

日本と韓国における戦略的投票

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Strategic Voting in Japan and South Korea

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Abstract

This study began with the question of whether the universal image that “Japan does not change” is indeed accurate. It sought to find the answer through strategic voting, and ultimately, it confirmed that patterns of change are also evident in Japan. Specifically, the study initially classified voters who chose a less favorable party than their preferred party as strategic voters and examined the distribution of these strategic voters. Contrary to typical stereotypes about Japan and South Korea, the study found that there is a higher incidence of strategic voting in Japan than in South Korea. However, South Korean strategic voting showed a distinct tendency to choose major political parties, while in Japan, strategic voting did not exhibit a consistent direction. While there is a quantitative prevalence of strategic voting in Japan, it is characterized by its dispersed nature. Furthermore, the analysis of the demographic characteristics and political consciousness of strategic voters revealed some differences between Japan and South Korea, but in both countries, strategic voting was shown to be driven by a desire to maximize the value of one’s vote and to reflect political consciousness.

Keywords: Change in Japan, Strategic Voting, 2017 the 48th House of Representatives Election, 2016 the 20th National Assembly Election, Japan, South Korea.

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I . Introduction

Japan and South Korea are often described as “close yet distant countries” in their relationship. While interpretations of this “close yet distant” relationship vary, it can imply both similarities and differences. One notable difference between Japan and South Korea is that Japan often has relatively stable characteristics, while South Korea is perceived as undergoing frequent changes. However, is the impression that Japan is relatively unchanging and South Korea frequently changes always accurate? Does Japan always remain the same and does South Korea always change in all social phenomena? This paper aims to explore these questions through strategic voting.

Strategic voting is generally defined as the voting behavior to choose a candidate or political party other than one’s most preferred choice when the winning prospects of the most preferred candidate or party are low (Cox 1997). The term “change” in this context refers to a change in consciousness or behavior. In this study, I will discuss “strategic voting” as a part of changing behavior, meaning the selection of a different candidate or party other than the most preferred one. From the perspective of strategic voting, the impression that Japan doesn’t change much, and South Korea changes frequently can be expressed as a hypothesis: “Japanese voters do not engage in strategic voting very often, while many South Korean voters do.” This study will examine whether this hypothesis holds.

Japan’s House of Representatives (HR) Election system and South Korea’s National Assembly member (NA) Election system share some similarities. Since 1996, both countries have used a mixed system of single-member districts (SMD) and proportional representation (PR) in their respective elections. Although there are some differences in the distribution of SMD seats and PR seats, both fundamentally employ a mixed system of SMD and PR. From the perspective of Duverger’s law (Duverger 1964), this suggests that similar results can be anticipated to some extent. However, Japan and South Korea generally maintain a one-party dominant system and a two-party system, respectively, and despite using similar mixed systems, differences in the political party systems resulting from election outcomes are apparent. There could be various explanations for this phenomenon, but this study aims to investigate the reasons behind these differences in Japan and South Korea based on the tendencies of strategic voting by their respective voters. When there are more strategic voters, there is a higher possibility that the votes of strategic voters who aim to enhance the

value of their votes will gather around a few political parties, making a two-party system more likely. On the other hand, when strategic voters are scarce, it is not as easy for votes to concentrate on specific candidates or parties, making the formation of a two-party system less likely.

This study will examine the tendencies of strategic voting in Japan and South Korea and investigate the impact of these tendencies on the political party systems. The focus of this study is the 48th HR Election in Japan held in 2017 and the 20th NA Election in South Korea held in 2016. Through these elections, I will analyze the characteristics of strategic voting in Japan and South Korea. This study aims to investigate the characteristics of strategic voting in both countries and examine whether the universal perception that Japan does not change much, and South Korea changes frequently is accurate.

Although this study compares Japan and South Korea, it reveals several limitations. First of all, considering several aspects, including the political system of Japan and South Korea, a complete comparison is not simple on a single criterion, such as election results. In particular, strategic voting is a very sensitive result to factors such as the number of candidates and the composition of parties or candidates and may vary from election to election and from district to district. As a result of the analysis, differences between the two countries are discussed, but in reality, it is not possible to completely match all conditions other than strategic voting, so various interpretations of the results can be made. Not only this study, but most comparative studies in the field of social science have similar limitations. Nevertheless, the purpose of this study is to enhance the understanding of both countries by revealing academic and social differences between Japan and South Korea.

