimer, 1937, p. 213)

The reference to Critical Theory should show that it is possible to oppose even long standing

traditions and to offer alternative interpretive repertoires. In this case Critical theory was opposing traditional theory whose origin could be traced back to Descartes. Within this paper traditional theory is relevant also because it is an influential heir of individualism. And individualism was one of the main targets of critique provided by Critical Theory. In other words, Critical Theory was theoretically overcoming the repressed social origin and character in the ways how traditional theory conceptualized human subjectivity, starting with elementary processes of perceiving the world. In that sense Critical Theory provides arguments in favor of claims that individualism is epistemologically founded on amnesia.

The subject is no mathematical point like the ego of bourgeois philosophy: his activity is the construction of the social present. Furthermore, the thinking subject is not the place where knowledge and object coincide, nor consequently the starting point for attaining absolute knowledge. Such an illusion about the thinking subject, under which idealism has lived since Descartes, is ideology in the strict sense, for in the limited freedom of the bourgeois individual puts on the illusory form of perfect freedom and autonomy (...) The acceptance of an essential unchangeableness between subject, theory, and object thus distinguishes the Cartesian conception from every kind of dialectical logic. (Horkheimer, 1937, pp. 221-222)

Thus, it is the community or culture in a broader sense that provide individuals with means to develop or understand themselves primarily as an autonomous individual or social being. Both forms of understanding have in common social and cultural genesis. The difference lies in the way how they relate to that genesis. Individualism tends to ignore or repress the social genesis of individuals and their thinking. What is usually called collectivism tends to see individuals in social context and conditioned on norms and requirements of groups, i.e. it tends to recognize the social origin and character of human subjectivity.

Therefore, I would claim that the so-called collectivism has epistemological advantages as it includes social genesis in the very notion of the individual. On the other side, individualism is epistemologically based on amnesia and repression which certainly compromise the epistemological quality of individualistic thinking. It reduces its awareness of its own operations and consequently ability to control and govern them. Thus, when analyzed in this way, the implications of individualism actually contradict its main assumptions. Even in its own privileged terms – autonomy – the far reaching consequences of individualism lead actually to less autonomy.

But as the individual is not aware of that, and individuals don't live isolated, with such an attitude of drawing attention away from the social individuals could be even more susceptible to influences, including malicious forms like manipulation. At the first glance these consequences might seem paradoxical, but they prove that indeed a dialectical critical thinking is necessary in order to be able to grasp all the mediated ways through which human subjectivity is constituted.

The second epistemological argument I'll explicate against the dualism of individualism and collectivism has been already mentioned, but can be formulated in a general manner. As already said, the original Critical theory of society was developed in Germany, in 1930s as a critique of traditional theory whose substantial aspect is exactly individualism. Instead Critical theory argued for social constitution of human subjectivity, including theorizing as one of its highest forms.

Critical theory of society is not a single case in the Western history of ideas of arguing for social constitution of subjectivity, which is an epistemological attitude characteristic of collectivism, even though, to my best knowledge, representatives of Critical theory did not use that term, whose connotations are not quite neutral. Thus, Western intellectual tradition, dominated by individualistic preferences, was able to bring about collectivist accounts - starting with Aristotle's understanding of human being as *zoon politikon*. In his *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* Kant (1798/1996) defined man in reference to his species, i.e. to other people.

Above all, it must be noted that all other animals left to themselves reach as individuals their full destiny, but human beings reach their full destiny only as a species. Consequently, the human species can work itself up to its destiny only through continuous progress within an endless sequence of many generations.

The sum total of findings generated by pragmatic anthropology as to the classification of man and the characterization of his development is as follows: Man is destined by his reason to live in a society of other people, and in this society he has to cultivate himself, civilize himself, and apply himself to a moral purpose by the arts and sciences. (Kant, 1798/1996, pp. 240-242)

Hegel also belongs to this tradition of self-constitution of man through objectification in different forms and through struggle for recognition by others. It is beyond the scope of this paper to do extensively with Hegel. But it would be important to point out just few aspects of his philosophy to justify his belongingness to antiindividualist tradition. Hegel criticized atomistic accounts of natural law, and even individualism of Kant's moral theory. (Honneth, 1995) Therefore I wanted to draw attention to other aspects of Kant's thought which argue for social understanding of human beings.

In a contemporary interpretation of Hegel provided by Axel Honneth in his historical reconstruction of social philosophy it is pointed to the limits of then existing traditions, which Hegel wanted to overcome:

Hegel sees them as marked by the same fundamental error. Both the 'empirical' and 'formal' treatments of natural law categorically presuppose the 'being of the individual' to be 'the primary and the supreme thing'... they always conceive of the purportedly 'natural' form of human behaviour exclusively as the isolated acts of solitary individuals, to which forms of community-formation must then be added as a further thought, as if

externally. (Honneth, 1995, p. 12)

Obviously, the atomistic and individualistic traditions have been very powerful and attractive to many authors who in their turn reproduced them. And we come to the same conclusion: it is indeed a dialectical critical thinking needed in order to grasp the limits of individualism and to find ways to overcome them.

Karl Marx, even though critical of Hegel's idealism, continued Hegel's critique of atomism and individualism and argued for historical and social constitution of human beings. In his early *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, written in 1844, but published only in 1932, Marx stressed the inevitable social nature of man, even in his solitary activities.

Social activity and satisfaction by no means exist *merely* in the form of an *immediate* communal activity and immediate *communal* satisfaction...

Even as I am *scientifically* active - ...I am socially active because I am active as a *man*... my *own* existence *is* social activity; what I make from myself I make for society, conscious of my nature as social. (Marx, 1844/1932/ 1994, p. 72)

As far as contemporary theories of knowledge are concerned, historically speaking internalist, and that means also individualist accounts of scientific knowledge and genesis of knowledge have given way to socio-historical accounts. Internalist accounts of scientific knowledge define the science, assuming that there is only one science, by scientific method, paradigmatically experimental method, criteria of objectivity which should guarantee, ideally, mirror-like representations of phenomena studied, paradigmatically again natural phenomena. The book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* by Thomas Kuhn (1962) is probably the best-known book marking the change from internalist accounts of science to socio-historical ones. It has been realized that, as formulated by Sandra Harding "sciences and their societies...co-constructed each other." (Harding, 1998, p. 2)

The changes in theories of knowledge, i.e. insights into "integrity of modern sciences with the rest of the economic, political, and social relations of their eras" (Harding, 1998, p. 2), accumulated in different fields. In epistemology itself there have been developments in form of social epistemology. One of its most prominent representatives Steve Fuller defined "social epistemology as the goal of all epistemology" (Fuller, 1991, p. 4). Feminist theories and postcolonial theories are other fields which brought about fruitful reflections on limitations of internalist accounts of knowledge and science and argued for theoretical contextualization of science in historical, social, cultural, but also race and gender processes.

For those who actually have examined the mass of historical, sociological, and ethnographic evidence produced in more than a quarter-century of examination of the integrity of sciences with the economic, political, and social projects of their eras, the internalist epistemology has become a relic of modern western "folk belief." While it still is articulated with noble intent, no longer can the historical claims upon which its plausibility depends pass the kinds of empirical and theoretical tests to which other

historical claims are expected to conform. (Harding, 1998, p. 2)
Thus, the epistemological deconstruction of individualism has implications which transcend the epistemological domain and enter socio-political life.

Individualism and liberalism

As already shown, individualism appears in different domains and forms, but its most powerful form is political liberalism. Liberalism has become dominant political doctrine of modern times. It is considered “the best moral foundation for modern democratic societies”, as claimed by John Rawls (1971) in his seminal work *A Theory of Justice*, arguably considered to belong to the most important works of political philosophy in the 20th century.

In my view, it is important to take into account both aspects of liberalism - it is individuocentric and soziophobic. (Jovanović, 2005) The pattern of privileging and repressing could be seen also at this theoretical level – liberalism has become marked and opposed accounts less promoted. One telling historical example are Locke and Shaftesbury. Locke (1690) promoted modern liberalism, claiming that men are by nature independent, while his student Shaftesbury (1711) defended understanding man as basically social being. And Shaftesbury’s position remained quite marginalized - at least for a long time. His significance started to be recognized only recently – for example, Michael Billig (2008) sees him as a forerunner of critical psychology.

The name liberalism suggests that it is derived from the notion of liberty, the hallmark of modern self-understanding of human beings. Or, to put it more critically, liberalism has semantically appropriated and monopolized the notion of freedom. As a consequence, its opposition is associated with no or in the best case less freedom, and this is a strong reason to discredit such accounts. Again, a more radical and critical thinking is necessary in order to provide a convincing critique of liberalism.