In this study, I will first summarize the concept of strategic voting and its operational definition based on previous research. Then, using survey data for both elections, I will measure strategic voting based on the voters' preferences for each political party and investigate the distribution of strategic voters who vote according to their preferences and sincere voters who vote for their most preferred party. I will then assess the differences in inter-party favorability among strategic voters and analyze the content of strategic voting, specifically which party's votes shifted to which party. Finally, I will reveal the characteristics of strategic voters by examining the tendencies of strategic voting based on demographic attributes and political consciousness and discuss which voters are more likely to engage in strategic voting.

II . Related Works

1. The Concept and Impact of Strategic Voting

Most democratic nations today adopt a representative democracy system. In democratic systems, the method for determining representatives generally involves elections. Voters use various criteria to choose candidates or political parties. Voters tend to consider not only their own preferences but also calculate the potential success of candidates or parties and seek to maximize the impact of their vote on the election results. When voters calculate and make choices different from their most preferred candidate or party in favor of those who are likely to win, this voting behavior is referred to as “strategic voting” (Cox 1997). On the other hand, strategic voting can also be defined as a voting behavior where voters make alternative choices to prevent the least preferred option from winning when the optimal preference is uncertain (Stephenson 2018, 2).

In contrast to strategic voting, there is a voting behavior known as “sincere voting,” where voters choose their top candidate or party based on their preferences (Usami 2000). Strategic voting, on the other hand, has the potential to influence election results as it involves not only casting votes for strong candidates or parties but also having an effect on reducing the votes for weaker candidates or parties (Plescia 2018). Definitions of strategic voting may vary, but the common concept is that it involves making choices that are not sincere to one’s preferences. Moreover, this voting behavior is generally discussed within the framework of rational choice theory, implying that strategic voting presupposes an intent to achieve the desired outcome in the election (Blais et al. 2001). In other words, since it is a voting behavior aimed at maximizing one’s expected utility, it is sometimes referred to as “instrumental voting” (Aldrich et al. 2018).

Strategic voting has been observed in various elections in South Korea, including Presidential Elections, NA Elections, and local elections, as well as in Japan’s HR Elections and local elections (An 1996, Kawato 2002, Kyung 2002, Jhee 2008, Natori 2008, Han 2013). There has been significant interest in the relationship between the mixed electoral systems and strategic voting in South Korea’s NA Elections and Japan’s HR Elections, which have used a mixed system of SMD and PR since 1996. In Japan, it has been found that the introduction of the mixed electoral system led to a higher concentration of votes for the top two candidates due to strategic voting (Kawato 2002). Furthermore, in the case of South

Korea, where the two-party system is predominant, strategic voting tendencies have been observed primarily when a third strong candidate or party occasionally emerges. However, contrary to theoretical expectations, in many cases, the impact of strategic voting is not significant enough to change the election results (Kawato 2002, Kyung 2002, Han 2013).

2. Operational Definition of Strategic Voting

Strategic voting can be challenging to conceptualize a perfect measurement method for since it is highly influenced by the electoral environment. The way that strategic voting is measured can lead to varying results. One of the prominent methods for measuring strategic voting is based on Cox (1997), but it also comes with some limitations.

A relatively recent method proposed in Japan by Kawato (2002) involves subtracting a party's PR vote share from their district vote share for each rank of candidates (or parties) in SMD. This method measures the extent of strategic voting as the difference between these two vote shares. In other words, this approach assumes that choices in the PR part of the election are sincere voting, and any deviation from this choice is considered strategic voting. In practice, among all the candidates, the top 1-3 candidates consistently showed a positive value in the equation "SMD vote share - the party's PR vote share", thus enhancing the credibility of Kawato's manipulative concept. Particularly in the 42nd HR Election in 2000, when a candidate from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was in first place, the value was higher compared to when a candidate from the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was in the first place, indicating a tendency where the strength of strategic voting varied based on the candidate's likelihood of winning.

However, the operational definition presented raises several questions because the electoral environments in SMD and PR are different, and comparing them directly can be problematic. The number of candidates (or parties) running in each SMD varies, and so does the candidacy of candidates from different parties. This makes it challenging to make a direct comparison between SMD and PR.

Particularly, in the case of South Korea, where the two major conservative and progressive parties nominate candidates in most SMD and the entire PR, the situation is relatively balanced. Therefore, an approach like Kawato's (2002) operational definition can be a relatively explanatory method. DPJ which recorded the second-highest number of seats after LDP nominated a significant number of candidates in the 42nd HR Election in 2000¹⁾, but there was a difference of about 75 candidates in the total number of candidates. Additionally,

there is a gap of 29 candidates in SMD and 67 candidates in PR. These differences in the electoral environments on both sides highlight the limitations of applying the concept of strategic voting universally.

Kyung (2002) focused on the 1997 South Korean Presidential Election and conceptualized a unique method for discussing strategic voting. In this approach, voters were asked to rank their most preferred candidate as the 1st choice, their most disliked candidate as the 3rd choice, and all other candidates as the 2nd choice. Particularly, the discussion of strategic voting was centered around voters who supported the 3rd choice candidates and their choices for the 1st or the 2nd choice candidates. Kyung's operational definition was feasible for the South Korean Presidential Election because, in that context, the top two or three candidates garnered nearly 99% of the total votes. However, it may not be as applicable to environments like Japan's HR Election, where there are numerous parties, and the vote share for specific parties is not significantly higher²⁾. In this study, the focus is shifted away from the previous approach and toward discussing strategic voting based on the differences in candidate preferences.

III. Data and Research Method

1. Data

In this study, I discuss strategic voting in both Japan's 48th HR Election 2017 and South Korea's 20th NA Election 2016. Both elections occurred without significant events such as a change in government, as seen after the 46th HR Election in 2012, or due to impeachment (in the case of South Korea in 2017), like the 21st NA Election in 2020. Therefore, these elections are characterized by a relative absence of a strong bias toward any specific political party. Additionally, both elections took place under conservative administrations, resulting in relatively minor ideological differences between the centralized parties of both countries. Furthermore, while Japan has predominantly followed a single-party-dominant system, South Korea tends to a two-party system. However, during the 2016 NA Election, a relatively strong third party, the "People's Party (PP)," emerged, which led to voting dispersion among the opposition parties. From this perspective, there are some similarities in the party systems of Japan and South Korea. Considering these criteria, both elections provide a conducive environment for the discussion of strategic voting in Japan and South Korea.

For the 2017 HR Election, data from the "JESVI 1st Wave 2017 HR Election Pre-election

Internet Survey” was utilized. This dataset was collected through an internet survey conducted using a three-stage quota system based on location, gender, and age group targeting residents aged 18 and above from October 14 to 16, 2017, in preparation for the 48th HR Election held on October 22, 2017. A total of 3,000 participants were surveyed. As for the 2016 NA Election in South Korea, data was collected through face-to-face interviews with a total of 1,999 participants aged 19 and above. The interviews were conducted nationwide from April 14 to April 20, 2016, excluding Jeju Province, following the 20th NA Election held on April 13, 2016. The survey used a stratified sampling method.

Both Japan’s HR Election and South Korea’s NA Election employ a mixed-member electoral system, which includes both an SMD system and a PR system. In the case of Japan’s HR Election, there are 289 SMD representatives and 176 PR representatives (for a total of 465 representatives, based on the 48th HR Election criteria). In South Korea’s NA Election, 253 representatives are elected from SMD, and an additional 47 representatives are chosen through PR (for a total of 300 representatives, based on the 20th NA Election criteria). While there is a difference in the ratio of SMD representatives to PR representatives between the two countries (62.15% vs. 37.85% in Japan and 84.33% vs. 15.67% in South Korea), both systems tend to favor a two-party system. However, it’s worth noting that Japan has maintained a one-party dominant system, while South Korea has typically sustained a two-party system, with occasional appearances of a strong third party that can influence multi-party dynamics.

Table 1: 2017 48th HR Election in Japan

Party	LDP	CDP	PH	Komeito	JCP	Nippon Ishin	SDP	Total
Vote Percentage	47.82%	8.53%	20.64%	1.50%	9.02%	3.18%	1.15%	91.84%
Number of Seats	215	17	18	8	1	3	1	263
Seat Percentage	74.39%	5.88%	6.23%	2.77%	0.35%	1.04%	0.35%	91.00%
Deviation Rate	26.58%	-2.65%	-14.41%	1.27%	-8.67%	-2.15%	-0.80%	

Source: Created by the author using Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (総務省) materials

Table 2: 2016 20th NA Election in South Korea

Party	Saenuri Party	DPK	People's Party(PP)	Justice Party(JP)	Total
Vote Percentage	38.33%	37.00%	14.85%	1.69%	91.88%
Number of Seats	105	110	25	2	242
Seat Percentage	41.50%	43.48%	9.88%	0.79%	95.65%
Deviation Rate	3.17	6.48	-4.97	-0.9	

Source: Created by the author using materials from the National Election Commission of South Korea