Such critique has been developed within communitarianism. For the sake of truth, however, it should be reminded that insights into social propensities of men were articulated also within the liberalism. In Locke, who certainly belongs to the most influential representatives of liberalism, we can find the following statement of man: “driven by a certain natural propensity to enter society and is fitted to preserve it by the gift of speech and the commerce of language.” (Locke, 1664/1990, p. 169). However, even though this propensity was naturalistically founded, in the reception of liberalism it was repressed and almost completely forgotten. A very similar destiny had reception of Rawl’s ideas on social orientation of naturally free and equal subjects. (Rawls, 1971).

Thus, within the structure of liberalism itself it is possible to recognize the same pattern – privileging individualistic aspects and marginalizing and repressing social ones. As a consequence, it is only with the emergence of communitarianism that a profound critique of individualism in liberalism has been developed.

Even though Rawls in his last work limited his original conception of justice - “justice is now presented as a political conception of justice” (Rawls, 2001, p. xvii), the core issues of liberalism remained – the individual and freedom precede the society. The very idea of “unencumbered self”, the quintessence of individualism, is one of the main targets of communitarian critique of liberalism. Michael Sandel (1982) is among the most known critics of this idea. He argues that liberal conception of person is not self-sufficient, contrary to claims of liberalism. In Sandel’s view even the liberal conception of person and the features ascribed to it presuppose a kind of community, even though liberalism is not ready to acknowledge it. Thus, we encounter again the same epistemological pattern of repression or amnesia.

In the critique of individualistic conception of subjects in liberalism Charles Taylor (1985), who rather uses the notion of atomism, pointed out that the very concept of right – fundamental in liberalism and its conception of person which is defined in terms of inalienable rights, must presuppose a community of those who acknowledge to each other the rights. I find this argument very strong - indeed the very concept of right belongs to the realm of social facts, not natural facts, in the sense how John Searle (1995) conceptualized it. All social facts are dependent on attitudes of subjects ready to acknowledge and treat accordingly those facts. There are no inherent features of a piece of paper to serve as money - it is money as there is an agreement among people to use a piece of paper as money. Rights presuppose acknowledgment - therefore there is struggle to recognize rights. The necessity of their recognition is not guaranteed by nature. “In so far as community and society are indispensable for acknowledgment of rights, and for their enforcement, it is clear that any danger to community or society poses danger to rights - here lies an aporia of liberalist individualism. “(Jovanović, 2005, p. 62)

The communitarian socialization of rights stands against the liberal naturalization of rights demonstrating once more fundamental differences in ways of thinking between liberalism and social accounts. As the concept of right has a privileged place within liberalism, it is clear that the communitarian critique of liberal concept of rights has far reaching consequences. But there are more targets of communitarian critique - also liberal conception of self or moral development. Communitarians claim that conditions for development of moral consciousness are given in the community which sets moral and social norms. It is by living in a community that its members learn those norms and shared meanings. Thus, it is community, not an isolated individual which provides conditions for moral autonomy – another important issue in liberal concept of person.

Obviously, good reasons are not always powerful enough to produce changes in real life. Thus, the good arguments provided by communitarians have not brought about the disappearance of liberalism, or at least its weakening. However, it is argued that liberalism accurately describes the social state of art.

Liberalism tells the truth about the asocial society that liberals create - not, in fact, *ex nihilo* as their theory suggests, but in a struggle against traditions and communities and authorities that are forgotten as soon as they are escaped, so that liberal practice seem to have no history. The struggle itself is ritually celebrated but rarely reflected on. The members of liberal society share no political or religious tradition; they can tell only one story about themselves and that is the story of *ex nihilo* creation, which begins in the state of nature or the original position. Each individual imagines himself absolutely free, unencumbered, and on his own - and enters society, accepting its obligations, only in order to minimize his risk. (Walzer, 1990, pp. 7-8)

But the point is, that even “asocial” society is a product of joint activities, of institutions, norms and values. They can be changed again by joint activities oriented toward different norms and values.

In conclusion

It is hoped that both historical and theoretical analyses have provided enough arguments to support the claim that individualism is an ahistorical and reductionist account of social and political history and development of individuals. The values of freedom, rights and autonomy, appropriated as an exclusive domain of liberalism, are result of social struggles, not innate, given features.

It is society that makes possible development of quite unique individualities. It is clear that both are needed, societies and developed individuals, sociality and individuality. But it is also important to bear in mind that both individuals and society are real. It is still used the argument that only individuals are real, not societies. But society is no less the fact than individuals, even though it is not possible to point to society as it is possible to point to an individual. Thus, it is necessary to transcend “perceptual centration” in order to grasp society. More than hundred years ago, John Dewey stressed that society is a real fact, a means to create individuals and nonsocial individual an abstraction at which one could arrive only if all human qualities were taken away.

In summary, individualism is epistemologically focused on results, prone to naturalism and “perceptual imperialism” and objectivist epistemology. Individualism in its political form of liberalism is committed to ideal of minimal society as society is seen as a source of obstacles only. Politically it is oriented at removing existing obstacles, at the best. Collectivism or social accounts in general focus on processes, are prone to socio-symbolic interactionism and argue for social epistemology. They have a demanding concept of society as society is seen as a formative factor. Politically they are oriented toward mobilizing for a creative advancement of society.

I hope to provide sufficient justification to argue against the dualism of individual and society and its theoretical duplication in dualism of individualism and collectivism. Dualism is

a form of epistemological pitfall. Both perspectives are needed as a way to transcend epistemological amnesia and socio-political resignation.

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V. Civilization and the humanity

For whom are the Humanities? : From a comparative perspective of the history of research on autobiographical writings in Europe and Japan

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Introduction

The idea of writing this paper comes from my personal experience at an interdisciplinary symposium on diary studies in Modern Japan at Meiji Gakuin University in 2016. I was requested to give a talk on diary studies in Europe for the purpose of comparing diary studies in Japan and Europe. The symposium was composed mainly of the scholars of Japanese Modern literature. The difference of my major in ‘History’ and subject of ‘Europe’ provided me with opportunities to ask myself two questions regarding the concept of ‘inter’ and ‘trans’. First, what is actually the purpose of doing interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary research which is currently the in thing to do? Second, for whom are the Humanities? The theories of the Humanities are universal or not?

In the symposium, the researchers of Japanese literature used some specific terms and adopted discourse analysis, which I do not usually do as an historian, conducting evidence-based or archival study. The conference language was Japanese, but we seemed to have pronounced even the simple word ‘text’ in a different way; they called documents ‘tekusto’, and I called them ‘tekisuto’. If you know the difference of the definition of these two in the context of Japanese language, you might know that the difference in pronunciation itself suggests the difference of our views on documents and of research methods indeed: ‘Tekusuto’ has supposedly its origin in French language, which is a subject of discourse analysis. ‘Tekisuto’ is used in a more general context. In addition, the researchers of Japanese literature employed some concepts such as “Modern” and “embodiment” without defining them strictly, which might be required in some other disciplines. All in all, I found it difficult to offer concrete feedbacks on their research themselves due to the lack of mutual consents on theories and academic language use, which are all defined by respective disciplines. I wondered whether we would be never on the same wavelength as long as we do ‘inter’disciplinary research, since we would not negotiate in terms of the way of shaping diary studies in respective disciplines and theories. Can we researchers, who have tailored themselves as such, take off our own glasses of disciplines, deciding our perspectives at all?

At the same time, however, another question came to my mind. This was around the congeniality, in other words ill-matching or well-matching among disciplines for doing a collaborative research. I was thinking about the difference in Modern and Postmodern theories within the discipline of History itself. For those who advocate Modern theories, basically evidence-based or archival studies of History, discourse analysis is not necessarily a valid

method, but for those who are engaged in Postmodern theories, it is valid. That might mean, historians, who dedicate themselves to studies based on Postmodern theories, can share methods with Literature researchers and they even might be able to go beyond their disciplines and do transdisciplinary research.

The recovery of transdisciplinary perspective from modern disciplinary perspective or ‘science’ in the Humanities has originated in the stream of Postmodernism. Therefore, it might be a matter of course that there are disciplines or theories suited for doing transdisciplinary research, while some are suited for inter- or multidisciplinary research. However, reflecting on the turn from Modernism to Postmodernism in terms of the turn from Eurocentrism to the deconstruction of Eurocentrism, I could not help asking myself for example, how the Humanities in Japan as a non-European civilization have conceptualized Postmodernism in general? Does it have any special impacts on the Humanities in Japan? This question has led to my second question, namely ‘for whom are the Humanities?’ The theories in the Humanities are universal or not?

In brief, language is the core of Philosophy, and shapes our ontology and epistemology [Note 1]. Investigators are not free from their worldview which is guided by language. In fact, the theories of the Humanities ‘in Europe’ have been developed in the European linguistic matrix and so in Western paradigm. The development of the analysis theories of diary studies in Europe, which I introduce in this paper, is not exceptional. During the symposium, I asked myself ‘Can we adopt European theories or framework for analysing Japanese diaries or vice versa irrespective of this difference in language or paradigm?’