Tables 1 and 2 summarize the actual vote share, number of seats, seat share, and deviation ratio of political parties that received more than 1% of the vote in the SMD in the 48th HR Election and the 20th NA Election. In Japan, there is a clear trend toward one-party dominance, with the LDP at the forefront, even in the 48th HR Election. On the other hand, South Korea generally exhibits a two-party system, but in the 20th NA Election, the third-largest party, the “People’s Party (PP),” which secured approximately 10% of the seats, emerged, indicating a tendency toward a multi-party system.³⁾

The deviation ratio, calculated as the difference between seat share and vote share, favors major parties in both Japan and South Korea. However, the deviation ratio for the LDP, which maintains a dominant position in Japan, is exceptionally high. Despite both countries using a mixed electoral system that combines SMD and PR, and despite having a higher number of seats allocated to SMD than PR, neither country prominently displays a clear two-party system. This discrepancy, where Duverger’s law doesn’t seem to apply, can be explained by various factors such as social cleavages. In this study, I aim to investigate the reasons for this phenomenon from the perspective of strategic voting.

2. Research Method

Strategic voting refers to the voting behavior in which voters prioritize the likelihood of winning over their preference to maximize the impact of their vote. However, the criteria for judging the likelihood of victory are subjective, and the criteria for strategic voting may not necessarily be universally agreeable to all voters. It’s worth noting that while survey data often include questions related to candidate or party favorability, disfavor, and support, they typically do not directly ask which candidate or party a voter thinks is likely to win. In cases where a voter’s choice of a candidate or party differs from the one they believe is likely to win, it could potentially challenge the fundamental assumption of rational choice theory among voters in voting behavior research.

As a result, there are various methods to measure strategic voting (Jhee 2008). For example, as I mentioned above, in a study analyzing strategic voting in the 15th Presidential Election in South Korea, the researcher used questions that asked respondents about their most favorite and least favorite candidates. She assigned the most and least favorite candidates as the 1st and 3rd choices, respectively, and considered candidates who were not mentioned for both as the 2nd choice. This approach is viable in cases like South Korea’s Presidential Elections, where typically two or three candidates receive nearly 99% of the

votes (Kyung 2002). However, such measurement methods may not be as feasible in the context of Japanese HR Elections, where, as shown in Table 1, voters recognize more than four political parties or candidates. In such cases, determining the preference for each candidate or party using existing survey data items may not be straightforward.

In this study, I measure strategic voting using questions about the degree of favorability and disfavor towards various political parties in both Japan and South Korea. In the Japanese survey data, respondents were asked to rate their level of favorability or disfavor toward political parties on a scale between 50 and 100 for favorable feelings and between 0 and 50 for disfavor feelings. The political parties included in the survey were the LDP, Party of Hope (PH), Komeito, Nippon Ishin no Kai, the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP).⁴⁾ Similarly, in the South Korean survey data, respondents were asked about their feelings towards the Saenuri Party, the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), the People's Party, and the Justice Party. They were instructed to choose a number between 0 (strongly dislike) and 10 (strongly like) to express their sentiments.⁵⁾

The analysis will begin by calculating the proportion of strategic voters in both Japan and South Korea. This involves identifying voters who have a favorite party but voted for another party due to strategic reasons. For instance, if a voter prefers Party A but votes for Party B, the difference in favorability ratings between Party A and all other parties will be examined. If the ratings for any of the parties (Party B or others) are lower (negative) than Party A, the voter will be classified as a strategic voter. This same approach will be applied in both Japan and South Korea to determine the proportion of strategic voters.

Following this, the study will calculate the difference in favorability ratings for each strategic voter group and examine whether certain groups tend to strategically vote for specific parties. Demographic characteristics such as gender, age, education, and household income, as well as political variables like ideology, political interest, political satisfaction, political efficacy, and political alienation, will be considered in the analysis.

IV. Empirical Analysis

1. The Distribution of Strategic Voting

The data from Japan were collected before the election, and they included both voters who participated in early voting and those who had not yet voted in the main election. Among the total of 3,000 respondents, there were 141 early voters and 1,130 respondents who had

decided on the political party they would vote for, resulting in a total of 1,271 respondents. Excluding 100 respondents who chose political parties or independents without a favorability rating, a total of 1,162 voters were analyzed to distinguish between strategic voters and sincere voters. The results are presented in Table 3.

Table 3: Strategic Voters and Sincere Voters in the 48th HR Election ⁶⁾

	LDP		CDP		PH		Komeito		JCP		Nihon Ishin		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	人	%
Strategic Voters	70	11.5	15	12.0	82	36.1	15	38.5	26	26.3	15	23.8	223	19.2
Sincere Voters	539	88.5	110	88.0	145	63.9	24	61.5	73	73.7	48	76.2	939	80.8
Total	609	100.0	125	100.0	227	100.0	39	100.0	99	100.0	63	100.0	1,162	100.0

Table 4: Strategic Voters and Sincere Voters in the 20th NA Election ⁷⁾

	Saenuri Party		DPK		People's Party		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Strategic Voters	32	10.1	58	21.9	10	9.6	100	14.6
Sincere Voters	285	89.9	207	78.1	94	90.4	586	85.4
Total	317	100.0	265	100.0	104	100.0	686	100.0

In the case of South Korea, the post-election survey resulted in 720 eligible voters for analysis. After excluding Justice Party voters (5 people) ⁸⁾, voters of other parties (2 people), and independent voters (27 people), a total of 686 voters were considered. The distribution of strategic voters and sincere voters among these 686 voters is shown in Table 4.

First, contrary to the initial expectation that South Korean voters would engage in more strategic voting than Japanese voters, the results differ from this assumption. In the case of Japan, approximately 19% of voters engaged in strategic voting, while in South Korea, about 15% of voters resorted to strategic voting. While it is challenging to generalize these results without verifying statistical significance, the comparison between the 48th HR Election and the 20th NA Election shows that Japanese voters are more likely to engage in strategic voting than South Korean voters. The total results are averaged figures. When breaking down the numbers by political party, it becomes evident that Japanese voters exhibit a greater tendency toward strategic voting. Approximately 39% of Komeito voters and about 36% of PH voters engage in strategic voting. While voters for the JCP and Nihon Ishin are slightly lower than Komeito and PH, each having around 26% and 24% strategic voters, they still surpass the highest percentage of strategic voters in South Korea, which is approximately 22% for the DPK.

The percentage of strategic voters in Japan's ruling LDP and South Korea's Saenuri Party,

the parties that secured the most seats in the previous elections⁹⁾, is not significantly higher compared to other political parties. The tendency for strategic voting in Japan's PH and South Korea's DPK, which exhibited relatively strong competitiveness compared to the previous ruling parties, appears relatively high. However, it's important to note that South Korea's DPK managed to defeat the previous ruling Saenuri Party and become the top party in the 20th NA Election. In contrast, Japan's PH had a high percentage of strategic voters, even though it received significantly more votes than the CDP (as shown in Table 1) and secured only one more seat than the latter in the single-member constituencies. This highlights a key difference between Japan and South Korea in terms of their electoral systems and political dynamics.

While many voters, in general, tend to cast sincere rather than strategic votes, it's conceivable that the impact of strategic voting could vary based on the political party system rather than the other way around. Investigating this aspect in more detail will be a task for future research. In the following section, I will analyze the total favorability ratings for each political party and examine the relationships between parties expressed as strategic voting.

2. Difference in Party Favorability

Table 5 presents the average difference in party favorability among strategic voters for each political party. For example, with the LDP voters, I calculate the difference between their favorability for the LDP and their favorability for other parties. If a negative result (-) is obtained, they are classified as LDP strategic voters. I then sum the differences for each LDP strategic voter and divide it by the number of LDP strategic voters (as shown in Table 3). The resulting values in Table 5 represent the average differences for LDP strategic voters. The data for Japan uses a range of 0 to 100, while the data for South Korea is measured on a scale of 0 to 10. Generally, the values on the Japanese side tend to be higher.

Table 5: Differences in Party Favorability (Average)

Japan:										
LDP Strategic Voters	LDP-PH	LDP-Komeito	LDP-Ishin	LDP-CDP	LDP-JCP	7.7	-0.7	-0.1	16.3	27.0
CDP Strategic Voters	CDP-LDP	CDP-PH	CDP-Komeito	CDP-Ishin	CDP-JCP	9.7	3.1	21.3	4.7	-2.0
PH Strategic Voters	PH-LDP	PH-Komeito	PH-Ishin	PH-CDP	PH-JCP	10.9	15.0	7.3	-14.4	0.5
Komeito Strategic Voters	Komeito-LDP	Komeito-PH	Komeito-Ishin	Komeito-CDP,	Komeito-JCP	-9.7	13.6	4.2	18.0	28.7
JCP Strategic Voter	JCP-LDP	JCP-PH	JCP-Komeito	JCP-Ishin	JCP-CDP	32.8	25.5	36.0	36.5	-18.7
Ishin Strategic Voters	Ishin-LDP	Ishin-PH	Ishin-Komeito,	Ishin-CDP	Ishin-JCP	-4.1	-4.3	9.5	3.3	10.1
Korea										
Saenuri Strategic Voters	Saenuri-DPK	Saenuri-PP	Saenuri-Justice			-2.1	-2.1	-0.6		
DPK Strategic Voters	DPK-Saenuri	DPK-PP	DPK-Justice			0.2	-1.4	-1.4		
PP Strategic Voters	PP-Saenuri	PP-DPK	PP-Justice			2.2	-0.8	0.6		