My concern was especially around the use of Japanese ‘first pronoun’, and I was thinking about my experience in Psychotherapy and Counselling Studies, since I problematized my sense of different selves in respective languages, regarding the use of the first pronoun: Briefly, Psychotherapy is Applied Social Science, and adopts qualitative inquiry. Researchers narrate a specific experience of themselves or others in a literary style so that the readership can resonate what is written. Qualitative inquiry in Psychotherapy does not apply any positivistic theories of Psychology or Cultural Anthropology, and draw any axiological conclusions, but it requires researchers to design their research through expressing their reality (ontology), defining it within one philosophical framework (epistemology), and rationalizing it by applying its related methodology and methods. In this way, researchers shape their inquiry into research. In relation to my use of the first pronoun and my sense of self in Japanese language, however, I found to be an epistemology diaspora. First, my sense of self in Japanese language is different from my sense of self in European languages. Second, my sense of self in Japanese language could not locate in any European epistemology. I thought, ‘if I dear to put my ontology as a Japanese into any European epistemology, this might be just an interpretation within the Western paradigm’.

In some disciplines of the Humanities, linguistic aspects and paradigms do not or less matter, and we are not always required to shape our personal experience or inquiry into our

research or study. However, I wonder whether the ontology (reality) of non-European civilizations is contained in European epistemology or the framework of respective disciplines in general. I do not say whether the Humanities are ‘useful’, but ‘helpful’ for deepening the understanding of our own reality? This is the question, ‘for whom are the Humanities?’

This paper firstly introduces the history of diaries and its research history in Europe as an example for thinking on the cohesion between Philosophy and theories, and the meaning of the turn from Modernism to Postmodernism. Then after, it briefly summarizes the characteristics of the history of diaries and a study on diaries in Modern Japan [Note 2]. In so doing, this paper aims at questioning the universality of the Humanities and suggesting the importance of inquiring epistemology which corresponds to ontological positions in each civilization or which encompasses the diversity of civilizations.

History of the practice of keeping a diary in Europe [Note 3]

In European languages, the word of ‘diary’ is etymologically originated in the Latin word ‘diarium’ (‘day by day’) and ‘ephēmeris’ (originally from the Greek word ‘ephēmeris’, ‘diary’ or ‘accounts’). For example, the English word ‘diary’, Italian ‘diario’ and German ‘Diarium / Tagebuch’ derive all from this Latin word ‘diarium’. The old French word of ‘diaire’ comes also from this ‘diarium’, and the words such as ‘diariste’ (‘writer or author of a diary’) and ‘diarisme’ (‘phenomenon of keeping a diary’) derive from this word ‘diaire’. The French word ‘journal’ is derived from the Latin word ‘diurnus’, which means ‘of the day’ (Hess, 1998/2009; Hocke, 1965/1991; Nejime, 2011).

The practice of keeping a diary in Europe is deemed to be originated in the custom of writing down personal events or family issues such as ceremonial occasions besides incomings and outgoings on household accounts in Florence in Italy in the 14th century (‘ricordanza’ or ‘ricordi’, Hess, *ibid.*; Nejime, *ibid.*) [Note 4]. Among them, there were memoranda including a family pedigree, which were kept for the purpose of transmitting the issues within the family (de la Roncière, 1985). As an example of this kind of diary, one can refer to the diary of Michel de Montaigne’s father, which Montaigne mentioned in the 34th chapter of the first volume of *Les Essais* (1580) (Hess, *ibid.*) [Note 5]. In the 19th century, Charles de Ribbe edited and published this sort of diaries in France, and indicated that this type of diary was also written by farmers as well [Note 6].

In the 15th and 16th centuries, people started to keep a chronological diary. According to Béatrice Didier, family journals or diaries, which are to be categorized as chronicles, were kept by burghers in France from the 15th century, when the social status of bourgeoisie made a sudden rise (Didier, 1976). In the case of German speaking countries, chronological diaries were started to be written among burghers from the beginning of the 16th century, and merchants, who made a business trip to Italy, started to keep a travel journal (Hocke, *ibid.*). In the UK, the diary of Edward VI (1537-1553) is regarded as the oldest existing diary today:

According to the description by British Library, he started to keep a diary at the death of his father Henry VIII, through following his tutor's advice. He kept his memorandum of his younger days through using the third person in singular for the first two years, and recorded his personal issues from 1550 [Note 7]. As for the practice of keeping a diary in the UK, Foisil reports that women kept a diary irrespective of social status from farmers to nobles, so as to record their daily lives (Foisil, 1986/1991).

In the 17th century, more and more people kept a diary. The fact that an increasing number of diaries from the 18th century has been discovered in any linguistic areas of Europe, let us assume that keeping a diary was widely practiced as one of their common life customs irrespective of their social status, and in addition, it was endorsed in the arena of education for urging children to have time management, developing their faculty of observation, and encouraging their reflections on thoughts and acts on each day, in particular, from the end of the 18th century through the 19th century. Even some books, which offered instructions on the ideal ways of keeping a diary, were written (Corbin, 1987/1999; Hess, *ibid.*) [Note 8]. At that time, keeping a diary had the aspect of pursuing insights into their inner worlds and also of religious confession. Furthermore, so-called 'literary diaries' or novels in the style of a diary were also begun to write. One of the good examples of 'literary diaries' is *A Journal of the Plague Year* (1722) by Daniel Defoe (Hocke, *ibid.*) [Note 9].

Since the 19th century, diaries have turned to become the places where one could pour forth one's feelings not in the form of religious confession, rather in the form that needed to be concealed from others [Note 10]. During two world wars in the 20th century, a number of people kept a diary both at the front and home front, which are now in the custody of diary archives [Note 11].

History of research on autobiographical writings including diaries in Europe

Philosophy was inextricably bound up with all disciplines of the Humanities and so both with Literature and History respectively. Scholars also used to hold various academic affiliations. Wilhelm Dilthey, for instance, was sociologist, psychologist, historian, and philosopher. Thus, it is not necessarily 'correct' to write a research history through demarcating disciplines from the today's perspective. Nevertheless, in this paper, I divide them into Philosophy and Literature, and History, and write a history of research on autobiographical writings including diaries so as to clarify the relations between Literature and History with focus on theories.

(1) Philosophy and Literature

Research on diaries has been mainly conducted in the arena of Philosophy and Literature as a part of the research on autobiographical writings. The analytical theory was the theory of autobiography, which was characterized by the developmental history of self-representation, in particular in relation to the birth of modern individuals.

The theory of autobiographical writings is based on the idea of the Swiss historian of Art

and Culture, Jakob Burckhardt in the 19th century. He claimed in his work *Die Cultur der Renaissance in Italien* (1860) that modern individuals, who could see one's state and the world objectively, were born in Italy in the 14th century, and that this birth of modern individuals could be recognized in the birth of autobiography. He had the opinion of Cultural History that the dominance of Christianity defied the culture of the Greco-Roman world and also the mental activity of human beings as its corollary consequence. According to Burckhardt, modern individuals were born through the renaissance, namely relearning the culture of the Greco-Roman world. Hence Burckhardt defined modern individuals as self-disciplined and cultured people, who could think by themselves and be free from religious valuation in some way [Note 12].

It was the German philosopher Georg Misch, who followed Jakob Burckhardt and wrote a masterpiece of the history of autobiography under the title *Geschichte der Autobiographie* (1907-1969) [Note 13]. He started his work with the Greco-Roman period and delineated the character of the Christian culture in Europe. In so doing, he concluded that the autobiography was the genre of writings that could be developed only within the framework of the Christian culture in Europe [Note 14]. The French philosopher, Georges Gusdorf espoused Burckhardt's theory as well, and inquired the conditions for writing an autobiography. In so doing, he concluded that an autobiographical writing could be written only by modern individuals in the civilized West [Note 15]. The German historian of Culture, Gustav Rene Hocke, who wrote the first comprehensive history of diaries in Europe, also subscribed the same theory.

In course of discovering the autobiographies, which were written in the Medieval period of Europe, and also the autobiographies, which were written in other civilizations including Japan, this theory of autobiography has lost its validity though. In addition, philosophers such as Michel Foucault [Note 16], Jacques Derrida [Note 17], Gilles Deleuze [Note 18] or later Judith Butler [Note 19], who are categorized as philosophers of Postmodernism or Poststructuralism in respect to their challenges toward Modernism, but did or do not necessarily identify themselves as such on their own, have introduced new concepts of individuation and linguistic philosophy: In respect to individuation, those philosophers have put doubts on the Modern concepts of self, which was characterized by consistency and autonomy, and claimed more relational self that was bound up with authorities for example. This change exerted influence on the theories of various disciplines and in this way, the theory of autobiography, which insisted that an autobiographical writing could be written only by modern individuals in the civilized West, was also relativized.