Positive (+) results indicate that voters have a higher favorability towards the party they voted for compared to other parties. This suggests that they are more likely to cast a sincere vote according to their favorability, and they exhibit a relatively weaker tendency for strategic voting. On the other hand, negative (-) results indicate that despite having higher favorability towards another party, they chose to vote for a different party, indicating a tendency for strategic voting. In particular, the magnitude of this numerical value (absolute value) is indicative of the strength of the tendency for strategic voting.

As Table 5 shows, it is evident that in South Korea, there is a significant tendency for strategic voting to favor the major parties. On the other hand, in Japan, while strategic voting is common, it appears to cross between opposition parties rather than predominantly favoring a single major party. In South Korea, the percentage of voters among the ruling Saenuri Party who engaged in strategic voting is not high (as shown in Table 3). However, within the relatively smaller group of strategic voters, there is a notable pattern where voters who prefer the opposition parties such as the DPK, PP, and Justice Party cast their votes for the Saenuri Party. Among the strategic voters for the DPK, there is a tendency to engage in strategic voting for smaller parties like the PP and the Justice Party. In the case of the PP, while there are some instances of strategic voting from Saenuri Party or DPK supporters, it is relatively weaker in intensity compared to the stronger tendency towards sincere voting.

In Japan, there doesn't appear to be a consistent pattern of strategic voting between major parties and smaller parties. Instead, the tendencies of strategic voting among strategic voters seem to move based on specific party-to-party transfers, rather than being significantly influenced by factors like party size. Among the voters who voted for PH (as shown in Table 3, 82 voters), there is a tendency for voters who prefer the CDP to engage in strategic voting. In the case of CDP strategic voters, they are more likely to come from voters who like the JCP. JCP strategic voters are more likely to come from voters who like the CDP. For voters of Nippon Ishin, their strategic voting tendency appears to come from those who prefer the LDP and PH. Japan exhibits a relatively higher frequency of strategic voting, but the diversity of strategic voting spread across various parties suggests that the effective number of parties may not decrease significantly.

3. The Characteristics of Strategic Voters

In both Japan and South Korea, while there are different trends in strategic voting, the presence of strategic voters has been confirmed. Now, I will investigate the attributes and

political attitudes of strategic voters in both countries.

The characteristics of strategic voters in Japan and South Korea will be analyzed primarily focusing on demographic attributes and political consciousness. For demographic attributes, variables such as gender, age, education, and household income will be used in both countries. Regarding political consciousness variables, ideology, political interest, political satisfaction, political efficacy, and political alienation will be utilized. Additionally, in South Korea, there has been a longstanding trend of high support for specific parties in certain regions, which is referred to as “regionalism voting.” Many studies on voting behavior in South Korea include residential areas as a demographic attribute (Kyung 2019). In this study, the variable of the residential area in South Korea will also be included. Table 6 presents the results of the logistic regression analysis, which examines the characteristics of strategic voters in Japan and South Korea based on demographic attributes and political consciousness.

Table 6: The Characteristics of Strategic Voters^{10, 11)}

	Japan		Korea	
	Odds Ratio	Std. Err	Odds Ratio	Std. Err
Gender	0.749†	1.123	0.619*	0.150
Age	1.007	0.006	0.991	0.010
Education	1.062	0.098	0.947	0.130
Household Income	1.010	0.028	1.083	0.177
Years of Residence	1.117	0.092	0.996	0.009
Capital Region			0.387**	0.132
Jeonla Region			0.091**	0.071
Gyeongsang Region			0.950	0.351
Chungcheong Region			1.003	0.430
Ideology	0.926*	0.032	0.862*	0.053
Political Interest	1.144	0.133	1.012	0.168
Political Satisfaction	1.358***	0.103	1.426†	0.270
Political Efficacy	0.86*	0.056	1.371**	0.197
Political Alienation	1.010	0.084	0.743†	0.121
Constant	0.872	0.065	0.852	1.040
	N=1,162		N=678	
	LR $\chi^2(10)=48.02$		LR $\chi^2(10)=59.26$	
	Prob> $\chi^2=0.0000$		Prob> $\chi^2=0.0000$	
	Pseudo $R^2=0.0423$		Pseudo $R^2=0.1045$	