In France, the studies on autobiographical writings have paid much more attention to style and person in terms of literariness. According to Remi Hess, since the French word 'journal' has two meanings of diaries and newspapers, those who are engaged in diary studies in French language tend to define the character of diaries through putting adjectives before the word 'journal'. In this way, besides the two categories of diaries such as 'private / intern' and

‘public / extern’, which dimensions people turned to gain in their ordinary lives from the age of Enlightenment during the 18th century (Brändle et al., 2001), the genre of diaries has been more and more subdivided (Hess, 1998/2009).

(2) History

In the 1950s, while the theory of autobiography was relativized in the arena of Literature, the Dutch historian and novelist, Jacque Presser acknowledged the value of autobiographical writings as historical documents and coined the term ‘ego-documents’ [Note 20]. He wrote a history of the Jews in the Netherlands during the second World War, based on ‘ego-documents’; ‘ego’ means the first pronoun, and Presser initially defined ego-documents as “those historical sources in which the researcher is faced with an ‘I’, or occasionally (Caesar, Henry Adams) a ‘he’ as the writing and describing subject with a continuous presence in the text“ (Dekker, 2002, p.14). In concrete, ego-documents include “autobiographies, memoirs, diaries and personal letters” (ibid.). The Dutch historian Rudolf Dekker, who evaluated Presser’s work in the 1980s, recognized it as his endowment that Presser worked not only as a historian, but also novelist and poet, and acknowledged the value of “literary aspects” of ego-documents, while official documents were evaluated more highly than those due to its aspects of records in the arena of History at that time (ibid., p.18). He also traced the track that the term ‘ego-documents’ was firstly introduced into English, most probably by the historian Peter Burke, German by Winfried Schulze, and French by Pierre-Yves Beaurepaire (ibid., pp.14-15) [Note 21].

However, in the 1950s, these ego-documents were not regarded as authentic documents or useful materials in the then main fields of History in general (Dekker, ibid.). In brief, ego-documents were not authentic enough for historians, who were engaged in Political history, for their main concern was the History of politically important events, and ego-documents were not to use as evidence for such. For the historians of Economic history, who were engaged in analysis of figures or mathematics, ego-documents were left out of consideration. Social history was characterized by constructivism that researchers utilized positivistic approach and assessed results based on quantitative data.

On the contrary, in the arena of History of ideas or History of mentalities, the German historian, Wilhelm Dilthey already asserted that autobiographical documents were the best materials for ‘understanding’ human life, in the 19th century. The important thing is the fact that he distinguished between human sciences and natural sciences; briefly saying, human sciences are for understanding the human life. Thus, the study is mainly based on interpretation, while natural sciences are for explaining the phenomena. Incidentally, Georg Misch, who wrote a history of autobiography, was his student and son-in-law.

It was only through the linguistic-turn [Note 22] and cultural-turn [Note 23] in the stream of Postmodernism in the 1970s that discourse analysis has become one of the valid methods, and that ego-documents have been acknowledged as sources for understanding the cultural and social phenomena of human beings in the arena of History: Concisely, it was the turn that one

has started to regard language as the ‘representation’ of human beings of cultural and social existence. In this understanding, the study of History is so conceptualized that historians write a history based on their own interpretation of ‘the represented’ in documents, and it was the turn in view from ‘the history based on evidence’ to ‘a history based on interpretation of historians’. From around that time, historians started to write a history of human life such as a history of children or a history of women through making use of ego-documents. These studies have been conducted within the frameworks of History such as *Microstria* in Italy [Note 24], *New history* in English speaking countries [Note 25], *Alltagsgeschichte* in Germany [Note 26], and *Social or Cultural history of L’écologie des Annales* in France [Note 27].

Today, the concept of ego-documents enables the researchers of Literature and History to work together. In German language, for example, the publishing house, Böhlau Verlag has published 25 volumes in the series entitled “*Selbstzeugnisse der Neuzeit*” (‘ego-documents in Modern times’) up to today [Note 28].

The case of Japan and Postmodernism in non-European civilizations

Now, we will take a brief look at the history of diaries and a study on diaries written in Modern Japan. There are three things to highlight before we go into this chapter. First, it is still not possible to write a history of diary studies in Japan, different from Europe, particularly because diaries written in Modern Japan have remained less studied both in the arena of Literature and History. Second, as an inevitable consequence, it is also still not possible to write a developmental history of analytical theories of diary studies in Japan. Third, different from some European countries, diaries written by ordinary people are not archived by public institutions. Voluntary-based archival work has been forwarded, for instance, by Rieko Shima (*Society learning from women diaries*) and Yusuke Tanaka (*Fukuda Hideichi Diary Collection*). These characteristics might provide the point for thinking over the characteristics of the Humanities in non-European civilizations. This chapter briefly summarizes the history of diaries in Japan, and introduces the study of Yuko Nishikawa, which is counted as one of the most important studies on diaries in Modern Japan. Then after, we will think over the meaning of Postmodernism in non-European civilizations and the question ‘for whom are the Humanities?’ from the comparative perspective of the history of research on autobiographical writings in Europe and Japan.

(1) The case of Japan

In Japan, both men and women of the noble class had already kept a diary since the 9th and 10th centuries. At that time, men kept a diary in Kanji (Chinese characters), which was used for keeping official documents, and women kept a diary in Kana, the newly developed writing system for vernacular Japanese. In the arena of History, the diaries, which were chronologically written by men are called *kokiroku* (‘old records’), which tell us the then social events and ceremonies. On the contrary, the diaries written by women are usually categorized as

‘literature’, since they often kept a diary ‘in retrospect’ and did not necessarily follow a chronological order. In addition, in such diaries, women delineated their own inner feelings beside describing certain events, and composed waka poems. In this way, the practice of keeping a diary started at an early time period in Japan, and this practice is regarded as a culture or even a ‘tradition’ of Japan due to its long history.

Comparing to the case of Europe, the start of the practice of keeping a diary in Japan was much earlier indeed. It was mainly due to the accessibility of papers; in China, papers were already produced around the 2nd century, and its technology was then transmitted to Japan in the 7th century. In Europe, costly parchments were used for a long time and the technology of producing papers was brought into Europe only in the 12th century.

Nevertheless, especially European scholars become interested in the reason why Japanese diaries in hand of women in particular had literary aspects at an early stage. The renowned researcher of Japanese literature, Donald Keene defines this sort of literary diaries as the “archetype of I-Novel” (‘I’ stands for the first pronoun) (Keene, 2010, p.18), which appeared as one genre of novels through the reform movement to a colloquial writing in Modern Japan in the 19th century of Meiji period. In Japanese literature, this birth of I-Novel has been discussed in relation to the birth of modern individuals under the Western influence. If we follow this definition of diaries in Modern Japan by Donald Keene, it might mean that the archetype of modern individuals existed already in the 9th century in Japan. The German researcher of diary studies, Ralph-Rainer Wuthenow also describes the high literariness as the character of Japanese diaries. Interestingly, he states that he does not know how he should understand the use of the third person in Japanese diaries such as *Izumi-shikibu nikki*, which was written in the beginning of the 11th century. He wonders whether this was the result of objective view on self or of literary elaboration (Wuthenow, 1990).

The practice of keeping a diary has never ceased throughout the history in Japan. It is said that diaries started to be published as stationery from 1879, and the Japanese publishing house Hakubun-kan commercialized diaries from 1895 (Nishikawa, 2009, pp. 76-78). Nishikawa, who has conducted research on the history of the commercialization of diaries in Japan, indicates that the Japanese publishing house increased the number of the variety up to 14 as of 1908 and this variety expansion was the result of having targeted at purchasers based on their “jobs, genders and age” respectively (ibid., p. 85). For example, there were “diaries for patriarches”, “diaries for women (unmarried women)” or “diaries for family (for married women)” (ibid., pp. 88-91). During and after the second world war, keeping a diary was brought into education. Students were required to submit their diaries to class teachers. This had mainly two aspects. One was for developing self-discipline in terms of moral training. Another was a sort of thought control, in particular during the war. Nishikawa terms this function of diaries “device for educating the nation” (Nishikawa, 2009) [Note 29].

The study of Nishikawa entitled *Nikki wo tsuzuru to iu koto. Kokumin-kyōiku sōchi to*

sono itsudatsu [The practice of keeping a diary. Device for educating the nation and deviance from this] (2009), whose study is regarded as one of the most important and comprehensive studies on diaries written in Modern Japan, is characterized by two aspects. First, she applies the theories of various disciplines such as Sociology and Anthropology without any (meta)philosophical consideration on links among disciplines and theories. In terms of adopting various disciplines, it is to be regarded as a sort of multidisciplinary research. She published her study in the series of ‘New history’, and described ‘New history’ as the “framework suited for investigating diaries themselves without dealing them as historical materials (evidence)” (2009, pp. 304-305), which is nothing other than discourse analysis and methods of Postmodernism in History (see the second chapter). In the epilogue, she made reference to the critics from sociologists and historians that her way of shaping research is of “Literature” in a negative sense due to “the lack of consistency in any academic disciplines and theories” (ibid., p. 304). This suggests us that those sociologists and historians might strictly locate themselves within modern disciplinary studies, and they might be aware of the problem of her multidisciplinary research, which is designed without considering the philosophical background of each discipline and theory, in other words without taking any epistemological positions. Second, she compares the diary studies of Europe and Japan in two ways; on the one hand, she applies some theories and academic terms in Europe without problematizing the difference in the paradigms of Europe and Japan. On the other hand, she asserts that adopting the theory of Didier (1976) for analysing the diaries in Modern Japan causes her “the strong feeling of something wrong” (Nishikawa, 2009, p. 9), and that it remains still problematic to put the perspectives of Comparative Cultural Study into the theories of diary studies (ibid., p.13 of bibliography).

Postmodernism is defined as “non-sentimental adieu [...] to the traditional metaphysical longing for totality, holism, and presence” (Wolin, 1992, cited in Crotty, 1998, p. 196). In this sense, taking no specific epistemological positions and disregarding the difference in the paradigms of Europe and Japan in her research can be regarded as the postmodern characteristics. And yet, she claims the incompatibility of adopting the theories of Didier for analysing diaries in Modern Japan, based on her “feeling”. What does it suggest in all? Is her position really compatible with that of Postmodernism?

(2) Postmodern and non-European civilizations

In the second chapter of this paper, we took a brief look at the transition of the concept of ‘self’. Thereby, I just enumerated Gilles Deleuze as one of the philosophers, who are categorized as philosophers of Postmodernism or Poststructuralism. It is important to underline that Deleuze’s (and Guattari’s) exhaustive and radical liberation of human beings expressed, for example, in the positively conceptualized “madness” of “schizophrenia” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972/1983) need to be read in the historical context of how mental illness (‘madness’) was conceptualized in the Western society. As an example, Foucault’s account in *Madness and*

Civilization: A history of insanity in the age of reason (1964) could be referred to especially in terms of Freud's positive and negative effects on other social and cultural arenas. Nevertheless, the following accounts of Deleuze (and Guattari) regarding 'individuation' are worthy of looking into as an example for getting to know their concept of 'self' and a unique example of referring to a Japanese literary style for describing their concept.

It is other-structure that ensures individuation within the perceptual world. It is not the I, nor the self: on the contrary, these need this structure in order to be perceived as individualities. Everything happens as though the *Other* integrated the individuating factors and pre-individual singularities within the limits of objects and subjects, which are then offered to representation as perceivers as perceived (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980 /2004, pp. 281-282) (emphasis in original).

Their concept of individuation is defined as 'haecceities' and described as follows:

We must avoid an oversimplified conciliation, as though there were on the one hand formed subjects, of the thing or person type, and on the other hand spatiotemporal coordinates of the haecceity type. [...] You are longitude and latitude, a set of speeds and slownesses between unformed particles, a set of nonsubjectified affects. You have the individuality of a day, a season, a year, *a life* (regardless of its duration) --- a climate, a wind, a fog, a swarm, a pack (regardless of its regularity). [...] A haecceity has neither beginning nor end, origin nor destination; it is always in the middle. It is not made of points, only of lines. It is a rhizome (ibid., pp. 289-290) (emphasis in original).

Among types of civilizations, the Orient has many more individuations by haecceity than by subjectivity or substantiality; *the haiku* [Note 30] for example, must include indicators as so many floating lines constituting a complex individual (ibid., p. 288) (emphasis by Miyata).

It is not only Deleuze, who came close to Eastern or other civilizations on their way of deconstructing or relativizing 'meta-narratives' or 'grand narratives' of Modernity [Note 31]. However, how do particularly Japanese readers of this paper perceive these accounts of individuation and haecceity by Deleuze (and Guattari), who referred to haiku for describing the individuation of their concept? Do they correspond to the reality of Japanese readers? How should we understand his statement, synchronically or diachronically? Have non-European civilizations experienced this deconstruction or relativization of Modernism as of their own problems?

In sum, this comparative perspective of the history of research on autobiographical

writings in Europe and Japan seems to intimate two aspects of the Humanities. First, the transition from Modernism to Postmodernism might encompass solely the European norms. Second, the epistemological framework of the Humanities does not always correspond to the ontology of non-European civilizations, as Nishikawa cannot espouse the theory of Didier, although she does not take any epistemological positions and disregard the difference in paradigms in a postmodernist-‘ic’ way.

Conclusion: ‘For whom are the Humanities?’

In this paper, the history of diaries and its research history in Europe was firstly introduced. We took a look at how the theory of autobiography has been relativized in the arena of Philosophy and Literature, and how autobiographical writings have been utilized as sources in the discipline of History. The key concept for understanding this process was the turn from Modernism to Postmodernism in the case of Europe. In the case of diary studies in Japan, on the contrary, less studies have been conducted on research history itself. As an example, we had an overview of Nishikawa’s research design, which was located in the framework for New history, and characterized by the lack of specific epistemological positions. This aspect was criticized by scholars, who might devote to modern disciplinary studies. Irrespective of the postmodern characteristics of her research design though, she still argued that she could not resonate the theories of diary studies in Europe for analysing diaries in Modern Japan. For thinking on whether her position is compatible with that of Postmodernism, this paper referred to Deleuze’s concept of individuation and haecceity that are described with an example of haiku, and posed a question, whether non-European civilizations have been concerned with the deconstruction or relativization of Modernism. In so doing, this paper suggests the following two points. First, the transition from Modernism to Postmodernism might have occurred only in the matrix of the European norms. Second, the current epistemological frameworks of the Humanities do not always live up to the ontology of non-European civilizations.

The eurocentric aspects of the Humanities might be a matter of course due to the history of the development of the Humanities. Based on the findings from this comparative perspective of the history of research on autobiographical writings in Europe and Japan, however, it might be important to note that we need to establish new epistemological frameworks, which correspond to the ontology of non-European civilizations, as Toshihiko Izutsu already claimed from his stance as linguistic philosopher [Note 32], and recover transdisciplinary humanities through developing new theories, which contain the reality of each civilization or/and the diversity of civilizations holistically, newly. In this way, the Humanities will be for ‘us’.

Notes

[1] [Ontology:] What is the nature of the “knowable”? Or, what is the nature of

“reality”? [Epistemology:] “What is the nature of the relationship between the knower (the inquirer) and the known (or knowable)?” (Guba, Egon. G. (1990) *The alternative paradigm dialog*. In. Guba, E.G. (ed.) *The paradigm dialog*. Newbury Park, London: Sage, p. 18.)

[2] I have already written a paper on this topic in Japanese language, which will be edited by Yusuke Tanaka and published by Kasama-shoin in 2017.

[3] Due to the limitation of my language availability, ‘Europe’ is limited in German speaking countries, France, Italy, and the UK. The following studies can be referred to as comprehensive studies on the practice of keeping a diary in Europe or respective countries: Hocke, Gustav René (1991) *Europäische Tagebücher aus vier Jahrhunderten. Motive und Anthologie*. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag (The first edition published 1963); Didier, Béatrice (1976) *Le Journal intime*. Paris: PUF; Buchholz, Magdalena (1983?) *Die Anfänge der deutschen Tagebuchschreibung*. Münster: Lit-Verlag (The first edition published as dissertation 1942); Ariés, Philippe et Georges Duby (1985-1987). *Histoire de la vie privée*. tome 1: De L’Empire romain à l’an mil, tome 2: De l’Europe féodale à la Renaissance, tome 3: De la Renaissance aux Lumières, tome 4: De la Révolution à la Grande guerre, tome 5: e la Première Guerre mondiale à nos jours. Paris: Seuil; Nejime, Ken’ichi (2011) *Renaissance seishin he no tabi* [Journey to the minds of Renaissance]. Tokyo: Sôbunsha.

[4] You will find some examples in the 7th chapter of the book by Nejime (2011) and the following translation book of *Diario fiorentino* by Luca Landucci (1436?-1516); Nakamori, Yoshimune and Taiyû Anpo (1988)(trans.) *Landucci no nikki. Renaissance. Ichi-shônin no oboegaki* [Diary of Landucci. Renaissance. A memorandum of a merchant] Tokyo: Kondô shuppan.