† $p<0.1$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

In terms of demographic attributes, both in Japan and South Korea, men tend to have a higher tendency for strategic voting compared to women. In South Korea, there is a unique social phenomenon known as “regionalism,” which shows the strong support for specific political parties in particular regions, and this regionalism has had a significant impact on most election results. For quantitative analysis of voting behavior in South Korea, it is common to include variables that represent regionalism. In this study, I have included variables for regionalism in South Korea, such as “Residing in the Capital Region (Capital Region),” “Residing in Jeonla Region (Jeonla Region),” “Residing in Gyeongsang Region (Gyeongsang Region),” and “Residing in Chungcheong Region (Chungcheong Region).” Voters residing in the Capital Region and the Jeonla Region tend to exhibit a weaker inclination towards strategic voting compared to voters residing in other regions. It is evident that regionalism also influences strategic voting behavior in South Korea.

From an ideological perspective, it appears that more innovative voters tend to engage in strategic voting than conservative voters. This is linked to a political consciousness aimed at changing politics. Additionally, in both Japan and South Korea, political interest is not strongly related to strategic voting, but political satisfaction impacts both. The less satisfied individuals are with politics, the higher the probability of engaging in strategic voting.

An interesting point to note is the influence of political efficacy on strategic voting, which differs between Japan and South Korea. Firstly, political efficacy is significant in both Japan and South Korea, but there are differences in the trends. In Japan, there is a higher probability of engaging in strategic voting as political efficacy is low, specifically, as individuals feel they have less influence on the government’s actions. In contrast, in South Korea, there is a higher tendency to engage in strategic voting as political efficacy is high, meaning that individuals with a higher sense of political efficacy are more likely to engage in strategic voting.

The analysis results suggest that the tendency for strategic voting reflects political consciousness. It’s not just about preventing wasted votes for Japanese and South Korean strategic voters, but it also sends a significant message to society that they are using strategic voting to aim for political and societal change. The relationship between political consciousness, such as political efficacy, and strategic voting among Japanese voters requires further detailed analysis and should be an area of focus in future research. This underlines the importance of understanding the motivations and implications of strategic voting in these contexts.

V. Conclusion

This study began with the question of whether the commonly held belief that Japan does not change much while South Korea frequently changes is always accurate. It used strategic voting to verify the answer to this question, and as a result, it confirmed that change is also occurring in Japan. In detail, the study first utilizes the difference in party favorability to classify voters into strategic voters, those who vote for a party they like less than the party they prefer. Then, it examines the distribution of these voters. Contrary to stereotypes about Japan and South Korea, the study reveals a higher proportion of strategic voting in Japan compared to South Korea.

However, South Korean strategic voting exhibits a noticeable tendency to choose major political parties. In contrast, in Japan, strategic voting does not seem to have a consistent direction or target. While strategic voting is relatively common in Japan, it is dispersed rather than converging toward a specific goal. This dispersion of strategic voting in Japan may result in a low opposition party seat share, potentially gaining significantly fewer seats than their actual vote share would suggest.

Also, this study examines the demographic attributes and political consciousness of voters who engage in strategic voting. While there are some differences between Japan and South Korea, both countries' strategic voting may reflect political consciousness aimed at not only maximizing the value of one's vote but also achieving political change.

In conclusion, the hypothesis tested in this study, which suggested that "Japanese voters do not engage in strategic voting very often, while many South Korean voters do." was not confirmed. The voting behavior of Japanese voters, as observed through strategic voting, is not in line with the universal image. It reveals that even in Japan, where there seems to be a perception of not much change, there is a considerable number of voters who, considering their chances of winning, do not vote according to their preferences. In other words, there is diversity in the changes taking place within Japan, which may not be immediately apparent on the surface.

This study is significant in its aim to enhance the understanding of Japan from a more multifaceted perspective and in its examination of whether Japan is indeed unchanging, based on the criteria of strategic voting. Furthermore, it is noteworthy for introducing a new and different operational definition of strategic voting. The unexpected strategic voting

behavior of Japanese voters suggests the need for continued and thorough observation in the future.