[5] “My father in his domestic economy had this rule (which I know how to commend, but by no means to imitate), namely, that besides the day-book or memorial of household affairs, where the small accounts, payments, and disbursements, which do not require a secretary’s hand, were entered, and which a steward always had in custody, he ordered him whom he employed to write for him, to keep a journal, and in it to set down all the remarkable occurrences, and daily memorials of the history of his house: very pleasant to look over, when time begins to wear things out of memory, and very useful sometimes to put us out of doubt when such a thing was begun, when ended; what visitors came, and when they went; our travels, absences, marriages, and deaths; the reception of good or ill news; the change of principal servants, and the like. An ancient custom, which I think it would not be amiss for every one to revive in his own house; and I find I did very foolishly in neglecting it.” (Charles Cotton (1877)(trans.) *Essays of Montaigne*. Retrieved May 20, 2017 from the University of Adelaide online ebook at:

<https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/m/montaigne/michel/essays/book1.34.html>)

[6] See the following works by Charles de Ribbe: *La vie domestique, ses modèles et ses règles*,

- d'après des documents originaux*. Paris: 1976. *Une famille au XVIe siècle*. Tours, Mame, 1879. *Les familles et les sociétés en France avant la Révolution*. Tours, Mame 1879. *Le livre de famille*. Tours, Mame 1879. *Une grande dame dans son ménage au temps de Louis XIV, d'après le Journal de la comtesse de Rochefort*. Paris, 1890. *La société provençale à la fin du moyen âge, d'après des documents inédits*. Paris, 1898 (Hess, 1998/2009, p. 37).
- [7] Retrieved May 20, 2017 from the British Library Online Gallery at <http://www.bl.uk/onlinegallery/onlineex/henryviii/birthaccdeath/edwardvidiary/>
- [8] For example, Jullien, Marc-Antoine (1808) *Essai sur l'emploi du temps, ou sur une méthode qui a pour objet de bien régler l'emploi du temps, premier moyen d'être heureux; à l'usage des jeunes gens de l'âge de 16 à 25 ans, extrait d'un travail plus étendu sur l'éducation* (Hess, 1998/2009, p. 45; Corbin, 1987/1999, pp. 466-469).
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An essay on Trans-Disciplinary Humanities: As a key element for Civilization Dialogue

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Problem Statement

The present-day world is facing a problem comprising two contrasting directionalities—progressing globalization and maintaining the diversity of cultures. These two directions relate to how the human society ought to be on a global scale, while also relating to how each region ought to be in the future. The question of what one can do through the academic disciplines to respond to this challenge is addressed in this essay. In general terms, academic pursuits nowadays are divided into three categories: human science, social science, and natural science. If the contemporary world is viewed from the perspective of academic disciplines, human livelihood is immersed in the benefits of natural science—often referred to as *science*—in the sense that humans are supported by various advances in science and technology. At the same time, technology born of that science is counted within the same category. Moreover, when one thinks of maintaining ethnic identity within groups such as a nation or region, or of the progressive development of welfare societies on a global scale, one can say that the social sciences are becoming increasingly important. However, when one considers the fact that humanity is now facing the need to pursue sustainability on a global scale, it is also certain that humanity must review the meaning of human existence and activity from its foundations. Thus, the pursuit of human science is also important with its numerous queries.

Certainly, combined domains where these three *sciences* (disciplines) interrelate are gaining importance in discussing the increasingly complex contemporary society. Interdisciplinary studies dealing with individual problems have also been conducted. Nevertheless, in considering how contemporary civilization has had significant involvement in human existence and activity, there must be great significance in working with the expansive domain of the humanities that make possible a re-questioning of values built and nurtured in each region or era by humanity. This paper presents an essay on trans-disciplinary humanities as a possibility for a form of academic pursuit that investigates the ideal state of 21st-century civilization.

Introduction to Trans-Disciplinary Humanities

Of the aforementioned three categories, this section particularly addresses the human sciences. The academic pursuit in the separate fields of study such as philosophy, history, literature, or art is not the sole significance of the humanities; it is also important that each discipline clarifies human values. These values were formed through the human spirit being shaken by the spirit

of a time or region. Therefore, whether these values are historical (diachronic) or regional (synchronic), they are only elucidated through integral and organic entanglement of these individual disciplines.

Further, such academic integration does not solely occur within the human sciences. For example, Leonardo da Vinci, the great master of the Renaissance, was simultaneously an artist, an inventor, an anatomist, and a physicist. In particular, he focused on the structures and movements in nature and tried to apply them to the understanding of human beings. For example, he mimicked the flow of water when drawing the hair of a woman. Therefore, one must have a considerably wide perspective—one that encompasses human, social, and natural science—to capture the entirety of his work. This is not true only for capturing the work of Leonardo da Vinci; we must consider him as a figure that symbolizes the Renaissance. In other words, the values of his era may only be understood through a synthetic study that encompasses human, social, and natural sciences.

Conversely, one could take the following view. In light of Leonardo da Vinci's existence and work, how do we, living in the contemporary society, position him? To which field does his research belong? This line of thought positions Mendel as a biologist (or geneticist) and Niels Bohr as a theoretical physicist. In the case of Leonardo da Vinci, such definition is not easy. This is not because academic disciplines were yet firmly defined but because each awareness and activity of Leonardo da Vinci superseded individual disciplinary boundaries. Therefore, one could consider his values as formed in a domain that is an organic integration and a fusion of what *we* consider a variety of academic disciplines according to *our* categorization. One could call this the synthesis of disciplines or the synthesis of knowledge. Here, we term this type of study that promotes the formation of such synthesized knowledge as *trans-disciplinary humanities*.

Civilizational Studies and Trans-Disciplinary Humanities

So far, we have conducted repeated and continued discussion on the relation between civilizational studies and trans-disciplinary humanities. According to this discussion, trans-disciplinary humanities refers to a “synthetic study of human existence and activity” (Watanabe & Hirano, 2016). In this sense, trans-disciplinary humanities has a closely-knit relation with civilizational studies because one could consider anything that humans have built up over time as civilization. Societies and communities formed the civilization in that era and region. In turn, societies and communities can be considered the aggregation of values including culture, lifestyle, and technology. Such aggregation of values is the essence that forms civilizations.

Here, we consider an example of the history of sciences. Generally speaking, there are three types of perspective regarding the research on the development of sciences:

(i) Internal perspective

- research into the development of elements (concepts and theories, etc.) which

compose sciences.

(ii) External perspective

- research for systems and constitutions of research or education in countries and regions, the elements by which sciences are surrounded.

(iii) Total perspective

- integrated research in these two perspectives, which discusses the development of sciences based on the influence of external elements.

Since the object of the history of sciences has usually been a process of historical development, the research has naturally been considered to consist of diachronic viewpoints.

In fact, most historians in the field of sciences are apt to consider that the chief aim of the history of sciences should be to analyze and to clarify the theoretical development of sciences, which is concerned the internal development of sciences. On the other hand, it is also true that the history of sciences is a discipline that has been promoting research into the development process of sciences (and even that of technologies) from an epistemological viewpoint. The historians in the field seek to discuss and to examine the various aspects of sciences: scientific theories, scientists' ideas, scientific matters in human life and culture, etc.

Therefore, it can be said that there exists another viewpoint. As mentioned above, all that human beings have built up should be considered to be a civilization, and therefore, sciences, which are a product of human wisdom, must also be a kind of civilization. When we consider sciences as a key element to understanding our civilization, we should see a society or a community including sciences as an integrated system of multi-cultured dimensions just as human cultures, human life-styles, etc. Here, a synchronic viewpoint becomes also an important element.

After all, research into the historical development of sciences clarifies the processes in which synchronic systems are prescribed among the human activities of thinking as diachronic media, and relates these systems to modern meanings. What is important here is to understand that each of these systems is integrated with multi-cultured dimensions in each community as well as internal theories of sciences. Therefore, the possibility of the total perspective of sciences arises, as a synthesis of the internal and external elements. This can correspond to the idea of trans-disciplinary humanities.

Case Study: The historical conversion of Japan

In this section, we discuss the necessity of Trans-Disciplinary Humanities by showing the typical changes before and after the Meiji Restoration. This discussion can also demonstrate the necessity of a synchronic perspective in research into the history of Japanese culture and thought.

The two periods, the Edo and Meiji eras, are separated by the Meiji Restoration with definitive value differences on either side. In the Edo period that knew nothing of the

rationalism of modern science, belief in gods or Buddhas are directly linked to the comprehension of nature. Though the period did not have advanced technologies such as mechanical technologies, it was host to an ecological society with extensive recycling that was only possible by artisanal craftsmanship. As such, Japan manages to achieve a dramatic change in its society on the point of adopting Western culture and lifestyles through the Meiji Restoration. It is civilizational transfer by the West into the civilization that existed up to the Edo period. This was not only a civilizational transfer; it even converted the cultural awareness that existed at the spiritual core of Japanese people at the time.

We also present another example, the history of mathematics in the Edo period, to show the mentality of Japanese people in this period. In Japan, there existed a kind of mathematics called Wasan. The Wasan is mathematics of old-fashioned figure that developed originally in Japan in the Edo era (from the 17th century until 19th century)*.

Nowadays, mathematics is usually considered to be universal. The universality of mathematics seems to be argued from the fact that mathematics has developed, especially after Descartes in the 17th century, with the aim of forming a conceptual system in spite of various aspects of its development process. In addition, mathematics today has developed under eurocentrism. But it should be sure that various kinds of mathematics have been developed in each culture and civilization. In spite of the fact, we perceive mathematics to be a conceptual discipline which has been formed by cutting off many concrete human-cultural parts and by rearranging the remaining conceptual parts into a logical and concise system. Therefore, it is undeniable that universal mathematics formed under eurocentrism loses the features that represent the original character related to human life and culture.

From a historical point of view, the Wasan was developed under the old Japanese tradition. It consisted of various works and some of them are almost equal to those of the European mathematics. For example, Seki Takakazu, one of the famous mathematicians in the Wasan, tried to calculate the numerical value of Pi (π) by means of regular polygons with sides of 2 to n-th power. His result is $\pi = 3.14159265359\dots$ Takebe Katahiro, one of his disciples, studied the same subject. Takebe introduced a kind of series which is equivalent to the series expansion of arctangent and tried to calculate the value of $\arctan 1 (= \pi/4)$. Their results are considered to reach the same level of European mathematics in those days. However, the Wasan was surely different from European mathematics; for the Wasan was lacking in logic and demonstration in a sense, though it proceeded in techniques to solve problems.

To understanding the Wasan, we should consider the cultural background and people's mentality in those days. The Wasan did not develop under academism like in many European countries. It would be rather a kind of art or technique than discipline. In European mathematics, the theories were systematized and these systems were succeeded as disciplines. On the other hand, what was important in the Wasan was how to solve given problems technically or skillfully. The results obtained by each mentor (teacher) were succeeded as if he

would initiate his disciples (pupils) into the secret of an art.

But, the Wasan is a kind of mathematics. It is sure that the Wasan treated various subjects related to everyday life and culture in those days. Therefore, it is meaningful to consider the history of the Wasan in synchronic perspective. Finally, the Wasan was supplanted by European mathematics under the Meiji Restoration.

Upon reflecting on such changes under the Meiji Restoration, as well as the conversion from the traditional Wasan to European mathematics, it is inappropriate to simply view the societal structure. We should also discuss individual cultures and individual aspects such as technologies that formed a part of lifestyle. Rather, it is important to consider the aggregation of values held by each person, and thus, there is a need for trans-disciplinary humanities. This is also true across civilizations. In the contemporary world steeped in the benefits of the scientific and technological civilization where we all use electric automobiles, mutual understanding across civilizations must start from an examination of regional values that include their respective historical backgrounds. Trans-disciplinary humanities is the clarification and promotion of such new knowledge.

The European Academism and Trans-Disciplinary Humanities

(1) Progressive Specialization in Academia

As mentioned above, what lies at the roots of civilizational dialogue is a query on the pursuit of human values that formed each civilization. This pursuit requires not only to be conducted in each specialized discipline but also a synthetic perspective that transcends such frameworks. Thus, trans-disciplinary humanities becomes important in civilizational dialogue.

However, to construct trans-disciplinary humanities, it is conversely crucial to have both a progressive specialization of academic disciplines and synthetic research. In trans-disciplinary humanities, the progressive specialization of academic disciplines and synthetic research are not mutually exclusive to each other; rather, one must view them as mutually dependent on each other.

The progressive specialization of academic disciplines is a format of knowledge that promotes the development of academic inquiry and has been formed through the evolution of such formats of knowledge. The progression of specialization can be regarded as a creation of a new field of research that promises new discoveries and inventions, and thus, as an expansion in the scope of human intelligence. Conversely, this creates the problem of how one can summarize such vast accumulation of knowledge produced by these specializations into a whole. Here lies the need for synthetic research.

Meanwhile, synthetic research is predicated on the abundance of facts and knowledge in each individual realm. The specific challenge here is to devise a methodology to synthesize intelligence that has been acquired by the various specializations.

By the late 1920s, philosophical anthropology was already acutely aware of this

challenge. Philosophical anthropology attempted to synthesize new and distinct intelligence accumulated in each specialization including biology, medicine, sociology, psychology, and folkloristics (Scheler, 2012). The great challenge posed here was to newly define an integrated philosophy on humanity. In other words, philosophical anthropology aimed to rule over individual knowledge acquired by each specialization by correcting and expanding traditional definitions of humanity that existed to that point.

(2) A New Direction for Philosophical Anthropology

One person engaged with this challenge was Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945). He had put forward the concept of animal symbolicum as a new conception of humanity. This is taken as a new integrative philosophy that was reached by philosophical anthropology. This concept made the following claims on human existence. On the one hand, humanity is ruled by biological laws that rule life in general. On the other hand, humanity differs from other creatures in that they are not completely adapted to its own closed environment (Umwelt) (Uexküll, 2005), but can also create an artificial symbolic world in a completely separate dimension. Such creative leaps regarding human nature were the very conception of general humanity in Cassirer's theory (Cassirer, 1997).

According to this theory, individual cultures, whether existing or lost, are myriad variations constructed on the foundation of the creative capacity commonly held by humanity. Cassirer had defined humanity as an existence that manipulates symbols in an attempt to systematize the knowledge accumulated by individual specialized disciplines on humanity and culture. However, in actuality, philosophical anthropology that handles the commonality of human culture is not very influential in the world today because of growing suspicions about such commonality or universality in the latter half of the 20th century.

However, from the standpoint of the main of this paper, trans-disciplinary humanities, in other words, the synthesis of academic inquiry, there must be significance in a renewed examination of the attempts of philosophical anthropology as a model for synthetic research. Rather, presently, there is an increasing importance in the pursuit of an integral conception of humanity or a generalized humanity. One could state that there is a demand for a new humanism that posits a direction for the ideal state of humanity and society in contemporary society as it faces the issues of globalization and sustainability. From a certain perspective, the history of humanism can demonstrate the process of temporary self-emancipation of humanity (Shimomura, 1997). This history originates in the classical humanism of Ancient Greece and describes the human activities revolving around freedom considering a given set of human and social values. From this history, one can understand that humanity sought to create new values to supersede the restrictions and limitations of the existing values and move forward to realize an idealized self and build society. Here is another possibility for trans-disciplinary humanities as a new synthesis of knowledge.

Further Discussion

Lastly, we again reflect on the problem of civilizational dialogue and consider the situations under which dialogues between civilizations have meaning. If human existence and activity form cultures and civilizations, there will always be differences generated between civilizations from different regions that have differing natural environments and historical backgrounds. If these civilizations stand independently of each other, the concept of having a dialogue may not be established. Nonetheless, civilizations must make contact at some point in the contemporary world with progressive globalization. Thus, the need for mutual understanding emerges and civilizational dialogue becomes a necessity. This is because, on a global scale, the coexistence of values held by differing civilizations is crucial to constructing a sustainable world.

Meanwhile, there is another problem that exists today. This is the issue of science and technology that supports contemporary civilization. The rational scientific and technological civilization brought about by the scientific revolution of the 17th century has provided material abundance to human life. On the contrary, it is also certain that this civilization has obstructed the values historically nurtured and developed by humanity. This is another instance where the necessity for civilizational dialogue is apparent from a certain perspective.

In reality, we cannot unconditionally accept modern humanism that improved science (e.g. see Bacon (2003)). It is certainly easy to recognize the positive aspects of scientific development on the basis of modern humanism and the subsequent technological advancement that has removed the natural threats to humanity one by one. However, it is also a fact that the progress of science and technology has secondarily created new threats. Today, the greatest threat to humanity is no longer nature but humanity itself. The development of modern science is the driving force in preparing a unified world that is not a grouping of regional worlds. In this sense, the globalization progressing in the contemporary society has one great root in modern science and technology. With the significantly developed transportation and communication technologies, the physical characteristics of national borders are disappearing. However, we still face the new issues of the economic divide and retention of unique cultures.

Such contemporary issues make the task of creating a new ideal society challenging. In other words, there is a renewed inquiry into an integral conception about humanity. Without such a concept, we may not be able to organize the vast knowledge that continues to accumulate in the diversity of separate sciences—the experiential knowledge on humanity and cultural society—as an asset of humanity. Furthermore, this poses a difficulty in determining a directionality about how each region ought to be in the future, and, as an extension, how the human society ought to be globally. In considering such challenges, one can find the motivation and significance for the pursuit of trans-disciplinary humanities.

* We have already studied the characteristic of the Wasan (Hirano, 2000). We represent this study with some revision.