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APPENDIX

Demographic Attributes:

- Gender : 1 Male, 2 Female (Common for Japan and South Korea)
- Age : Full years (Common for Japan and South Korea)
- Education:

Japan - 1 New Elementary School / Old Elementary / Old Junior High, 2 New High School / Old Junior High, 3 Technical College / Junior College / Old Elementary / Old Junior High, 4

University / Graduate School / Professional School

South Korea - 1 Less than middle school graduate, 2 Less than high school graduate, 3 Less than college graduate, 4 4-year university or higher

- Household Income:

Japan (Annual) - 1 Less than 2 million yen, 2 2-3 million yen, 3 3-4 million yen, 4 4-5 million yen, 5 5-6 million yen, 6 6-7 million yen, 7 7-8 million yen, 8 8-10 million yen, 9 10-12 million yen, 10 12-14 million yen, 11 More than 14 million yen

South Korea (Monthly) - 1 Less than 1 million won, 2 1-1.99 million won, 3 2-2.99 million won, 4 3-3.99 million won, 5 4-4.99 million won, 6 5-5.99 million won, 7 6-6.99 million won, 8 More than 7 million won

Political Consciousness:

- Ideology : Rate your own ideology from 0 (Progressive) to 10 (Conservative) (Common for Japan and South Korea, with the additional choices of “Don’t know” and “Have not heard of” in South Korea, cases where both of these options are chosen were treated as missing data).

- Political Interest:

In response to the question, “Regardless of whether there is an election or not, some people are always interested in politics, while others are not very interested. How much attention do you pay to political events? Which of the following best describes you?” in Japan:

1 Quite interested, 2. Somewhat interested, 3 Not very interested, 4 Not interested at all

“How interested were you in this election?” in South Korea,

1 Quite interested, 2. Somewhat interested, 3 Not very interested, 4 Not interested at all

- Political Satisfaction:

In response to the question, “How satisfied are you with current politics?” in Japan,

1 Quite satisfied, 2 Somewhat satisfied, 3 Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, 4 Somewhat dissatisfied, 5 Quite dissatisfied

“How satisfied are you with our country’s democracy overall” in South Korea,

1 Quite satisfied, 2 Somewhat satisfied, 3 Not very satisfied, 4 Not satisfied at all

- Political Efficacy:

“I believe that I have no influence on what the government does”(Japan) / “People like me have a hard time influencing what the government does” (South Korea) with options ranging from 1 (Strongly agree) to 5 (Strongly disagree).

- Political Alienation:

“Politicians don’t care about people like us” (Japan) / “Politicians and public servants don’t care about what people like me think” (South Korea) with options ranging from 1 (Strongly agree) to 5 (Strongly disagree).

註)

- 1) In the 42nd HR Election in 2000, the number of candidates was as follows: LDP 337 candidates (271 in SMD, 326 in PR), Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 332 candidates (300 in SMD, 224 in PR), DPJ 262 candidates (242 in SMD, 259 in PR). The difference in the total number of candidates is because many candidates ran in both SMD and PR, leading to an overlap in candidate numbers between the two systems. This discrepancy is why the total number of candidates does not match the sum of the candidates in SMD and PR.
- 2) It is common to perceive that the LDP in Japan often secures a majority of seats, and therefore, its vote share is generally perceived to be similar to its seat share. However, there can be variations between elections, but in many cases, the LDP's vote share typically hovers around the 30-40% range of the total voters, depending on the specific election.
- 3) Even when combining the results of the PR, the overall trend in the political party system doesn't change significantly.
- 4) The data from JESVI the 1st Wave includes question Q5.
- 5) In the South Korean data, there are response options for "don't know" and "never heard of" regarding political parties. Cases where both of these options are selected have been treated as missing data and processed accordingly.
- 6) The voters who selected parties other than the main parties and independents were excluded. The remaining 6 major parties had 1,162 respondents.
- 7) In the Korean survey, there are options for "Don't know (98)" and "Never heard of (96)." When a respondent selects "Don't know" or "Never heard of," the analysis considers the difference between these options and other parties' differences to determine strategic voting vs. sincere voting.
- 8) Since there are only 5 cases for the favorability rating of the Justice Party, these cases are excluded from the analysis.
- 9) Japan's 47th HR Election in 2014 and South Korea's 19th NA Election in 2012.
- 10) Information regarding the scale of each variable is referred to the APPENDIX.
- 11) Dependent Variable: 1 for Strategic Voter, 0 for Sincere Voter