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Where civilizations meet: Borders of pleromatic textures

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Civilizations have no explicit form. Their borders cannot be specified on any map, nor are they marked by labels like “You are about to leave the X- sector”—as former border notices in Berlin warned the flaneurs. There are no national “sectors” in our minds—we operate with hyper-generalized notions such as civilization that are inherently appealing and give order to our general relating with the world. This order is the core of our lives as human beings.

In the minds of human beings the contrasts of civilizations are prominent, and inherent (Figure 1). Figure 1 illustrates how the clandestine clash of civilizations—that could become a dialogue if turned into one—clandestinely occurs in our opposite ways of relating with nature on the Orient and in the Occident. The flowers can be cut—severing their life in the natural world—to be put into the vase so that the “natural beauty” of the flowers can be enjoyed in human-made environments (Figure 1.B.). Or they can be preserved as part of the nature—in a garden (Figure 1.A.)—so that they stay with the nature and—as such—can be appreciated for their beauty by human beings.

Figure 1. Flowers in two kinds of presentations

A. Within nature



B. Taken out of nature



Interesting affective and cognitive “blind spots” occur—the makers of bouquets from cut flowers decidedly fail to think of their role as violators of the nature. They would most likely deeply unappreciated rhetorical labels such as “flower killer”. Yet the fate of the flowers in a

vase—soon to dry up and be thrown out—points in the direction of them being slow executioners of the nature.

The Occidental civilization takes its pride from breaking off from the nature. In contrast, the Occidental civilizations accept and cherish the interdependence with nature— even if carefully grooming it through cultural means, as the traditions of the Higashiyama culture indicate (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Civilization *through* nature (*Ginkakuji*, Kyoto)



The contrast is clear—but not exclusive. Nature has no straight lines—while human reconstruction of it often introduces precise linear order in the traditions of building houses, highways, and administrative power hierarchies. There are places where the human construction and nature are set up to meet. In Figure 2 we can observe the harmony of the transition from the nature of non-linearity through the border zone of curvilinearity into the linear order. The unity of linearity and non-linearity provides us with richness of patterns that organize our life-worlds.


Centrality of generalization in the human *psyche*

All human psychological functions lead to generalization of experience from a here-and-now setting (mandated axiomatically by the reality of irreversible time) to a there-and-then ill-determined possible settings in the future. These settings are necessarily impossible to predict since all future is unpredictable. The generalizations are *pre-jected* [Note 1] onto the possible future settings, and can instrumentally lead to the construction of some of these. By

generalizing we *move towards* making the future into present, but we do not determine it.


Generalization happens in two ways of sign construction in parallel—by schematization (Figure 3.A.) and by pleromatization (Figure 3.B.). Schematization is well known in the cognitive sciences as arrival at abstracted category of one or another kind. The category—often namable in everyday language terms (e.g. “justice”, “fairness”, “weather”) constitutes a point-like sign in the theory of semiotic dynamics. It is a constricted version of a field-like sign—which under specifiable circumstances can be de-constricted to become a field-like sign. As such, it transfers from a schematized to a pleromatized form of generalization—ending up with hyper-generalized sign fields. This form of generalization involves signs that are *more complex* in their structure than the original complexity of the phenomena. Through such increased complexity of presentation it is the totality (*Ganzheit*) of the phenomena that is abstracted and generalized—ready for providing the “atmospheric framing” for further experiences. All psychological phenomena that create affective context for relating with the world—“group atmospheres” of working groups, “political or moral sentiments” in a given community at a time, etc. – are all examples of such hyper-generalized pleromatic fields.

Figure 3— Two ways to generalization



The two processes feed into each other, arriving at generalization (Figure 4.). Such generalization entails the unity of the abstracted schematization (X) and its context (non-X). The latter is ever-present and is encoded as a field-like sign.

Figure 4. Emergence of generalization at the meeting points of schematization and pleromatization



In each mental process, both schematization and pleromatization processes are involved—yet with different dominance of each over the other. On the one extreme—in the domain of mathematical definitions—it is the schematization direction that dominates. In contrast—in everyday experiences it is the pleromatic direction—well fitted to capture the totality of experience—that dominates over the schematizing tendency. We here encounter phenomena that we recognize, affectively value—and yet their verbal labeling (schematization result) adds nothing to the experience (Figure 5)

Figure 5. Experiencing clouds: pleromatization in the lead




Any person can easily arrive at a recognition “these are clouds” in case of Figure 5, but that schematization does not add to the pleromatic experience. Furthermore—a cloud is an

ephemeral phenomenon in our distant perception. It exists in our distal perception. We observe its irregular forms that give us the pleromatic structure of our presentation of the “real cloud”. Yet that structure itself is not real—anybody flying through them in an airplane fails to share a similar perceptual experience. And—the wind blows the clouds away and leads to their change of form.

The phenomenon of clouds becomes meaningful through the pleromatization process that transcends the particular schema (“cloud”) to the hyper-generalized notion of “weather”. While the borders of cloud patterns can be pointed out, those of “weather” cannot. “Weather” has no boundaries—it is a totality (*Ganzheit*) without borders. As a hyper-generalized sign of field-like nature (as it is referenced through schematized imprecise word *weather*) that may become presentable in an abstracted form (Figure 6).

Figure 6. The map of “weather” with pleromatic and schematic features




Generalized pleromatic presentation of the schematized category “weather” takes the form of weather maps—produced since the 1860s. Figure 6 is an example of regular practice in presenting weather patterns by mapping 3-dimensional image onto the 2-dimensional map.

The third dimension of air pressure becomes marked by isobars of similar pressure readings that form zones in the field. The high (H) and low (L) pressure zones are schematically marked on the map. Yet these are not points but sub-fields of the whole that is demarcated by isobars. Figure 6 is an example of pleromatic generalization—the field of the original weather in any of the locality becomes presented by a map that is more comprehensive and abstract than the original.

The Pleromatic Texture


The weather map (Figure 6) is an example of pleromatic texture of the field-like sign. It is a *Ganzheit* that has conventionalized structure that allows us to make sense of the general weather patterns. It allows us to “capture the whole” together with the specification of current situation in any selected part of the map. Yet the structure of the weather patterns is constantly on the move—what seems a texture of the map can change in its form any moment. Such texture is the semiotic basis for any subjective meaning of “being in the World” as it covers the “feeling of” (and “feeling for”) the given moment in such encounters. *Civility* of human ways of being—and *civilizations* as these collectively grow on the basis of civility—are based on the pleromatic textures of the everyday moments of hyper-generalized *Einfühlung* (“feeling-in”). The pleromatic texture provides general orientation for the directions in the field (Figure 7)

Figure 7. Forms of tension in the field



In Figure 7 I present different versions of sub-structures of the pleromatic textures. These may be characterized by congruence in the field, by oppositions (B) and by divergence (C). A contextualized general picture is given in Figure 8.

Figure 8 Pleromatic textures in contact of two fields



In Figure 8 we can observe deep inter-penetration of the directions of movement within each field. In the dialogues of civilizations these can be represented by parts of each other within the fields of each other (red and blue arrows). At some junctions (X) the directional vectors within each field meet in a tension of direct opposite ways of how acting is expected (cf. Figure 1 above). At others, the dialogue between fields (civilizations) proceeds by way of tendencies from each other navigating among the “natives”. In our everyday life we encounter a number of such inserted directions within the other field (Figure 9)

Figure 9. Consoling entrance to a Cretan restaurant



The entrance scene of a Cretan restaurant for tourists reminds the latter that they will not be subjected to the normal Mediterranean cultural code of friendliness expressed by touching the bodies of others. For Northern European holiday makers such moment of movement in the Mediterranean cultural areas is of constant tension and irritation—hence the schematic marker of the border zone of the restaurant indicates the general atmosphere for human encounters in it. The restaurant becomes a “touch-free” zone—in analogy to “smoke-free” public areas.

Conclusions: Pleromatic textures in the dialogues of civilizations

In Japanese relations with the World, only the trained expert should be able to recognize the subtle beauty within art and architecture; the beauty of the object should not be underscored and emphasized, but gently hidden. The example from *Ginka-kuji* (Figure 2) reminds us of the subtlety of the ways in which civilizations capture the totality of human relationships with the nature, with others, and—with themselves.

In the cultural psychology of semiotic dynamics such subtlety of the total is captured by the notion of pleromatization. In this paper I have given form—texture—to pleromatic field-like signs. Such texture entails dynamic directions of varied orientations embedded in the field and setting the stage for transformations of the field itself, as well as for encounters with different fields. Discussions of meetings of civilizations are an example of such encounters.

Note

[1] In contrast to the notion of *projection*- widely used in psychoanalysis- the *prejection* entails future-focused positioning of a sign field in the indeterminate future—“there-and-when-ever”

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